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- ii -EXECUTIVE  SUMMARY 
U.S.  GOVERNMENT  SUPPORT  OF  THE 
U.S.  COMMERCIAL  AIRCRAFT  INDUSTRY 
The  United  States  government  provides  massive,  systematic  support  to 
the  U.S.  commercial  aircraft  industry  pursuant  to  a  long-standing  U.S.  policy 
of  striving  to  maintain  U.S.  superiority  in all areas  of  aeronautics 
technology.  The  total  amount  of  this  support  cannot  be  quantified  precisely 
because  it  is  indirect  and  because  there  is  a  striking  lack  of  transparency 
concerning  many  of  its basic  features.  Nonetheless,  one  can  reasonably 
estimate  that  U.S.  government  support  to  the  U.S.  commercial  aircraft 
industry  during  the  past  fifteen  years  was  in  the  range  of  $18  billion  to 
$22.05  billion. 1  If  current  dollar  rather  than  historical  dollar  figures  are 
used  for  the  quantification of  the  benefits  of  Department  of  Defense  and 
National  Aeronautics  and  Space  Administration  (NASA)  research  and 
development,  the  estimated  range  of  total  benefits  is  $33.48  billion to 
$41.49  billion. 
The  U.S.  government  supports  the  U.S.  commercial  aircraft  industry 
through  three  principal  means:  (1)  U.S.  Department  of  Defense  research  and 
development  (R&D);  (2)  NASA  R&D;  and  (3)  the  U.S.  tax  system. 
1.  U.S.  Department  of  Defense  R&D 
The  strategic  importance  of  aeronautics  has  led  the  U.S.  D~partment of 
Defense  to  devote  enormous  resources  to military aeronautics  R&D  in  the  post-
World  War  II  period.  Given  that  the  major  companies  in  the  U.S.  commercial 
aircraft  industry are  deeply  involved  in military aeronautics  development  and 
production  and  that  military and  commercial  aeronautics  technology  often 
overlap,  these  companies  derive  very  substantial crossover  commercial 
benefits  from  their  participation  in military R&D.  For  example,  examination 
of  each  of  the  "quantum  leaps"  achieved  in  commercial  aeronautics 
technology -- the  Boeing  707,  the  wide-body  jets and  now  the  development  of  a 
supersonic civil  transport  plane -- reveals  that  substantial  U.S.  government 
involvement  in  the  period prior  to each  breakthrough  provided  support 
essential  to achieving  the  commercial  innovation. 
In  the  past  fifteen years,  the  U.S.  Department  of  Defense  has  spent 
approximately  $50  billion on  aeronautics  R&D  grants,  with at  least  $6.34 
billion of  those  funds  going  to  the  two  principal  U.S.  producers  of  large 
commercial  aircraft,  Boeing  and  McDonnell  Douglas,  for  aircraft-related  R&D. 
Further,  based  on  analyses  of  the applicability of  military aeronautics 
technology  to  commercial  uses,  we  estimate  that_ the  $50  billion of  military 
aeronautics  R&D  constituted  a  benefit  of  between  $5.9  billion and 
1  These  figures  and  all  following  dollar  figures  are  based  on actual,  not 
constant,  dollars,  with  the  exception of  several  figures  expressed  for 
illustrative purposes  in  current dollars  and  explicitly described  as  such. - 2  -
$9.7  billion to  the  commercial  aircraft  industry,  taken  as  a  whole. 
Expressed  in  current  dollars,  taking  account  of  opportunity costs  and 
compound  interest accumulation,  the  commercial  benefits  of  DoD  R&D  were 
between  $12.42  billion and  $20.18  billion.2 
Although  the  Department  of  Defense  attempts  to  recoup  some  of  the 
commercial  benefits private  companies  derive  from  participating  in military 
R&D,  between  1976  and  1990  the  Department  of  Defense  recouped  only  about  $170 
million  from  private  companies  engaged  in  aeronautics  R&D,  a  tiny  percentage 
of  the  total benefits  these  companies  actually  received. 
In  addition  to  the  direct  Defense  Department  R&D  grants  to  private 
companies,  the  U.S.  government  also  reimburses  private  companies  for  R&D 
projects  they  undertake  on  their  own  that  may  have  military  relevance.  The 
commercial  utility of  such  independent  research  and  development  efforts 
(IR&D)  is  even  higher  than  in  government-initiated  R&D,  because  the  companies 
choose  the  research areas  themselves,  and  they  are  very  conscious  of  the 
value  they  receive  from  dual  use  technologies.  Since  1976,  U.S.  companies 
have  received  approximately  $5  billion of  reimbursements  from  the  government 
for  aeronautics  !R&D,  constituting  a  probable  benefit  to  the  commercial 
aircraft  industry of  between  $1  billion and  $1.25  billion. 
2.  NASA  R&D 
NASA  R&D  provides  a  second  major  form  of U.S.  government  support  for 
the  U.S.  commercial  aircraft  industry.  One  of  NASA's  principal  goals  is  to 
promote  U.S.  technological  superiority  in  aeronautics.  To  that  end,  NASA 
sponsors  large  amounts  of  civil aeronautics  R&D,  as  well  as  some  military 
aeronautics  R&D.  In  the  past  fifteen  years,  NASA  devoted  $8.9  billion  to 
civil  and  military  aeronautics  R&D.  This  R&D  has  consisted of  large-scale 
projects,  such  as  the  Aircraft  Energy  Efficient  Program  and  work  developing 
the  supercritical  wing,  as  well  as  numerous  smaller-scale projects  aimed  at 
encouraging  specific  technological  developments  in aeronautics. 
Given  that  one  of  NASA's  primary objectives  is  to  support 
technological  developments  in  U.S.  commercial  aeronautics  and  that  NASA's 
military  and  civilian R&D  goals  are  closely  interrelated,  it can  be 
reasonably  estimated  that  90  percent  of  NASA's  R&D  expenditures  constitute  a 
benefit  to  the  U.S.  commercial  aircraft  industry.  Thus,  the  $8.9  billion of 
NASA  R&D  in  the  past  fifteen  years  translates  into  a  benefit  of  $8  billion  to 
the u.s.  commercial  aircraft  industry.  Expressed  in  current  dollars,  the 
commercial  benefit  of  NASA  R&D  in  the  past  fifteen  years  is  $16.96  billion. 
3.  U.S.  Tax  System 
The  U.S.  tax  system also  benefits  the  U.S.  commercial  aircraft 
industry.  The  "completed  contract  method"  for  determining  when  contract 
2  See  note  10,  infra,  for  an  explanation of  the  methodology  of  this 
actualization calculation. - 3  -
income  is  subject  to  tax  has  allowed  U.S.  aircraft  manufacturers  to  reduce 
taxes  by  deferring  substantial  amounts  of  income.  Use  of  domestic 
international sales corporations  (DISCs)  and  foreign  sales  corporations 
(FSCs)  also has  permitted  substantial deferrals.  From  1976  to  1990,  these 
various  deferrals and  exemptions  provided  benefits  of  approximately  $1.7 
billion to  Boeing  and  $1.4  billion  to  McDonnell  Douglas. 
Taken  together,  the  three major  quantifiable areas  of  support  to  the 
U.S.  commercial  aircraft  industry  provided  an  estimated  $18  billion  to 
$22.05  billion  of  benefits  from  1976  to  1990,  or  $33.48  billion  to 
$41.49  billion  if  current  dollar  figures  are  used  to quantify  the  benefits  of 
Department  of  Defense  and  NASA  R&D.  The  total  benefits  to  the  industry  from 
U.S.  government  support  likely  exceeded  these  amounts,  however,  because  the 
u.s.  government  provides  several  other  important  forms  of  support  that  are 
exceedingly difficult  to quantify.  U.S.  aircraft manufacturers'  use  of 
government  test  facilities  at  reduced  rates  and  the  special  purchase  in  1982 
of  McDonnell  Douglas  KC-lOs  by  the  U.S.  government  are  just  two  examples  of 
such  other  forms  of  support. 
In  sum,  although  a  lack  of  transparency  in  the  multifaceted 
interactions  between  the  U.S.  government  and  the  U.S.  commercial  aircraft 
industry  makes  any  exact quantification of  overall  industry  benefits 
impossible,  it  is clear  that  u.s.  government  support  of  the  U.S.  commercial 
aircraft  industry  has  been  a  pervasive  element  of  U.S.  government  policy over 
the  last  two  decades.  Objective observers  agree  that  U.S.  government  support 
has  played  a  critical  role  in assuring  the  key  technological  advances  made  by 
the  U.S.  industry  and  thus,  in  assuring  the  competitive  position  the  U.S. 
commercial  aircraft  industry enjoys  today  in  markets  throughout  the  world. - 4  -
I.  RESEARCH  AND  DEVELOPMENT:  DEPARTMENT  OF  DEFENSE 
A.  Direct  Department  of  Defense  (DoD)  Funding 
of  Research  and  Development 
The  desire  to  maintain  preeminence  in  military aeronautics  is  at  the 
core  of  the  U.S.  government's  overall  commitment  to  U.S.  aeronautics.  A 
consistently  high  level of  investment  in  aeronautics  research  and  development 
(R&D)  has  been  a  key  element  of  the  U.S.  military's  aeronautics  strategy 
since  World  War  II.  In  the  past  fifteen  years,  military spending  on 
aeronautics  R&D  has  grown  steadily  from  $1.9  billion  in  1976  to  ~pproximately 
$5  billion  in  1990,  for  a  fifteen-year  (1976-1990)  total of  approximately 
SSO  billion  (see  Exhibit  1). 
This  $50  billion of  government  funds  has  benefited  companies  involved 
in  every area  of  aeronautics  technology.  Given  that  most,  if  not  all,  of  the 
companies  involved  in  the  manufacture  of  large  commercial  aircraft  and  their 
major  subcomponents  are also  involved  in military aeronautics,  significant 
quantities  of  this military  R&D  funding  has  flowed  to  companies  in  the  U.S. 
commercial  aircraft  industry.  According  to  information  drawn  from  official 
compilations  of  U.S.  government  R&D  contracts,  for  example,  Boeing  received 
at  least $5.8  billion of  DoD  R&D  contracts  between  1979  and  1990  and 
McDonnell  Douglas  received at  least  $6.6  billion. 3  Of  these  amounts, 
$1.79  billion of  the  DoD  funds  Boeing  received  were  for  aircraft-related  R&D 
and  $4.55  billion of  the  DoD  funds  McDonnell  Douglas  received  were  for 
aircraft-related R&D.4 
Participation  in  the  vast  pool  of  military aeronautics  R&D  brings 
significant  benefits  to  the  U.S.  commercial  aircraft  industry.  The  most 
fmportant  benefits are  the  technology  transfers  that  occur  from  the  military 
to  the  commercial  domain.  Such  technology  transfers  are  of  three  principal 
types: 
0  Plane-to-plane  transfers:  A  number  of  new  commercial  aircraft  have 
been  substantially derived  from  particular military aircraft,  with  the  U.S. 
government  investment  in  the  military aircraft  underwriting  a  substantial 
part  of  the  cost  of  developing  the  new  commercial  aircraft.  For  example,  the 
3  This  information  was  obtained  from  the  Federal  Procurement  Data  Center. 
1979  is  the  first  year  for  which  the  Federal  Procurement  Data  Center  has  such 
information available. 
4  The  information  on  DoD  R&D  contracts  to  Boeing  and  McDonnell  Douglas  that 
was  obtained  from  the  Federal  Procurement  Data  Center  was  organized  by 
product  service  codes.  The  figures  for  aircraft-related  R&D  cited  in  the 
text  were  arrived  at  by  adding  up all  the  contracts  whose  product  service 
codes  included  the  term  "R&D  Aircraft."  Examples  of  product  service  codes 
that  were  assumed  not  to  be  substantially aircraft-related are  "R&D  Missile 
and  Space  Systems"  and  "R&D  Space  Science." - 5  -
Boeing  707,  the  Boeing  747,  the  McDonnell  Douglas  DC-10  and  the  High  Speed 
Civil  Transport  currently under  development  borrowed  or  will  likely borrow 
significantly  from  predecessor  military planes -- the  KC-135,  the  C-SA  (for 
both  the  747  and  the  DC-10)  and  the  National  Aerospace  Plane  respectively. 
These  plane-to-plane  transfers  are  discussed  in  greater  detail  below. 
0  Major  component  transfers:  The  transfer of  military aeronautics 
technology  to  the  commercial  domain  also occurs  with  respect  to  major 
aircraft  components.  Major  components  developed  for  military  use  are 
sometimes  incorporated  directly  into commercial  aircraft.  An  obvious  example 
of  this  kind  of  transfer  is  jet  engines,  which  are  the  single  most  costly 
component  of  large  commercial  aircraft.  Most  of  the  engines  used  today  by 
U.S.  large  commercial  aircraft  were  originally designed  for  military aircraft 
and  developed  under  military contracts. 
0  Minor  component  transfers:  Smaller-scale  transfers  of  military 
technology  to  the  commercial  domain  occur  in  the  hundreds  and  even  thousands 
of  aeronautics  R&D  projects  that  p,rivate  companies  carry out  for  the 
military.  These  occur  with  respect  to all.areas of  aircraft  technology, 
including  aerodynamics,  navigation  systems,  materials,  and  avionics.  These 
technology  transfers  are  more  difficult  to  identify and  quantify  because  of 
their  smaller  size,  but  they  are  very  significant  nonetheless. 
The  various  transfers of  military aeronautics  technology  to  the 
civilian domain  are  not  mere  happenstance.  It  is  the  specific policy of  the 
Department  of  Defense  to  encourage  and  facilitate  such  transfers.  This 
policy,  known  as  the  "dual-use  policy,"  aims  simultaneously at  broadening  the 
utility of  military  R&D  expenditures  and  helping  to  ensure  U.S.  technological 
superiority  in  commercial  as  well  as  military aeronautics. 
"DoD  is  a  firm  and  enthusiastic  su~porter of 
domestic  technology  transfers.  .  .  .  We  have  a 
science  and  technology  program  which  is  aimed  at 
providing options  for  future  military systems. 
There  are  important  spin-off  economic  benefits  to 
civilian technology  from  these  dual-use 
technologies:"s 
*  *  * 
"We  are  finding  that  technology  transfer of  the 
dual  use  technology  is  going  so wonderfully  into 
5  Dr.  George  P.  Millburn,  Deputy  Director  of  Research  and  Engineering, 
Office  of  the  Secretary of  Defense,  International  Technology  Transfer:  Who 
Is  Minding  The  Store?,  Hearing  before  the  Subcomm.  on  International 
Scientific Cooperation of  the  House  Comm.  on  Science,  Space,  and  Technology, 
lOlst  Cong.,  lst Sess.,  July  19,  1989,  at  69. - 6  -
the  commercial  sector  that  frankly,  I  don't  have 
any  idea  for  improving  it."6 
Given  the  vast  quantity  and  complexity  of  DoD  aeronautics  R&D,  it  is 
impossible  to calculate with  precision  the  amount  of  such  R&D  that  has 
commercial  applicability.  Nonetheless,  given  the  substantive  analysis 
concerning  the  significant  commonalities  between  large  commercial  aircraft 
and  military aircraft  (as  detailed  in  the  four  case  studies  below)  some 
estimates  can  be  made.  It  can  be  conservatively estimated  that  between 
25  percent  and  50  percent  of  the  aircraft-related  DoD  R&D  work  carried out  by 
the  two  primary  U.S.  manufacturers  of  commercial aircraft,  Boeing  and 
McDonnell  Douglas,  has  commercial  applicability. 7  With  respect  to  R&D  giants 
to  Boeing  and  McDonnell  Douglas  that  do  not  fall  in  the  "R&D  Aircraft" 
category,8  and  DoD  aeronautics  R&D  grants  to  companies  other  than  Boeing  and 
McDonnell  Douglas,  a  lower  rate of  commercial  applicability exists,  probably 
in  the  range  of  10  percent  to  15  percent.9 
This  means  that  the  $1.79  billion of  aircraft-related  DoD  R&D  grants 
that  Boeing  received  from  1979  tb' 1990  probably  had  a  value  to  Boeing's 
commercial  operations  of  between  $449  million and  $898  million  and  that  the 
6  Dr.  Craig  I.  Fields,  Director,  Defense  Advanced  Research  Projects  Agency, 
Hearings  on  National  Defense  Authorization  Act  for  Fiscal  Year  1991  before 
the  House  Comm.  on  Armed  Services,  lOlst  Cong.,  2d  Sess.,  March  1,  7,  8,  15 
and  April  4,  1990,  at  52-53. 
7  The  25  percent  to  SO  percent  range  for  aircraft-related  DoD  R&D  work  is 
based  on  the  analyses  of  the  Boeing  707,  Boeing  747,  McDonnell  Douglas  DC-10, 
and  the  High  Speed Civil  Transport  (see  Section  I.F below)  which  show 
substantial  commonalities  between  these  airplanes,  or  planned  airplanes,  and 
military aircraft.  These  case  studies  are  not  intended  as  an  exhaustive 
analysis of military-civilian commonalities  but  rather  as  illustrations of 
the  enduring  existence  of  such  commonalities  across  several  generations  of 
U.S.  aircraft. 
8  As  discussed  in  note  4,  the  contracts  to  Boeing  and  McDonnell  Douglas  that 
were  not  within  the  "R&D  Aircraft"  product  codes  covered  a  range  of 
aeronautics-related domains,  some  of  which  probably  have  some  relation  to 
commercial  aircraft  technology -- such  as  "R&D  Electronics  and 
Communications"  and  "R&D  Physical  Science." 
9  This  estimate of  10  percent  to  15  percent  was  arrived at  through 
consultations with  technical  experts  in  the  aeronautics  field  as  well  as 
analysis of  the  commonalities  between  specific military  and  commercial 
aircraft,  as  discussed  in  Section  I.F.  Also,  we  have  been  advised  of  a  1976 
study of  aeronautics  R&D  which  concludes  that  15  percent  of  military 
aeronautics  R&D  is  commercially applicable:  Osborne,  Jr.  & P.  Bartley, 
"Survey  of  Civil Application of  Military Aviation  Technology"  (Department  of 
Defense  and  Aerospace  Industries  Association of  America,  1976).  We  have  not, 
however,  been  able  to obtain  a  copy  of  the  study. - 7  -
$4.55  billion of aircraft-related  DoD  R&D  grants  that  went  to  McDonnell 
Douglas  in  the  same  period  probably  had  a  value  to  McDonnell  Douglas  of 
between  Sl.l4 billion and  $2.28  billion.  For  illustrative purposes,  these 
benefit  figures  can  also  be  expressed  in  current dollars,  through  a  basic 
opportunity  cost/compound  interest  calculation.10  Under  such  a  calculation, 
the  benefit  to  Boeing  was  between  $879  million  and  $1.76  billion and  the 
benefit  to  McDonnell  Douglas  was  between  $2.23  billion and  $4.45  billion. 
For  the  other  $43.6  billion of  DoD  aeronautics  R&D  (the  R&D  grants  to 
Boeing  and  McDonnell  Douglas  that  did  not  fall  in  the  category of  "R&D 
Aircraft"  and  the  R&D  grants  that  went  to other  companies),  the  commercial 
value  was  probably  between  $4.36  billion and  $6.54  billion.l1  Expressed  in 
current  dollars,  this  range  of  benefits  would  be  $9.31  billion to 
$13.97  billion.  Thus,  the  total  commercial  value  to  the  U.S.  industry  of  the 
$50  bill1on of  military aeronautics  R&D  was  probably  between  $5.9  billion and 
$9.7  billion  (or  if  expressed  in  current dollars,  between  $12.42  billion and 
$20.18  billion). 
Technology  transfers  are  not  the  only  means  by  which  the  U.S. 
commercial  aircraft  industry  benefits  from military  R&D.  The  extensive 
participation of  private  companies  in  highly  sophisticated military  R&D 
projects  helps  train  technical  personnel  in  those  companies.  Military  R&D 
work  also  pays  for  basic  equipment,  such  as  highly  specialized tools,  that 
may  later  be  used  for  civilian aeronautics  work.  Infrastructural  items.such 
as  laboratories  and  test  facilities also may  be  used  in  both  military and 
civilian work.  And  even  if  a  military  R&D  project  does  not  lead  to a 
specific  technological  advance,  it may  have  commercial  utility to  the  company 
lO  For  the  purposes  of  this opportunity  cost/compound  interest  calculation 
we  assume  that  the  benefits were  distributed  over  the  relevant  years  in 
proportions  roughly  similar  to  the  overall  distribution of  DoD  aeronautics 
R&D.  For  interest  rates,  we  have  used  U.S.  30-year  Treasury  Bond  rates  and 
have  compounded  the  interest annually  up  to  1991.  This  calculation should  be 
considered  a  rough  estimate  made  for  illustrative purposes  only. 
11  In  sum,  of  the  $50  billion of  DoD  R&D,  $6.34  billion went  to-Boeing  and 
McDonnell  Douglas  for  ~R&D Aircraft"  work,  $6.04  billion went  to  Boeing  and 
McDonnell  Douglas  for  R&D  work  outside  the  "R&D  Aircraft"  category,  and 
$37.6  billion went  to other  companies  in  the  aeronautics  industry.  These 
figures  may  not  be  exactly correct  for  two  reasons.  First,  the  Federal 
Procurement  Data  Center  information  about  contracts  to  Boeing  and  McDonnell 
Douglas  starts at  1979  whereas  the  overall  $50  billion figure  for  all  DoD 
aeronautics  R&D  starts at  1976.  Thus,  DoD  c9ntracts  to Boeing  and  McDonnell 
Douglas  from  1976  to  1978  are  not  segregated  out  of  the  $17.6  billion figure. 
Second,  it  is  not  cert~in that  all of  the  $12.4  billion of  DoD  R&D  contracts 
to  Boeing  and  McDonnell  Douglas  reported  by  the  Federal  Procurement  Data 
Center  are  included  in  the  figures  we  drew  from  Aerospace  Facts  and  Figures 
90-91  for  total  DoD  aeronautics  R&D.  In  any  event,  these  two  possible 
imprec1s1ons  point  toward  possible  underestimating  rather  than  overestimating 
and  thus  the  figures  in  the  text  are,  if  anything,  on  the  low  side. - 8  -
that  carried  it out  by  informing  the  company  of  research  "dead-ends"  that 
should  be  avoided.  Finally,  in  some  instances,  the  military division  of  an 
aircraft manufacturer  rna~ produce  parts  for  civilian aircraft  produced  by 
that  same  manufacturer.1  These  various  benefits are difficult  to  identify 
in  particular  cases  and  unlikely  to  be  quantifiable,  but  they  are  nonetheless 
a  significant  by-product  of  the  extensive military  R&D  work  performed  by  the 
aeronautics  industry. 
B.  Independent  Research  and  Development/Bid 
and  Proposal  Costs 
In  addition  to direct  grants  for  military research  and  development, 
DoD  provides  additional  support  for  R&D  work  by  private  companies  through  two 
other  mechanisms.  First,  DoD  will  reimburse  costs  incurred  by  companies 
undertaking  independent  research  and  development  (IR&D).  !R&D  differs  from 
standard  R&D  in  that  IR&D  projects  are  undertaken  on  the  independent 
initiative of  the  companies,  whereas  standard  R&D  is  undertaken  in  response 
to  specific  requests  by  DoD.  Second,  DoD  systematically  reimburses  companies 
for  certain costs  incurred  in  the  development  of  bids  and  proposals  (B&P)  for 
military contracts.  These  costs  frequently  include  research  and  development 
costs associated  with  formulating  a  bid  or  proposal. 
The  process  for  determining  and  allocating  the  funding  for  IR&D  and 
B&P  includes  four  stages: 
12 
0  The  contractor  develops  its  IR&D  program  for  the  upcoming  year  and 
participates  in bids  and  proposals. 
0  DoD  technical  personnel  evaluate  IR&D  projects  to  determine  if  they 
have  military  relevance.  This  requirement  is  met  "when  the  contractor 
can  demonstrate  that  the effort  under  a  proposed  contract  or  grant 
would  have  a  potential  relationship  to  a  military  function  or 
operation."13 
0  DoD  and  the  contractor negotiate  advance  agreements  to  determine 
the  ceiling of  IR&D  and  B&P  costs  that  will  be  reimbursable  by  DoD  in 
the  upcoming  year.  In  establishing  these ceilings,  DoD  takes  into 
account  the  degree  to which  the  various  proposed  projects are  relevant 
to  a  military use.l4 
0  The  costs  actually  recoverable  from  DoD  are  computed  by  dividing 
the  contractor's projected  sales  to  DoD  by  the  contractor's  total 
There  is  some  evidence  that  this  occ~rs at  Boeing. 
13  DoD  FAR  S  231.205.18;  Armed  Forces--Military  Procurement  Act  of  1971, 
Pub.  L.  No.  91-441,  §§  203-204. 
14  DoD  FAR§  242.1006;  Armed  Forces--Military  Procurement  Act  of  1971,  Pub. 
L.  No.  91-441,  §  203. - 9  -
sales  and  multiplying  that  number  by  the  lesser of  the  total  IR&D/B&P 
costs  incurred  and  the  negotiated  ceiling.15 
Because  IR&D  and  B&P  costs  are  reimbursed  through  confidential 
provisions  in  individual  defense  contracts,  establishing  the  precise quantity 
of  benefits  received  by  individual  companies  and  industries  is difficult,  if 
not  impossible.  However,. at  least  one  commentator  has  argued  that  the 
methodology  used  to  negotiate  IR&D  ceilings  provides  a  40  percent  subsidy  of 
company  IR&D  costs.l6  In  addition,  reasonable  estimates of  the  benefits 
received  by  the  aeronautics  industry  may  be  made  through  reference  to 
aggregate data. 
According  to  aggregate  figures,  between  1976  and  1985,  the  costs 
i~curred by  private  companies  involved  in military  R&D  for  IR&D  and  B&P  grew 
from  approximately  $2  billion to  $7  billion per  year  for  a  total of  over 
S42  billion. 17  DoD  reimbursed  over  $18  billion of  those  costs  or 
approximately  43  percent  of  the  costs  incurred. 18  In  1989  and  1990  alone, 
private  companies  incurred  over  $14  billion  in  IR&D  and  B&P  costs.  DoD 
reimbursed  approximately  S7  billion,  or  half  of  the  costs  incurred.19  Thus, 
we  estimate  that  between  1976  and  1990,  private  companies  have  recovered 
approximately  $35  billion  in  IR&D  and  B&P  costs. 20 
In  the  1980s,  DoD  aeronautics  R&D  constituted,  on  average, 
approximately  15  percent  of  total  DoD  R&D. 21  Thus,  we  believe  it is 
l5  Lichtenberg,  US  Government  Subsidies  to  Private Military  R&D  Investment: 
The  Defense  Department's  Independent  R&D  Policy,  National  Bureau  of  Economic 
Research,  Reprint  No.  1415,  at  150-51  (1990);  Alexander,  Hill  & Bodilly,  The 
Defense  Department's  Support  of  Industry's  Independent  Research  and 
Development  (IR&D):  Analysis  and  Evaluation at  13-14  (RAND  1989). 
16  Lichtenberg,  supra note  15,  at  157. 
17  RAND  Study,  supra  note  15,  at  Appendix  A. 
18  Id. 
19  Defense  Contract  Audit  Agency,  Independent  Research  and  Development  and 
Bid  and  Proposal  Costs  Incurred  by  Major  Defense  Contractors  in  the  Years 
1989  and  1990. 
20  The  S35  billion  figure  is  the  sum  of  the  following:  1976-1985 
reimbursement  of  SlB  billion;  1989-1990  reimbursement  of  $7  billion;  and 
1986-1988  reimbursement  of  SlO  billion  (this  latter figure  is  an  estimate 
based  on  the  figures  for  the  preceding  and  subsequent  years). 
21  This  percentage  was  calculated  by  dividing  the  annual  budget  authority 
for  DoD  aeronautics  R&D  by  the  annual  DoD  outlay  for  all  R&D  for  each  year  of 
the  1980s  and  averaging  those  percentage  figures.  All  of  these  data  were 
obtained  from  Aerospace  Facts  and  Figures  90-91  at  110,  111  (1990). - 10  -
reasonable  to  assume  that  the  aeronautics  industry,  on  average,  has  received 
approximately  15  percent  of  the  DoD  IR&D  and  B&P  outlays. 22  Based  on  this 
assumption,  aeronautics  contractors  have  probabl~ received  over  S5  billion as 
reimbursement  for  IR&D  and  B&P  costs  since  1976.  3 
As  discussed-above,  given  the  structure of  the  IR&D/B&P  process,  DoD 
must  ensure  that  its support  in  these  areas  is  given  to  projects  with 
military  relevance.  However,  DoD  does  not  have  to  fund  projects  that  have 
exclusively military applications.  In  fact,  since  contractors  develop  their 
IR&D  programs  on  their  own  initiative,  they  may  consider  a  variety of 
factors,  including  potential commercial  applications,  in selecting  IR&D 
projects.  Thus,  it  is  likely that  projects  funded  through  DoD's  IR&D  and  B&P 
reimbursements  have  a  somewhat  higher  level of  commercial  applicability  than 
direct  R&D  grants. 
There  is  at  least  some  direct  evidence  of  this  phenomenon.  For 
example,  IR&D  carried out  by  the  Boeing  Commercial  Airplane  Company  was 
instrumental  in  developing  windshear  detection  systems  and  riblets -- drag 
reducing  grooves  molded  into  thin plastic  film  and  applied  to external 
surfaces  of  an  airplane  to  reduce  fuel  experiditure. 24  Similarly,  IR&D 
enabled  Boeing  to  achieve  a  number  of  significant  technological  advances 
which  contributed  to  the  development  of  the  747,  including:  innovations 
relating  to  power  spectral  density~  gust  design  procedures~  runway  roughness 
measures  for  d;namic  taxi  loads;  fatigue  and  fracture  and  materials 
applications.2 
Overall,  we  estimate  that  between  20  percent  and  25  percent  of  IR&D 
and  B&P  work  in  the  military aeronautics  field  has  commercial 
22  This  15  percent.estimate  is consistent  with  the  fact  that  20  to 
25  percent  of  all  IR&D  goes  to  the  aerospace  sector,  which  includes 
aeronautics  and  space  applications.  See  Report  of  the  National Critical 
Technologies  Panel.at  97  (1991). 
23  This  number  is  calculated  by  multiplying  $35  billion,  the  estimate of 
total  DoD  reimbursed  costs  for  IR&D  and  B&P  between  1976  and  1990,  by 
15  percent,  the  estimate of  the  historic  fraction  of  R&D  outlays  received  by 
aeronautics  contractors. 
24  rtNational  Benefits of  IR&D,rt  Aerospace  Industries Association of  America, 
Dec.  18,  1987,  at  9. 
25  Research  and  Development  Contributions  to  Aviation Progress  (RADCAP)  546 
(1972).  The  RADCAP  report  is  a  joint  Department  of  Defense,  NASA  and 
Department  of  Transportation  study of  U.S.  aeronautical  progress  since  1925, 
reviewing  the  contributions of  military aeronautical  research  and  development 
programs  to civil aviation. - ll -
applicability. 26  Therefore,  the  approximately  $5  billion of  !R&D  and  B&P 
cost  reimbursements  that  aeronautics  contractors  have  received  in  the  past 
fifteen  years  entailed  a  benefit of  between  $1  billion and  $1.25  billion to 
the  commercial  aircraft  industry. 
In  sum,  it  is clear  that  U.S.  government  support  for  aeronautics 
research  and  development,  through  both  R&D  contracts as  well  as  !R&D  and  B&P 
reimbursements,  is  extremely  significant  to  the  U.S.  commercial  aircraft 
industry.  A  1982  study  of  aeronautical  research  and  technology  policy  by  the 
U.S.  Office  of  Science  and  Technology  Policy  (a  part of  the  Executive  Office 
of  the  President  of  the  United  States)  found  that: 
"U.S.  government  investments  have  supported  most 
aeronautical  R&T  on  which  the  industry  has 
depended.  For  example,  major  aeronautical  firms, 
such  as  Boeing,  spend  less  than  1.0  to  1.5 
percent  of  their  privately  funded  R&D  budget  on 
aeronautical  R&T  development  activities,  which  is 
defined  as  research  ending  2  to  3  years  before 
start of  system  development."27 
C.  MANTECH 
In  addition  to  providing  support  to  contractors  to  develop  various 
technologies  through  R&D,  !R&D  and  B&P,  DoD's  Manufacturing  Technology 
Program  (MANTECH)  provides  support  to contractors  to  encourage  the  use  of  new 
technologies  in manufacturing  processes.  The  broad  goals  of  MANTECH  include 
improving  the  productivity and  responsiveness  of  the  U.S.  industrial  base  by 
bridging  the  gap  between  R&D  results  and  full-scale  production  and  assuring 
that  more  effective  industrial  innovation  is  stimulated  by  reducing  the  cost 
and  risk  of  applying  new  and  improved  manufacturing  technology. 2B 
Between  1976  and  1990,  funding  for  MANTECH  totalled close  to 
S2  billion.29  These  funds  were  dedicated  to all  the  branches  of  the  military 
26  This  estimate  was  arrived at  through  consultations  with  technical  experts 
in  the  aeronautics  field  and  analysis  of  the  role  that  !R&D  has  played  in  the 
development  of  specific aircraft,  such  as  detailed  in  the  case  studies  in 
Section I.F.  below. 
27  Office  of  Science  and  Technology  Policy,  Executive Office of  the 
President,  Aeronautical  Research  and  Technology  Policy,  Vol.  l:  Summary 
Report,  Nov.  1982,  at  26. 
28  Department  of  Defense  Instruction No.  4200.15  (May  24,  1985);  Statement 
of  Principles  for  Department  of  Defense  Manufacturing  Technology  Program 
(March  14,  1980). 
29  See  Lehn,  An  Overview of  the  Department  of  Defense  Manufacturing 
[Footnote  continued  on  next  page! - 12  -
and  to  a  full  array of  defense-related manufacturing  technologies.  It  is  not 
clear  from  the  available data  what  proportion  of  the  funds  were  dedicated  to 
aer0nautics  manufacturing  technologies.  However,  based  on  the  fact  that  in 
the  1980s  DoD  aeronautics  R&D  constituted  on  average  approximately  15  percent 
of  total  DoD  R&D,  it  is  reasonable  to  assume  that  the  aeronautics  industry 
has  received  approximately  15  percent  of  the  DoD  MANTECH  funding.30  Based  on 
this  assumption,  approximately  $300  million  in  MANTECH  funding  has  been 
dedicated  to  facilitating  the  implementation  of  new  aeronautics  manufacturing 
technologies  since  1976. 
The  MANTECH  program  guidelines  specify  that  support  should  be  provided 
only  when  there  is  a  well-defined  DoD  requirement  for  the  technology.3l 
However,  the  manufacturing  advances  facilitated  by  the  MANTECH  program  have 
also  led  to  commercial  benefits. 32  For  example,  a  survey  of  75  completed  Air 
Force  MANTECH  projects costing  $33  million  found  that  the  MANTECH  project 
results  were  expected  to  reduce  production  costs  by  a  total of 
$933  million -- a  $534  million  savings  on  the  production of  military  items 
and  a  $399  million  savings  on  commercial  production. 33 
Thus,  it  is clear  that  the  aeronautics  industry  has  received 
significant  commercial  benefits  from  the  MANTECH  program.  However,  because 
detailed data  on  specific  MANTECH  projects  and  expenditures are  not  publicly 
available,  and  because  of  the difficulty  in allocating benefits  between  the 
military and  commercial  spheres,  it  is  not  possible  to establish  the  precise 
magnitude  of  the  commercial  benefits  bestowed  by  MANTECH. 
D.  Patents  and  Exclusive  Licensing 
The  U.S.  government  also provides  support  for  the  commercial  aircraft 
industry  through  another  mechanism:  the  grant  of  proprietary  rights  to 
technological  advances  developed  under  government-sponsored  R&D  contracts. 
(Footnote  continued  from  previous  page] 
Technology  Program  at  3  (Office  of  the Assistant  Secretary of  Defense 
Production  and  Logistics,  August  29,  1990);  GAO,  Report  to  the  House 
Committee  on  Banking,  Finance  and  Urban  Affairs,  Subcommittee  on  Economic 
Stabilization,  Department  of  Defense  Manufacturing  Technoloqy  Program--
Management  Is  Improving  But  Benefits  Hard  to  Measure  at  2  (November  30; 
1984). 
30  The  intent  of  the  MANTECH  program  is  to  facilitate  the  introduction of 
R&D  advances  into manufacturing  processes.  Thus,  we  believe  there  may  be  a 
rough  equivalence of  the  proportion of  aeronautics-related expenditures  in 
DoD  R&D  and  MANTECH. 
31  Department  of  Defense  Instruction No.  4200.15  (May  24,  1985). 
32  GAO  Report,  supra  note  29,  at  8-9;  Lehn,  supra  note  29,  at  3. 
33  GAO  Report,  supra  note  29,  at  8. - 13  -
These  technological  advances  can  be  divided  into  two  general  types --
patentable  inventions  and  technical  data. 
1.  Patents 
By  statute  and  executive order,  a  unified  U.S.  government  policy 
exists  to  promote  the  commercialization of  federally  funded  research.3~ 
Under  that  policy,  all contractors  may  retain title to  any  inventions  made  in 
whole  or  in part  with  federal  funds  and  to  any  patents  covering  such 
inventions. 35  In  exchange,  the  U.S.  government  retains  a  royalty-free  right 
to  use  the  patented  invention  for  government  purposes. 
In  certain  instances,  title will  pass  from  the  contractor  to  the 
federal  government.  This  will  occur,  for  example: 
(l)  If  the  contractor  elects  not  to  retain title  to  a  subject 
invention: 
(2)  If  the  contractor  fails  within certain specified  times  to  disclose 
the  invention  to  the  government  or  to elect  to retain title to  the 
invention; 
(3)  In  those  countries  in  which  the contractor  fails  to file  patent 
applications  within  a  specified  time: 36  and 
(4)  In  any  country  in  which  the  contractor  decides  not  to  continue 
pursuing  a  patent  on  a  subject  invention. 
Generally,  the  contractor  would  retain a  nonexclusive  royalty-free  license 
throughout  the  world  in  each  subject  invention  to  which  the  government 
obtains  title.37 
34  See  35  u.s.c.  SS  200  et  seq.  (1984);  Presidential  Memorandum  on 
Government  Patent  Policy  to  the  Heads  of  Executive  Departments  and  Agencies, 
February  18,  1983;  Exec.  Order  No.  12,591,  52  Fed.  Reg.  13,414  (1987). 
35  The  question of allocation of  rights  between  the  government  and  the 
contractor  is  premised  upon  the  existence  of  a  "subject  invention,"  which  is 
defined  in  the  Federal  Acquisition Regulation  (FAR)  clause  52.227-12  as  "any 
invention  of  the  Contractor  conceived  or  first  actually  reduced  to  practice 
in  the  performance  of  work  under  [the  government] ...  contract." 
36  There  are  certain exceptions  to  this  rule. 
37 ·  If  the  contractor  fails  to  disclose  the  subject  invention  to  the 
government  within  certain specified  times,  however,  the  contractor  generally 
relinquishes  its right  to  the  nonexclusive,  royalty-free  license.  FAR  clause 
52.227-l2(e). - 1+  -
The  u.s.  regulations  also  contain  a  concept  called  "march-in  rights." 
For  any  invention  to which  a  contractor  has  acquired  title,  the  government 
may  require  the  contractor,  for  reasons  and  under  procedures  prescribed  by 
statute,  to  grant  a  license  to  a  responsible  applicant  on  reasonable  terms  in 
any  field  of  use  that  the  contractor  has  inadequately  developed. 
2.  Technical  Data 
Where  the  government  provides  total  funding  for  a  project,  it 
generally acquires  unlimited  rights  in  the  technical  data pertaining  to  the 
items  or  processes  developed  under  the  project.  The  government  also  has 
unlimited  rights  to  release  or  disclose  the  data  to  persons  outside  the 
government,  which  would  permit  the  use  of  the  technical  data  by  those  persons 
for  commercial  purposes. 
However,  to  encourage  the  commercial  exploitation of  technologies 
developed  under  a  government  contract,  the  government  may  agree  to  use  the 
technical  data  subject  to  government  purpose  license  rights  (GPLR).  GPLR 
give  the  government  a  royalty-free  right  to  use,  duplicate,  and  disclose data 
for  government  purposes  only  and  to permit  others  to  do  so  for  government 
purposes only  for  a  stated  period  of  time.  During  the  period  when  GPLR  are 
in effect,  the  contractor  has  an  exclusive  right  to  use  the  technical  data 
for  commercial  purposes.  After  the  time  period  has  elapsed,  the  GPLR  will 
expire,  and  the  government  will  be  entitled  to unlimited  rights  in  the 
data. 38 
When  an  item or  process  is  developed  partly with  government  funds  and 
partly at  private  expense,  the  respective  rights of  the  contractor  and  the 
government  "shall  be  agreed  upon  as  early  in  the  acquisition  process  as 
practicable  (preferably  during  contract  negotiations)."  10  U.S.C. 
S  2320(a)(2)(E). 
E.  Recoupment 
Some  parties may  argue  that  aeronautics  companies  pay  back  to  the  DoD 
as  recoupment  payments  a  significant  proportion of  whatever  commercial 
benefits  they  receive  from  participation  in  military  R&D  projects.  If  this 
assertion  were  true,  it would  greatly  reduce  the  importance  of  the  support 
received  by  ~he industry  from  the  DoD  described  in  the  preceding  sections. 
This  section analyzes  the  issue  of  recoupment,  reviewing  first  the  basic 
legal  provisions  concerning  recoupment  payments  to  the  DoD,  and  then 
examining  the  actual  practice. 
38  GPLR  is  used  by  DoD,  not  by  civilian agencies. - 15  -
1.  Recoupment  Law 
a.  Scope 
It  is  the  stated  policy of  DoD  to  recover  the  cost  of  developing 
products  and  technology  by  assessing  a  recoupment  charge  whenever  a 
contractor  sells  a  defense-related  item  or  its equivalent  either  commercially 
or  through  a  foreign  military sale.  These  charges  are  intended  to  recoup  the 
nonrecurring  costs  in  DoD  R&D  contracts. 39  We  focus  on  recoupment  arising  in 
the  context  of  commercial  sales,  since  recoupment  relating  to  the  sale of 
military  items  to  foreign  governments  is  outside  the  scope  of  this 
memorandum. 
DoD's  recoupment  program  is described  and  implemented  through  the 
Defense  Department  Supplement  to  the  Federal  Acquisition  Regulation  (DFARS), 
DoD  Directive  2140.2  issued  in  1985,  and,  effective  May  1989,  through  a 
revised  recoupment  clause  and  related  regulations.  The  new  clause,  DFARS 
S  252.27-1-7001,  "Recovery  of  Nonr~curring Costs  on  Commercial  Sales  of 
Defense  Products  and  Technology  and  of  Royalty  Fees  for  Use  of  DoD  Technical 
Data,"  is  a  mandatory  clause  for  all  RDT&E  contracts  and  subcontracts  of 
Sl  million or  more.  See  DFARS  S  271.004. 
DoD's  recoupment  provisions apply  differently to various  products  and 
technology  categories.  Products  are  divided  into Major  Defense  Equipment 
(MOE)  and  non-MOE.  MOE  is  any  item  identified as  "significant  combat 
equipment"  on  the  United  States  Munitions  List  having  nonrecurring  RDT&E 
costs  of  more  than  S50  million  or  a  total  production cost  exceeding 
S200  million.  This  category also  includes  commercial  derivatives  of  MOE. 
Non-MOE  is  any  item  of  equipment  not  qualifying  as  MOE,  including  major  and 
non-major  components  of  MOE,  non-MOE  end-items  and  components,  and 
modification kits  for  such  end-items. 
Technology  is  broken  down  into  the  following  three  categories: 
(l)  technical  data  packages  to  be  used  for  the  manufacture  or  production  of 
any  MOE  or  non-MOE;  (2)  computer  software;  and  (3)  other  technology 
transfers,  including  transfers  of  industrial or  manufacturing  processes. 
b.  Amount  To  Be  Reimbursed 
Recoupment  charges  for  MOE  are  assessed  on  a  E£2  rata  basis  (total 
nonrecurring  costs  divided  by  total  estimated  number  of  units  to  be  produced 
over  the  life of  the  project).  In  cases  where  a  commercial  item  being  sold 
has  less  than  90  percent  commonality  with  the  MOE  item,  the  government 
usually will adjust  the  charge  based  on  the  d~gree of  commonality. 
39  Nonrecurring  costs are  "(t]he costs  funded  by  a  Research,  Development, 
Test  and  Evaluation  (RDT&E)  appropriation  to  develop or  improve  the  product 
or  technology  under  consideration either  through  contract  DoD  or  in-house 
effort."  Defense  Department  Supplement  to  the  Federal Acquisition  Regulation 
(DFARS)  S 252.271-7001. - 16  -
Recoupment  char4es  also are  assessed  on  major  components  of  MOE  items  on  a 
Q£2  rata basis.  0 
With  respect  to  non-MOE  end-items  and  components,  the  government  does 
not  assess  recoupment  charges  until  $2  million of  government  ROT&E  funding 
has  been  or  is  expected  to  be  incurred  for  any  particular  item  or  component. 
Once  this  threshold  is  reached,  the  government  assesses  a  surcharge  of 
5  percent  of  the  price of  the  item. 
For  technology,  recoupment  charges  are  assessed differently for  each 
of  the  three  technology  categories.  Transfers  of  Technical  Data  Packages 
used  in  manufacturing  are  treated as  follows: 
0 
0 
0 
For  Technical  Data  Packages  (TOP)  transferred  to  foreign  entities 
to  be  used  to  manufacture  non-MOE  items  for  non-u.s.  government 
use,  a  royalty  fee  of  5  percent  is applied  for .each  item 
manufactured  for  use  within  that  country,  and  an  8  percent  royalty 
fee  is applied  on  ite~~ manufactured  for  third party use  by  or  on 
behalf  of  foreign  governments  or  international organizations. 
TOPs  transferred  to U.S.  contractors  for  the  manufacture  of 
non-MOE  items  are  subject  to  a  royalty  fee  of  5  percent  on  those 
items  manufactured  for  export,  and  a  royalty  fee  of  3  percent  on 
items  manufactured  for  U.S.  consumption.41 
TOPs  transferred  for  use  in manufacturing  an  MDE  item  for  non-U.S. 
government  use  are  not  subject  to  a  royalty fee,  but  the  approved 
MOE  recoupment  charge  will  be  assessed  for  each  item manufactured 
using  the  TOP. 
With  respect  to  computer  software,  a  E£2  rata  recoupment  charge  is 
assessed  for  sales  of  software  whenever  the  U.S.  government  funds,  or  is 
expected  to  fund,  $2  million or  more  to  develop  the  software. 
For  all other  technology  transfers,  including  transfers of  TDPs  for 
purposes  other  than  manufacturing,  and  all transfers  of  industrial or 
manufacturing  processes,  the  recoupment  charges  assessed  are  to  equal  the 
fair  market  value of  the  technology.42 
40  No  charge  is  made  on  sales of  non-major  MDE  components,  however,  because 
the  recoupment  charges  are  recovered  on  the  related  MDE  item  sales. 
41  These  fees  appear  to  be  somewha~  higbe~ than  those  that  NASA  may  impose 
in  similar  circumstances.  See  Section  II .D  infra. 
42  For  transfers  to  any u.s.  domestic  organization,  this charge  shall  be  the 
lower  of  either:  (a)  a  proportionate  share  of  the  DoD  investment  cost 
identified  to  the  development  of  the  technical  data  and  technology  involved; 
or  (b)  a  fair  market  price  for  the  technical  data  and  technology  involved, 
[Footnote  continued  on  next  page] - 17  -
Finally,  waivers  or  reductions  in  the  recoupment 
above  may  be  approved  for  a  particular  commercial  sale. 
Approval  is  based  upon 
charges  described 
See  DFARS  S  271.005. 
(i)  the  same  criteria used  to  grant  waivers 
under  FMS,  that  is  to  say,  whether  a  particular 
sale  would  significantly advance  U.S.  government 
interests  in  the  standardization of  NATO  or 
certain other  military  forces,  or 
(ii)  if  the  domestic  sale  is  in  the  best 
interest of  the  United  States  to  satisfy a 
demonstrable  right  of  the  manufacturer  or  the 
purchaser,  or 
(iii)  to obtain advantage  to  the  U.S. 
Government. 
In  sum,  although  the  regulations  on  DoD  recoupment  have  a  fairly 
comprehensive  reach,  there  are  nonetheless  clear  gaps  in  this  coverage,  and 
DoD  has  considerable  discretion  in  deciding  when  to assess  recoupment 
charges.  There  is  no  mandatory  recoupment  clause  for  contracts of  less  than 
Sl  million. 43  Recoupment  charges  are  not  assessed  on  non-Major  Defense 
Equipment  end-items  and  components  where  less  than  $2  million of  DoD  funding 
has  been  or  is  expected  to  be  incurred  for  any  particular  item or  component. 
Finally,  recoupment  can  be  waived  altogether. 
2.  Actual  Practice Regarding  Recoupment 
As  noted  above,  the  regulations outline  a  recoupment  program  of 
considerable  breadth.  Under  the  regulations,  DoD  is entitled  to  recover  R&D 
costs  through  levies  on  commercial  sales of  major  defense  products, 
components,  and  items  derived  from  major  defense  products.  However,  as  noted 
above,  there  are  a  number  of  formal  exceptions  to  the  recoupment  policy  that 
reduce  its coverage.  In  addition,  on  a  practical  level,  the  complexities 
[Footnote  continued  from  previous  page) 
based  on  an  engineering analysis  of  demand  or  the  potential monetary  return 
on  investment. 
43  Of  the  $5.8  billion of  DoD  R&D  grants  to  Boeing  in  the  1979-1980  period, 
approximately  $580  million were  through  contracts  of  less  than  Sl  million. 
Of  the  $6.6  billion of  DoD  R&D  grants  to  McDonnell  Douglas  in  the  same 
period,  approximately  $1.2  billion were  through  contracts of  less  than  Sl 
million.  Thus,  $1.78  billion of  the  DoD  R&D  grants  to  Boeing  and  McDonnell 
Douglas  from  1979  to  1990  were  through  contracts  that  may  not  have  had 
recoupment  clauses at all. - 18  -
associated  with  assessing  recoupment  charges  in  various  contexts  undoubtedly 
limit  the  effective  reach  of  the  program  even  further. 
For  example,  when  a  contractor  sells a  product  in  the  commercial 
market  that  is  derived  from  its defense  work,  it  is  very difficult  to assess 
the  amount  of  government  support  attributable  to  that  product.  First, 
determining  the  degree  to  which  a  product  is  a  derivative of  another  product 
is  necessarily  complex  and  to  some  extent  subjective.  Further,  the  full 
range  of  benefits  to  a  contractor's  commercial  operations  could  be  invisible 
to  an  auditor.  For  example,  commercial  operations  could benefit  from  the 
identification of  technological  dead-ends,  and  the  testing  and  training  in 
the  use  of  certain tools,  technical  processes  and  facilities. 
Given  the  relative  complexity  of  calculating  the  recoupment  due  on 
commercial  sales  of  military-related products,  we  would  expect  that  the 
majority of  the  recoupment  received  by  DoD  is  related  to  foreign  military 
sales.  This  conclusion  is bolstered  by  the  fact  that  the  majority  of  the 
literature on  DoD  recoupment  focuses  on  foreign  military sales  and  by  the 
fact  that  the  specific  instances  of  recoupment  are  primarily  in  the  foreign 
military sales  sphere  rather  than  in  the  commercial  domain.  Furthermore,  it 
is our  understanding  that  approximately  75  percent  of all  DoD  recoupment 
results  from  foreign military sales.44 
There  is  scanty  publicly available data quantifying  the  actual 
recoupment  payments  made  by  private  companies  to  DoD.  Recoupment  charges  are 
apparently  recorded  in  a  DoD  budget  line  item  that  includes  a  number  of  other 
categories  of  DoD  receipts.  Thus,  it  is  not  even  possible  to establish  the 
total  amount  of  recoupment  charges  collected  by  DoD. 
It  is  possible,  however,  to  make  an  estimate.  We  have  learned  that 
between  approximately  1983  and  1988,  total  recoupment  to  DoD  averaged 
approximately  S300  million  per  year,  that  recoupment  has  not  increased 
substantially  since  1988  and  that  recoupment  levels  were,  if anything,  lower 
in  the  years  prior  to  1983.45 
Given  that aeronautics  R&D  has  averaged  approximately  15  percent  of 
total  DoD  R&D  in  the  198Qs, 46  it  is probably  reasonable  to assume  that 
approximately  15  percent  of  all  recoupment  to  DoD  is aeronautics-related.  If 
44  Information  from  DoD. 
45  Id.  Figures  in  this  range  wer~ recently  stated publicly  by  a  major  u.s. 
defense  contractor:  Don  Cassidy,  Vice  President  for  Contracts at  Hughes 
Aircraft,  said  that  DoD  recoups  between  Sl50  million and  S300  million  per 
year.  "Industry Pressure  Forces  DoD  to  Review  Recoupment  Policy,"  Defense 
News,  April  22,  1991. 
46  See  supra  note  21. - 19  -
so,  this  means  that  approximately  S45  million  per  year  of  aeronautics-related 
recoupment  is  paid  by  the  industry  to  DoD. 
Thus,  assuming  that  approximately  75  percent  of  recoupment  payments 
are  related  to  foreign  military  sales  and  25  percent  to  commercial  sales,  the 
amount  of  aeronautics-related  recoupment  resulting  from  commercial  activity 
is  on  the  order  of  $11.25  million  per  year.  In  the  1976-1990  period, 
therefore,  we  can  estimate  that  the  U.S.  commercial  aircraft  industry  made  a 
total  of  approximately  $170  million  in  recoupment  payments  to  DoD.  Although 
this  is only  a  very  rough  estimate,  it  is  a  clear  indication  that  the  amount 
of  recoupment  paid  by  the  U.S.  commercial  aircraft  industry  is  much  less  than 
the  benefits  that  the  industry  has  derived  from  the  tens  of  billions of 
dollars of  DoD  R&D  funds  for  aeronautics  in  the  1976-1990  period. 
F.  Plane-to-Plane Transfers 
The  above  sections  analyzed  the  general  phenomenon  of  DoD-sponsored 
aeronautics  R&D  and  the  benefits  it provides  to  the  U.S.  commercial  aircraft 
industry.  This  section  examines  four  specific cases  of  military  R&D  benefits 
to  the  commercial  industry -- the  four  major  instances  where  a  major 
commercial  airplane  was  developed  or  is  likely  to  be  developed  from  a 
military airplane:  the  Boeing  707  (from  the  KC-135),  the  Boeing  747  (from 
the  C-5A),  the  McDonnell  Douglas  DC-10  (from  the  C-5A)  and  the  High  Speed 
Civil  Transport  (from  the  National  Aerospace  Plane).  Each  of  these  cases 
concerns  the  actual  or  prospective  introduction of  a  large  commercial  air 
transport  plane  representing  a  significant  technological  advance  over 
existing  planes.  In  each  case,  substantial  U.S.  military ll&D  made  or  will 
make  the  new  commercial  planes  possible.  Taken  together,  these  cases 
constitute  strong  evidence  for  the  proposition  that  no  new  generation of 
large  U.S.  commercial  aircraft  has  been  or  will  be  developed  without 
substantial  government  support. 
l.  Boeing  707 
The  Boeing  707,  developed  and  launched  in  the  1950s,  was  the  first 
major  commercial  airliner  produced  by  Boeing.  The  707  was  an  extremely 
successful  plane  that  dominated 'commercial  aircraft  markets  in  the  1960s,  and 
was  responsible  for  Boeing's  ascendancy  over  Douglas  Aircraft  Corporation  as 
the  primary  U.S.  manufacturer  of  commercial  aircraft. 
a.  Benefits  from  the  KC-135 
The  Boeing  707  "is  an  excellent  example  of  a  'quantum  jump'  made 
possible  by  military  technology  and,  also,  of  the  mutually  beneficial 
exchange  between  commercial  and  military aircraft.
1
' 47  In  designing,  testing 
and  producing  the  707,  Boeing  benefited  from  its military aeronautics 
contracts,  and  in particular,  from  its  role  in  the  KC-135  Air  Force  tanker 
and  the  B-47  and  B-52  programs.  According  to  the  RADCAP  Report,  "[i]n  the 
47  RADCAP,  supra  note  25,  at  536. - 20  -
development  of  the  Boeing  707,  the  transfer of  technology  from  the  military 
version  to  the  commercial  version  was  more  than  90%."48 
The  benefits  to  the  707  from  the  KC-135  program  were  the  most 
significant.  Production  of  the  707  followed  the  KC-135  by  about  a  year,  and 
the  planes  were  so  similar  that  the  707  was  always  regarded  as  the  commercial 
equivalent  of  the  KC-135,  even  though  the  707  was  slightly  larger  and 
heavier. 49 
The  development  of  the  707  was  made  much  easier  as  a  result  of  the 
testing  and  operational  experience  Boeing  had  first obtained  through  the 
KC-135.  Both  in  develo~ment and  in production,  the  707  benefited  so  much 
from  the  concurrent  KC-135  program  that  one  analyst  has  concluded,  "without 
the  huge  KC-135A  program  there  would  almost  certainly  have  been  no  commercial 
Model  707,  as  its unit  cost  would  have  been  too  high,  especially without  the 
benefits  of  using  some  KC-135  jigs  and  tooling."50 
The  development  of  the  707  was  also  aided  by  the  KC-135  program at  the 
testing stage.  Since  the  first  707  was  not.produced  until  100  KC-135s  had 
already  been  produced,  the  707  benefited  from  the  extensive  test  programs  and 
flight  experience  on  the  nearly  identical  KC-135. 51  The  KC-135  provided 
valuable  data  for  the  707  in  areas  such  as  transonic flutter  prevention and 
fuselage  pressure  testing.52  In  addition,  because  the  Dash  80  (a  prototype 
jet transport  developed  by  Boeing  in  the early 1950s)  was  used  as  a  test 
vehicle  for  the  KC-135  program,  the Air  Force  agreed  to  assume  all flight 
test  costs  and,  in  addition,  to  pay  Boeing  a  6  percent  fee  for  these  tests. 
Since  the  Dash  80  was  also  the  prototype  for  the  707,  much  of  the  necessary 
testing  for  the  707  development  was  not  just  free  but  actually generated 
positive  cash  flow  for  Boeing.53 
The  side-by-side  production  of  the  707  with  the  KC-135  also  provided 
substantial benefits  to  the  707.  The  707  wa; assembled  in  a  government-owned 
plant  at  Renton,  Washington.54  A portion of  the  production  process  for  the 
two  planes  at  that  plant  was  identical,  since  22  percent  of  the  parts  were 
48  Id.  at  528. 
49  .;;.T~h;.;:e;__:;B:..:o:..:e:..:l::..;.  n:..:.g06-.;:;.C.;:;.o..;.;;m.p;.;:a:..:.n:..oy'-':'----'P'-r=-o;;;.d=u..::;c....;t-=s;__:;&:..._;P;....;r:...o=-g"'-"-r.;:;;a..;.;;mc.;:;.s  at  13-14  ( u n  d a t e d l . 
50  M.J.  Hardy,  Boeing  66  (1982). 
51  RADCAP,  at  537. 
52  Id.  at  533. 
53  Harbridge  House  Inc.,  United  States  Subsidization of  the  Commercial 
Aircraft  Industry  II-12,  II-22  (1978)  (hereinafter  "Harbridge  House  1978 
Study"). 
54  Id.  at  II-22. - 2l  -
exact  equivalents  in  both aircraft.55  In  addition,  for  nonrecurring 
engineering  and  production costs  common  to  both  the  707  and  the  KC-135 
programs,  the  government  agreed  that  80  percent  of  such costs  would  be 
charged  to  the  KC-135  and  only  20  percent  to  the  707.56 
b.  Benefits  From  the  B-47  and  B-52 
In addition  to  benefits  from  the  KC-135  program,  the  707  benefited 
from  Boeing's  participation  in  the  B-47  and  B-52  long-range  bomber  programs. 
For  example,  the  high  aspect  ratio,  35°  swept  wing  design of  the  B-47  gave 
Boeing  extensive  aerodynamic  and  design data  needed  to develop  the  707.  B-47 
flight  experience  and  data  provided  Boeing  with crucial  information  on  wings 
with  pylon  suspended  engine  nacelles,  on  the  effects of  structural 
flexibility on  aileron effectiveness  and  handling qualities,  and  on 
aeroelasticity.  Based  on  this  information,  Boeing  developed  new  design 
methods  for  the  707.  The  operational  experience  of  the  B-47  also contributed 
to  the  707  design  in  the  areas  of  structural  response,  load  distribution, 
transfer  functions,  and  fatigue  ~esting.57 
Similarly,  Boeing's  wind  tunnel  tests  on  the  B-52  wing  yielded 
valuable  data  on  engine  nacelle  placement  and  pylon  design  which  supplemented 
earlier  B-47  nacelle  tests.  The  B-52  wind  tunnel  tests also led  to  a  707 
wing  design  that  was  thicker  near  the  root,  improving  structural  efficiency 
and  reducing  weight.  The  707's  use  of  spoilers  for  roll  control  and  of 
in~oard ailerons  also came  from  the  B-52.58 
One  indication of  the  extent  of  the  benefits  to  the  707  from  the  B-47 
and  B-52  programs  is  that  the  707  prototype  required  only  1,357  hours  of  wind 
tunnel  testing,  while  the  B-47  re~uired 7,600  hours  and  the  B-52  required 
7,800  hours  of  wind  tunnel  time.5 
55  Boeing  Commercial  Aircraft  Co.,  International Competition  in  the 
Production  and  Marketing  of  Commercial  Aircraft  3  (1982).  It  should  be  noted 
that  Boeing  agreed  to  reimburse  the  government  $110,000  per  unit  for  the 
first  100  707s  produced  on  KC-135  tooling,  and  $60,000  for  each  of  the  next 
100  707s  thus  produced.  Harbridge  House  1978  Study,  at  II-22.  It  is 
difficult  to  assess  whether  such  compensation  is at all commensurate  with  the 
benefits  received  by  Boeing. 
56  Harbridge  House  1978  Study,  at  II-22. 
57  RADCAP,  at  532-33. 
58  Id.  at  533,  535. 
59  Harbridge  House  1978  Study,  at  II-11. - 22  -
c.  Benefits  from  Engine  Programs 
The  707  also benefited  enormously  from  military engine  programs  of  the 
1950s.  The  Pratt  & Whitney  JT-3C  engine,  which  was  used  for  the  707,  was  a 
commercial  derivative of  the  Pratt  & Whitney  J-57,  developed,  tested  and 
proven  through  the  B-52  and  KC-135  programs.60 
The  U.S.  military  had  spent  approximately  $400  million on  the 
development  of  the  J-57  engine  by  1956,  and  had  put  the  engine  through  more 
than  3  million  engine  flight  hours  and  68,000  hours  of  engine  development 
testing.6l  By  the  time  the  JT-3  was  introduced,  therefore,  the  military 
engine  program  had  generated  experience  which  was  readily applied  to  the 
commercial  engine  program.  For  example,  the  military engine  program 
developed  new  manufacturing  technologies  to  solve  problems  involving  high 
temperature  alloys  and  hydrogen  embrittlement,  which  were  subsequently  used 
for  the  commercial  engine.  Throughout  both  the  military and  commercial 
programs,  the  JT-57  and  the  JT-3  maintained  a  high degree  of  commonality.62 
d.  Other  Benefits 
Finally,  a  number  of  the  benefits  to  the  707  from  military  programs 
came  through  commercial  versions  of  equipment  developed  by  vendors  for 
military  purposes  that  were  used  by  Boeing  in  the  707.  These  included  the 
707  autopilot,  a  Bendix  design  derived  directly  from  prior military 
experience,  as  well  as  electronic  systems  such  as·  the  Distance  Measuring 
Equipment,  air  traffic control  equipment,  altimeter  and  antenna  systems, 
Omega  and  Loran  navigation  systems,  and  the  Instrument  Landing  System.63 
e.  Quantifying  the  Benefits of 
Military  Provisions  to  the  707 
Definitive quantification of  the  benefits  to  the  707  from  military 
programs  is probably  not  possible.  However,  according  to  one  commentator, 
"[t)he  707 ...  cost  Boeing  only  $16  million,  because  the military B-47, 
B-52,  and  KC-135  bore  the  entire brunt  of  development  --~bout $2  billion."64 
It  should  also be  noted  that  benefits  to  the  707  from  military 
programs  were  passed  along  to  later  Boeing  aircraft.  For  example, 
significant  features  of  the  707  fuselage,  which  was  a  widened  version of  the 
60  RADCAP,  at  532,  535. 
61  Id.  at  535. 
62  Id.  at  533-34. 
63  Id.  at  534-36. 
64  American  Institute of  Aeronautics  and  Astronautics,  The  Supersonic 
Transport:  A Factual  Basis  for  Decision  at  61. - 23  -
KC-135  fuselage,  were  incorporated  in  the  fuselages  of  the  Boeing  727,  737 
and  757. 
2.  Boeing  747 
The  development  of  the  Boeing  747  is  a  more  complex  and  less direct 
case  of  U.S.  government  support  for  the  U.S.  commercial  aircraft  industry. 
Unlike  Boeing's  previous  success -- the  707  -- the  747  was  not  simply  the 
civilian version  of  a  military  jet.  Rather,  the  development  of  the  747 
benefited  from  a  variety of  indirect  government  supports,  including  funding 
for  the  research  and  development  of  an  overall design  for  a  wide-body  jet 
~ursuan~  to  a  request  for  bids  to  develop  a  large  jet  for  the  U.S.  military; 
funding  for  certain  Boeing  independent  research  programs;  funding  for 
research  and  development  of  key  technologies  and  components,  such  as  engines, 
pursuant  to military  programs;  and  access  to government  facilities during  the 
flight  testing  phase  of  the  project. 
a.  Benefits  from  the  C-SA 
The  principal  government  program  contributing  to  the  initial 
development  stages of  the  747  was  the  Department  of  Defense  competition  in 
the  early  1960s  for  development  of  a  large  new  military  transport  plane,  the 
C-SA.  In  1964,  DoD  contracted with  Boeing,  Lockheed  and  Douglas  for  each  of 
the  manufacturers  to  develop  a  proposal  and  bid  for  the  C-SA  during  a 
nine-month  "Program Definition Phase."  Although  ultimately Boeing  was  not 
granted  the  C-SA  contract,  it  received  at  least  S7.5  million  to  research  and 
develop  its C-SA  proposa1.65 
The  research  and  development  of  the  747's  structural and  aerodynamic 
configuration  and  design  benefited  from  Boeing's  government-funded  work  for 
the  C-SA  proposal.  Boeing  conducted  extensive wind  tunnel  testing  and 
analysis  of  structural  and  aerodynamic  design during  its proposal  work  for 
the  C-SA.  Quantifying  the  extent  to  which  Boeing's  work  under  the  C-SA 
program  contributed  to  the  eventual structural  and  aerodynamic  design 
technology  of  the  747  is difficult.  However,  the  RADCAP  study states that 
"the  extensive  analyses  and  wind  tunnel  testing on  the  C-SA  proposal  aircraft 
undoubtedly  contributed significant preliminary design  information  for  the 
747."66  Although  the  final  configuration of  the  747  was  quite  different  from 
Boeing's  C-5A  proposal,  the  testing of  Boeing's C-SA  proposal generated 
valuable  data  regarding  the  structural  and  aerodynamic  design  of  wide-body 
jet  transports  generally. 
Moreover,  Boeing's  work  on  the  C-SA  proposal  enabled  Boeing  to develop 
an  organization  and  expertise  to  confront  t9e  challenges  posed  in  the 
development  of  a  viable  design  for  a  wide-body  jet.  Thus,  for  example,  the 
65  Harbridge  House  1978  Study,  at  82.  Lockheed  received  an  equal  amount  to 
research  and  develop  its proposal.  Id. 
66  RADCAP,  at  544. - 24  -
100  engineers  who  conceived  the  design  for  the  747  had  all  been  members  of 
the  team  assembled  to  generate  the  C-5A  proposal. 67 
b.  IR&D  Programs 
Through  independent  research  and  development  programs,  supported  in 
some  measure  by  the  U.S.  Government,  Boeing  achieved  a  number  of  significant 
technological  advances  which  contributed  to  the  development  of  the  747,68 
These  included  innovations  relating  to  power  spectral density,  gust  design 
procedures,  runway  roughness  measures  for  dynamic  taxi  load,  fatigue  and 
fracture  and  materials  applications.69 
c.  Engines 
Boeing  also  enjoyed  important  indirect  benefits  from  the  C-5A  and 
other  military  programs  directed at  developing  new  propulsion  technologies, 
which  in  turn  facilitated  the  development  of  the  747.  Under  those  military 
programs,  the  u.s.  Government  supported  the  development  of  the  high  bypass 
turbofan  engine  technology  which  was  a  critical prerequisite  to  the 
feasibility of  the  747. 
In  the  early 1960s,  the  Department  of  Defense  (partially  in 
conjunction  with  the  FAA  and  NASA)  provided  extensive  funding  to  the 
manufacturers  of  aircraft  engines  through  various  programs  for  the 
development  of  high  bypass  ratio turbofan engines.  Pratt  & Whitney  (through 
its parent  company  United  Aircraft),  for  example,  received  approximately 
$11.6  million  in  1964-65  to  research  and  develop  engines  to propel  the  C-5A, 
and  General  Electric  was  awarded  approximately  $13.4  million  for  its engine 
work  in  the  initial C-5A  competition.70 
In  the  period  before  1970,  when  the  first  747  went  into commercial 
service,  the  government  (DoD,  NASA  and  FAA)  accounted  for  over  67  percent  of 
the  total  R&D  expenditures  for  turbofan  engines  in  the  United  States.71  The 
747  engine,  the  Pratt  & Whitney  JT-9D,  was  a  redesigned  and  improved  version 
67  J.  Newhouse,  The  Sporty Game  113  (1982). 
68  Although  we  are  unable  to quantify  the  independent  research  and 
development  grants  received  by  Boeing,  historically  DoD  has  reimbursed 
between  40  percent  and  50  percent  of  IR&D  costs.  See  Section I.B. 
69  RADCAP,  at  546. 
70  Harbridge  House  1978  Study,  at  B2. 
71  Booz,  Allen  Applied  Research,  Inc.,  A Historical  Study  of  the  Benefits 
Derived  from  Application  of  Technical  Advances  to Civil  Aviation at  A9  (1971) 
(prepared  for  the  Joint  DOT-NASA  Civil  Aviation  R&D  Policy  Study). - 25  -
of  the  Pratt  & Whitney  engine  developed -- though  not  selected -- for  the 
C-SA  competition. 
Such  substantial  funding  of  engine  development  costs  undoubtedly 
provided  significan~ benefits  to  wide-body  jets generally  and  the  747  in 
particular.  Given  the  fact  that  an  aircraft's propulsion  system constitutes 
a  large proportion of  the overall  component  costs,  and  given  the  importance 
of  engine  technology  to  the  feasibility of  wide-body  jets,  large-scale 
government  subsidization of  engine  development  costs  likely  had  a  substantial 
impact  on  the  overall  development  costs of  the  747. 
d.  Other  Components 
In  addition  to  the  benefits described  above,  a  number  of  other 
components  in  the  747  benefited  from  military programs: 
°  Flight  Control  and  Avionics:  Perhaps  as  much  as  50  percent  of  the 
flight  control  equipment  used  in  tre  747  was  derived  from  military  sources; 
most  of  the  technology  transfer  in  this area  came  through  other  systems 
produced  by  Boeing  for  the  military.72  In addition,  the  747's  avionics 
systems  came  primarily  from  subcontractors  who  used  militarily-derived 
methods  and  techniques  for  a  broad  range  of  navigation  and  communications 
instruments.73 
0  Landing Gear:  Boeing  developed  the  16-wheel  high-flotation main 
landing  gear,  used  in  the  747,  during  its research  for  the  C-5A  proposa1.74 
0  Titanium  Forgings:  Boeing  utilized  a  number  of  innovative 
materials  in  the  747  in  order  to  reduce  its weight,  including  fiberglass 
panels  and  titanium structures.  Wyman-Gorman,  a  Boeing  subcontractor,  was 
able  to produce  the  large  titanium  forgings  for  the  747  with  the  use  of 
special military  tooling.75 
e.  Flight  Testing 
During  the  extensive  flight  testing of  the  747,  which  cost  a  total of 
$67.7  million,  Boeing  used  government  flight-test  facilities  in addition to 
its own  airfields.  Specifically,  Boeing  used  military facilities at  Edwards 
Air  Force  Base,  Roswell  Air  Force  Base  and  Moses  Lake  as  well  as  Boeing's  own 
facilities  at  Boeing  Field  and  Paine  Field.76 
72  RADCAP,  at  546. 
73  Id.  at  547. 
74  Harbridge  House  1978  Study,  at  II-3. 
75  RADCAP,  at  548. 
76  Id.  At  this  point,  it  is  unclear  whether  or  how  Boeing  was  charged  for 
the  use  of  the military  facilities. - 26  -
3.  DC-10 
In  developing  the  DC-10,  McDonnell  Douglas  benefited substantially 
from  previous  research,  technical  development  and  testing  done  pursuant  to 
military  programs  and  government-funded  research.  One  prominent  illustration 
of  this  phenomenon  is  the  fact  that  the  engine  used  on  the  DC-10  was,  in 
large  measure,  derived  from  an  engine  developed  pursuant  to  a  military 
program.  Military programs  and  government-funded  research also  supported  the 
development  of  the  DC-10  in  a  variety of  other,  if  less  prominent,  ways. 
a.  Propulsion 
The  DC-10  benefited  substantially  from  the  close  relationship between 
the  CF6  engine  used  for  the  DC-10  and  the  TF-39  developed  for  military  use. 
The  government  invested  S212  million  to develop  the  TF-39  engine. 77  Except 
for  the  fan  system,  the  CF6  engine  employed  basically  the  same  technology  as 
the  TF-39. 78  Moreover,  the  high .b¥pass  fan  used  jn the  CF6  engine  was  based 
on  developments  made  in  NASA  and  military  programs,  and  the  installation 
technology  for  the  high  bypass  fan  engines  was  developed  pursuant  to 
government-funded  research.79 
Furthermore,  the  development  and  testing of  the  CF6  was  substantially 
facilitated  by  the  related  TF-39  program.  For  example,  prior  to  the  first 
DC-10  commercial  flight  in  1971,  27,000  of  the  30,500  hours  of  engine 
development  testing  had  been  completed  in  the  TF-39  configuration.  In 
a6dition,  the  development  of  the  CF6  was  facilitated  by  the  128,000  engine 
flight  hours  accumulated  by  the  C-SA  aircraft. 
b.  Technical  Advances  Incorporated 
The  DC-10  was  also  the  beneficiary of  numerous  technical  developments 
which  had  their  roots  in military  programs,  including,  inter alia:  (l) 
advances  in  the  design of  the airfoil section of  the  wing  derived,  in  part, 
through  work  done  by  McDonnell  Douglas  in  developing  its C-5A  proposal;  (2) 
advances  in  nacelle  and  pylon drag  design  derived,  in  part,  through  work  done 
by  McDonnell  Douglas  in developing  its C-5A  proposal;  (3)  the  development  of 
double-slotted  wing  flaps  which  was  facilitated  by  McDonnell  Douglas' 
military  programs,  particularly  those  relating  to  fighter  aircraft;  (4) 
advances  in  nacelle  strakes  which  were  first  investigated  pursuant  to  a 
military  program;  and  (5)  advances  in  the  design  of  the  flight  control  system 
which  were  based  on  principles of  redundancy  developed  pursuant  to military 
77  Id.  at  553. 
78  Id.  at  551. 
79  Id.  at  551. - 27  -
programs  dating  back  to  the  late 1950's.80  Moreover,  potential  deficiencies 
in  the  aerodynamic  design  were  avoided  due  to McDonnell  Douglas'  past 
military  and  commercial  aircraft  programs.Bl 
c.  Hardware  Transfers 
Direct  transfer of  hardware  from  military aircraft  to  the  DC-10  was 
not  common.  However,  strong  common  evolutionary  sources  can  be  identified  in 
many  areas.  Government-conceived  or  sponsored  hardware  concepts  that  were 
applied  to  the  design  of  the  structure of  the  DC-10  include:  (1)  titanium 
slat  and  flap  tracks;  (2)  floor  structure;  (3)  forming  of  large  skin 
structures;  (4)  local  averaging  technique  for  T6  to  T73;  (5)  cold  drawn  and 
aged  titanium  springs;  (6)  brazed  stainless steel hydraulic  tubing; 
(7)  brazed  chemically pure  titanium  tubing  with Ti-6Al-4V  fittings;  (8)  thin 
wall  aluminum  (356)  castings;  (9)  isothermal  no-draft  Ti-6-6-2  forgings; 
(10)  welded  and  brazed  acoustical  panels  from  Inconel  718  and  316L;  and 
(11)  investment  castings  from  Inconel  718.82  In  the  area of  flight  control, 
the  autopilot  for  the  DC-10  was  a  derivative of  the  autopilot  developed  for 
the  C-133,  the  C-141  redundant  yaw  damper  experience  provided  background  for 
the  DC-10,  and  previous  work  done  on  a  military hydraulics  actuation  system 
was  applied  to  the  DC-10.  According  to  one  estimate,  approximately 
30  percent  of  the  DC-10  flight  control  technology  was  derived  from  military 
sources. 83  A smaller,  but  significant  percentage  of  the avionics  equipment 
configuration  and  navigation  systems  in  the  DC-10  were  directly derived  from 
military  programs.  Further,  the  electronics  systems  techniques  were,  in 
large  part,  derived  from  military  programs  as  were  the  antenna  techniques.B4 
d.  Government-Sponsored  Research 
The  results  of  government-sponsored  research  and  development  in  the 
areas  of  non-stationary aerodynamics;  low  level  turbulence  measurement, 
definition  and  analysis;  fracture  toughness;  parametric  fatigue  analysis; 
structural ·analysis  programming  and  manufacturing  technology  were  directly 
transferred  to  the  DC-10  design  team.85  Similarly,  McDonnell  Douglas' 
independent  research  and  development,  funded  by  the  government  through 
80  Id.  at  549-51. 
81  Id.  at  550. 
82  Id.  a~  552-53. 
83  Id.  at  553. 
84  Id.  at  554. 
85  Id.  at  551. - 29  -
military  programs,  made  major  contributions  to  McDonnell  Dougras'  data  bank 
and  was  an  important  part  of  the  technology  needed  to  design  the  DC-10.86 
4.  Supersonic  and  Hypersonic  Transports 
The  fourth  example  of  U.S.  government  investment  in  "quantum  leap" 
aircraft  technology  that  will  result  in  the  plane-to-plane  transfer  of 
technology  from  the  military  to  the  civilian side  is  the  current  work  being 
done  on  supersonic  and  hypersonic  transports.  The  two  primary  programs  in 
this  area  are  the  National  Aerospace  Plane  (NASP)  and  the  High  Speed  Civil 
Transport  (HSCT).  The  NASP  is  to  be  a  space  and  military aircraft  that  would 
travel  at  an  altitude of  approximately  150,000  feet  at  speeds  of  Mach  5  to 
Mach  15.  The  HSCT  is  to  be  a  long-range  high  speed civil transport  that 
would  fly  at  60,000  feet  at  speeds  of  Mach  2  to  Mach  5.  The  basic  outline of 
these  two  programs  is set  out  below,  followed  by  a  brief  analysis  of  the 
commercial  significance of  the  NASP  and  the  potential  interrelation of  the 
two  programs. 
a.  National  Aerospace  Plane 
In  January  1986,  DoD  (through  DARPA,  the  Air  Force  and  the  Navy),  NASA 
and  the  Strategic Defense  Initiative Organization  initiated a  $700  million 
program  to  design  the  NASP,  a  vehicle  that  could  take  off  horizontally  from 
an  aircraft  runway,  fly directly  into  low  earth orbit  at  25  times  faster  than 
the  speed  of  sound  and  demonstrate  single-stage-to-orbit  (SSTO)  operations. 87 
In  April  1986,  DARPA  awarded  $7  million  in  contracts  to  a  number  of  U.S. 
aircraft  manufacturers,  including  Boeing  and  McDonnell  Douglas,  in  a 
competition  for  the  conceptual  design of  the  NASP. 88 
The  NASP  is  now  in  its Phase  II contract  stage  which  will  last  until 
January  1993,  at  which  time  a  decision will  be  made  on  whether  or  not  to 
build  a  pair of  X-30  research vehicles  to validate  the  computational  fluid 
dynamics,  materials,  structures  and  propulsion  development  aspects  of  the 
program.  On  February  1,  1991,  the Air  Force--NASA  joint  program  office 
awarded  McDonnell  Douglas,  General  Dynamics,  Rockwell  Corp.'s  North  American 
Aircraft,  Pratt  & Whitney,  and  Rockwell's  Rocketdyne,  joined  in  a  single 
team,  a  $502  million contract  to  continue  airframe  and  propulsion  development 
on  the  NASP  up  to  the  planned  1993  deadline.89 
86  Id.  at  552. 
87  Statement  by  John J.  Welsh,  Jr.,  Assistant  Secretary of  the  Air  Force  for 
Acquisition,  Hearing  before  the  Subcomm.  on  Research  and  Development  of  the 
Comm.  on  Armed  Ser~ices and  the  Subtomm.  ~n Technology  and  Competitiveness  of 
the  House  Comm.  on  Science  Space,  and  Technology,  March  12,  1991,  guoted  in 
Def~nse News,  March  18,  1991,  at  3. 
88  "Aircraft  Design,"  Aerospace  America,  December  1988,  at  70. 
89  Defense  News,  March  18,  1991,  at  3. - 29  -
As  shown  in  the  chart  below,  total  funding  for  NASP  through  fiscal 
year  1991  was  Sl.8 billion,  with  the  total cost  for  the  technolo~ 0  development  phase  of  the  NASP  program  estimated  at  $3.3  billion. 
NASP  Funding  (millions) 91 
DoD  NASA  Total 
F'l  1988  $338  Sl48  $486 
F'l  1989  569  237  806 
F'l  1990  195  59  254 
F'l  1991  163  95  258 
F'l  199292  Ulli  .LID  ll.Q2l 
Total  1498  611  2109 
b.  High  S~eed Civil Transport 
The  technological  development  of  HSCT  can  be  traced  back  to  the 
Supersonic  Cruise  Transport  (SST)  program  started  in  the  early  1960s,  the 
Supersonic Cruise  Research  (SCR)  program  which  lasted  from  1973  until  1981, 
and  more  recently,  the  NASP  program.93  In  addition,  various  R&D  programs 
initially undertaken  for  military purposes  are  now  being  transferred  to  HSCT 
applications.  For  example,  test  programs  on  military applications  of  vortex 
flap  technology  were  expanded  to  include  vortex  flap  research  applicable  to 
wing  designs  for  the  HSCT.94 
Efforts  aimed  specifically at  the  development  of  HSCT  began  in  1986, 
when  NASA  let  two  3-phase  study  contracts  to  Boeing  Aircraft  and  McDonnell 
Douglas  to examine  the  state of  readiness  of  HSCT  technology,  alternative 
90  S~ace Flight,  April  1991,  at  135. 
91  NASP  Fiscal  Year  1991  Budget  Request,  at  15;  Joint  Hearing  of  the 
Committee  on  Science,  Space  and  Technology,  and  the  Subcommittee  on  Research 
and  Development  of  the  Committee  on  the  Armed  Services  House  of 
Representatives,  August  2,  1989  at  66;  "NASP  Industry  Consortium  is  Hailed  as 
Model  for  Future  High-Tech Projects,"  Space  N~ws,  March  18,  1991,  at  4. 
92  1992  figures  are  budget  requests. 
93  Study  of  High  Speed  Civil  Transport,  NASA,  at  17  (1989). 
94  Aviation  Week  & Space  Technology,  June  18,  1991,  at  84. - 30  -
design  concepts,  environmental  issues,  and  economic  and  market  issues.95 
Then,  in  1989,  NASA  developed  a  proposed  HSCT  research  and  technology  (R&T) 
program  to assess  the  technology  needed  for  the aircraft  industry  to  reach  a 
decision  on  whether  to  proceed  with  development  and  production  of  an  HSCT.96 
Although  the  R&T  program  is  aimed  at  developing  technologies  for  an  HSCT, 
NASA  hopes  that  at  the  conclusion of  the  program,  the  technology  will  be 
validated  to  the  point  where  the  U.S.  aerospace  industry will  move  forward 
and  develop  a  commercial  HSCT.  To  help ensure  this,  the  program  is  to  be  a 
joint  industry-government  activity.97 
The  HSCT  R&T  program  estimates  that  HSCT  development  will  require 
combined  NASA  and  industr~ contributions  amounting  to  Sl.S  to  S2.0  billion 
over  ten  to  twelve  years.  8  NASA's  1990  budget  included  S25  million  to 
initiate efforts  related  to  the  development  of  an  environmentally  and 
economically  sound  high  speed  commercial  transport. 
In  1991,  NASA  efforts  aimed  at  providing  a  foundation  for  development 
of  a  new  HSCT  were  accelerated.  NASA  earlier  had  planned  to  initiate a 
six-year,  Sl-billion Phase  2  high-speed  program  in  fiscal  year  1993. 
Progress  was  so  rapid  in  Phase  1,  however,  that  a  Phase  2  element  involving 
propulsion  system materials  is  being  initiated a  year  early  in  fiscal  year 
1992  with  a  request  for  $16.5  million.99 
c.  Carryover  Benefits  from  NASP  to  HSCT 
Although  the  NASP  and  the  HSCT  ultimately are  intended  to  be  quite 
different  planes,  the  technical  requirements  and  capabilities  of  the  high 
speed  flight  which  each  will specialize  in are  similar,  and  therefore  much  of 
the  technology  development  on  the  NASP  and  HSCT  has  been  parallel, 
complementary,  and  performed  by  the  same  contractors.  NASP  and  HSCT 
technology areas  under  development  include  pr?pulsion  systems  and  fuels; 
aerodynamics;  materials  and  structures;  flight  and  engine  control  systems; 
and  displays  and  navigational  systems.100 
95  Study  of  Hfgh  Speed Civil Transport,  at  7. 
96  !d.  at  57. 
97  !d. 
98  !d.  Although  there  was  no  specific  HSCT  program  prior  to  1989,  NASA 
spent  approximately  SlO  million  to  Sl5  million  in  FY  '88  on  related 
technologies.  Study  of  High  Speed  Civi~ ~ransport,  at  12. 
99  Aviation Week  & Space  Technology,  March  18,  1991,  at  149. 
lOO  Commercial  High  Speed  Aircraft  Opportunities  and  Issues  23  (1989);  T.J. 
Gregory  & H.  Wright,  National  Aerospace  Plane  Status  and  Plans  at  149-56  (May 
1989);  Jane's- All  the  World's  Aircraft,  1989-1990,  at  471. - 3l  -
Numerous  reports  and  official  statements  demonstrate  the  potential 
interrelationship between  the  two  vehicles  and  their development.  For 
example,  one  report  states: 
"Although  not  directed  toward  a  supersonic 
civilian aircraft,  the  NASP  program  bears  some 
relation  to  the  current  interest  in  HSCT .... 
While  there  is little relationship  between  the 
NASP  and  an  HSCT  in  the  Mach  2-4  range,  some  of 
the  technologies  developed  for  the  NASP  may  be 
applicable.  The  potential applicability  would  be 
significantly greater  for  an  HSCT  in  the  Mach  5 
range ..• particularly with materials  and 
engine  technologies.  In  addition,  the  NASP 
program  has  contributed  to  the  renewed  interest 
in  an  HSCT  and  has  helped  maintain active 
research  into  high  speed  flight ......  101 
The  link  between  the  military and  civilian application of  high  speed 
flight  is  further  demonstrated  by  a  statement  in National  Aeronautical  R&D 
Goals,  a  1985  report  prepared  by  the  Executive  Office  of  the  President, 
Office  of  Science  and  Technology  Policy  which  states: 
Gaining  sustained  supersonic cruise capability  is 
of  very  high  priority  for  future  military 
aircraft survivability .•..  However,  this 
military capability  is also.aligned  with  highly 
constructive civil opportunities  that  could 
benefit  the u.s.  in  important  non-military areas 
as  well. 
In general,  there  is  a  strong  belief  that  through  the  NASP  program,  a 
competitive  base  for  future  hypersonic  programs  is  being established.102 
NASP  could  yield  "technologies  that  would  not  only  add  to  an  overall  defense 
technology  base  but  help  to  maintain U.S.  leadership  in  technologies critical 
to  the  aerospace  industry,  show  important  benefits  to  a  wide  spectrum  of  high 
tech  industries  and  provide  revolutionary  methods  of  transportation: 
civilian,  military and  space-oriented."l03 
NASP  work  on  composites  is  a  primary  example  of  an  area  of  development 
expected  to  have  numerous  commercial  spinoffs.  The  National  Materials  and 
Structures  Augmentation  Program  (NMASAP)  consortium,  which  includes all  five 
NASP  contractors,  was  established  to develop  these  materials  cooperatively 
and  accelerate  their  development.  Each  NASP  contractor  has  a  contract  with 
101  Commercial  High  Speed  Aircraft Opportunities  and  Issues,  at  3. 
102  See  Statement  of  J.  Welsh,  supra  note  87. 
103  Space  Flight,  April  1991,  at  134. - 32  -
the  government  to  lead  the  development  of  a  particular material,  with  such 
contracts  to  date  totaling  nearly  $150  million.  As  stated  in Congressional 
testimony  on  the  National  Critical Materials  Council,  "(t)he  NMASAP 
achievements  have  laid  the  ground  work  for  materials  spin-offs  which  may  be 
applicable  to  the  medical,  automotive,  and  commercial  aircraft 
industries.~ 104 
II.  RESEARCH  AND  DEVELOPMENT:  NASA 
A.  NASA  Overview 
1.  Introduction 
As  described  in  Aeronautics  and  Space  Report  of  the  President  --
1989-1990  Activities,  ~[t]he National  Aeronautics  and  Space  Administration 
(NASA),  established  in  1958,  is  responsible  for  planning,  conducting,  and 
managing  civilian research  and  development  activities  in  aeronautics  and 
space.~  As  such,  one  of  NASA's  principal  missions  is  to  help  preserve  U.S. 
leadership  in  aeronautics. 
"Since  the  early days  of  aviation,  the  technology 
developed  by  NASA  and  its predecessor -- the 
National  Advisory  Committee  on  Aeronautics  -- has 
been  a  major  factor  in  the  preeminence of  this 
Nation  in atmospheric  flight  -- both  in military 
aircraft  and  in  civil  transports.  Today,  the 
aircraft  industry  is  the  leading  contributor  to 
our  balance  of  trade,  providing  a  positive 
contribution  and  a  favorable  balance  of 
$16.8  billion last  year.  Eighty-six  out  of  every 
hundred  civil  transports· in  the  world  today  were 
built  in  the  United  States.  More  than  a  million 
Americans  earn their  living  in  aeronautics. 
Clearly,  our  Nation  is  the  world  leader  in 
aeronautics.  We  need  to  keep  it that  way."l05 
*  *  * 
l04  Testimony  by  Robert  H.  Gulcher,  Rockwell  International  and  Ned  D. 
Newman,  McDonnell  Douglas,  on  the  NASP  Materials  and  Augmentation  Program, 
Hearing  on  the  National Critical Materials  Council  before  the  Subcomm.  on 
Transportation,  Aviation  and  Materials  of  the  House  Comm.  on  Science,  Space 
and  Technology,  June  26,  1990,  at ~6~67; 
l05  Dr.  James c.  Fletcher,  Administrator,  National  Aeronautics  and  Space 
Administration,  1990  NASA  Authorization,  Hearings  before  the  Subcomm.  on 
Space  Science  and  Applications  of  the  House  Comm.  on  Science,  Space,  and 
Technology,  lOlst  Cong.  1st  Sess.,  February  2,  28,  March  1,  7,  9,  21,  23, 
April  4,  5,  6,  11,  18,  1989,  Vol.  II,  at  17. - 33  -
"Since  the  establishment  of  NACA  in  1915,  through 
the  formation  of  NASA  in  1958,  and  into  the 
1990s,  our  aeronautics  program  has  represented  an 
important  technological  resource  within  the 
United  States,  broadly contributing  to  both civil 
and  military aviation.  These  75  years  have 
forged  a  strong  partnership with  industry and 
academia  which  has  been  the  foundation  for  major 
aviation  advancements  and  which  still serves 
today as  the  model  for  cooperation  in  other 
fields."106 
*  *  * 
"The  ongoing  NASA  aeronautics  research  and 
technology  program  is vigorous  and  productive. 
We  conduct  pioneering  research  in  emerging 
technologies,  selectively conduct  the  highest 
payoff  systems  technology  programs,  and  produce 
technologies  that  industry  can  incorporate  into 
future  products.  The  results of  our  research  are 
major  factors  in  our  country's aeronautical 
leadership.  We  have  provided  much  of  the 
technology  base  that  has  enabled  the  United 
States  to  be  the  world  leader  in aviation."l07 
In  order  to  fulfill  its mission  and  responsibilities,  NASA  is  the 
primary  government  provider  of  civilian  R&D  funds  for  the  aeronautics 
industry.  NASA  is  best  known  for  its large-scale  R&D  efforts  such  as  the 
Aircraft  Energy  Efficient  Program  (ACEE),  the  noise  reduction  program,  and 
the  supersonic/hypersonic  transport  program.  However,  NASA  has  also 
sponsored  and  been  involved  in  many  smaller-scale,  shorter-term  R&D  projects 
targeted  at  providing  practical solutions  to  problems  and  issues  in  the 
aeronautics  field  such  as aircraft  icing sensors,  windshear  prediction  and 
various air safety spinoffs.  Many  of  the  technological  advances  produced  by 
NASA  research  have  been  incorporated  by  U.S.  manufacturers  of  large 
commercial  aircraft  into their  products,  resulting  in  large cost-savings  to 
those  manufacturers.  Furthermore,  the  U.S.  companies  that  perform  this.R&D 
106  Arnold  D.  Aldrich,  Associate  Administrator,  National  Aeronautics  and 
Space  Administration,  Aeronautics,  Exploration  and  Technology,  1991  NASA 
Authorization  Hearing  before  the  Subcomm.  on  Transportation,  Aviation  and 
Materials  of  the  House  Comm.  on  Science_,  Space,  and  Technology,  lOlst  Cong., 
2d  Sess.,  March  20,  1990,  No.  112,  Vol.  I,  at  7,  19. 
l07  Dr.  William  F.  Ballhaus,  Jr.,  Director,  Ames  Research  Center,  National 
Aeronautics  and  Space  Administration,  1990  NASA  Authorization Hearing  before 
the  Subcomm.  on  Transportation,  Aviation  and  Materials  of  the  House  Committee 
on  Science,  Space,  and  Technology,  lOlst  Cong.,  lst Sess.,  April  26,  1989, 
No.  17,  Vol.  I,  at  8-9. - 3 ...  -
work  benefit  greatly  from  the  training  it provides  to  company  personnel  and 
from  the  associated advances  in  in-house  research,  design  and  production 
capabilities. 
In  addition  to civilian aeronautics  R&D,  NASA,  usually  in  conjunction 
with  the  Department  of  Defense,  also  funds  military  R&D  projects  in  the 
aeronautics  field.  The  National  Aerospace  Plane  program  is  a  prime  example 
of  this  type  of  research.  NASA's  military  R&D  contributes  to u.s. 
technological  superiority  in military aircraft.  It also  provides  significant 
crossover  benefits  to  the  u.s.  commercial  aircraft  industry.  Due  to  the  fact 
that  NASA  is  deeply  involved  in  civilian aeronautics  R&D,  its military  R&D 
activities  are  closely  related  to civilian aeronautics  and  have  a  high  level 
of  crossover  benefits.  The  1982  study of  aeronautical  research  and 
technology  by  the  White  House  Office  of  Science  and  Technology  Policy 
concluded,  for  example,  that  ~go  percent  or  more  of  the  current  NASA  R&T 
development  efforts  have  applicability  to  both civil and  military 
aeronautical  products."l08 
In  general  NASA  civilian and  military  R&D  have  played  a  major  role  in 
the  development  of  the  U.S.  commercial  aircraft  industry: 
108 
"During  the  postwar  period,  the  commercial 
aircraft  industry  has  benefited  from  substantial 
direct  (NASA  and  NACA)  and  indirect  (military 
research  and  IR&D)  federal  financial  support  for 
research.  The  size of  the  federal  R&D 
investment,  as  well  as  the  existence of  a 
dedicated civilian  technology  development 
program,  renders  the  aircraft  industry unique 
among  U.S.  manufacturing  industries.  Both  NACA 
and  NASA  were  centers  for  generic  research  and 
reduced  the  costs  to  industry of  R&D  through 
operation  and  construction of  testing  and 
research  installations.  Moreover,  both civilian 
and  military research  programs  encouraged  the 
wide  diffusion of  technological  knowledge  within 
the  aircraft  industry,  supporting  th~ development 
of  a  readily accessible  industry  knowledge  base. 
In  this way,  the  federal  programs  operated  in  a 
fashion  that  closely  resembles  the  coorerative 
R&D  programs  in  the  Japanese  economy."  09 
See  supra  note  27,  Vol.  II  at  VII-14. 
l09  D.  Mowery  & N.  Rosenberg,  Technology  and  the  Pursuit of  Economic  Growth 
188  (1989). - 35  -
2.  NASA's  Organizational Structure 
A diagram of  NASA's  organizational  structure  is  contained  in 
Exhibit  2.  As  the  diagram  indicates,  there  are  four  offices  responsible  for 
overseeing  and  undertaking  the  majority of  R&D  projects  within  NASA: 
1)  Aeronautics  Exploration  & Technology;  2)  Space  Science  & Applications; 
3)  Space  Flight;  4)  Space  Operations.  As  the  name  implies,  the  Office of 
Aeronautics  Exploration  & Technology  undertakes  the  majority of  activities 
related  to  the  commercial  aircraft  industry.  This  office  is  responsible  for 
the  planning,  advocacy,  direction,  execution,  and  evaluation of  projects  and 
research activities concerned  with  aeronautics  research  and  technology.llO 
The  offices of  Space  Science  & Applications,  Space  Flight  and  Space 
Operations  are all  involved  in different aspects  of  space activities 
including  programs  directed  toward  understanding  the  space  environment, 
developing  space  transportation capabilities,  and  providing  spacecraft 
operations  and  control  and  communication  centers. 
3.  NASA  Aeronautics  Budget 
NASA's  budget  is organized  into five  major  sections:  (1)  Research  and 
Development;  (2)  Space  Flight,  Control  & Data  Communications; 
(3)  Construction of  Facilities;  (4)  Research  and  Program  Management;  and 
(5)  Inspector General.lll 
All  or  almost  all of  NASA's  aeronautics  programs  (civilian  and 
military)  fall  under  the  section of  the  Research  and  Development  budget 
called Aeronautical  Research  & Technology  which  is  administered  by  the  Office 
of  Aeronautics,  Exploration  and  Technology.  The  Aeronautical  Research  and 
Technology  budget  is  divided  into  two  primary areas:  (a)  research  and 
technology  base  and  (b)  systems  technology  programs.112  Research  and 
technology  base  funding  covers  broad  research'areas  such  as  fluid  and  thermal 
physics  research  and  technology,  propulsion  and  power  research and 
technology,  and  materials  and  structures  research  and  technology.  Systems 
technology  programs  cover  funding  for  specific  technology  programs  such  as 
rotor  craft  systems  technology,  high-performance aircraft systems  technology, 
advanced  propulsion  systems  technology,  and  high  speed  research.113 
The  NASA  aeronautics  budget  has  grown  fairly consistently  from 
$324.9  million  in  1976  to  $931.8  million  in  1990.  It totalled $8.9  billion 
from  1976  to  1990.  Yearly  figures  for  the  total  NASA  budget  and  the  NASA 
110  Aeronautics  and  Space  Report  of  the  President,  1989-1990  Activities, 
at  10. 
111  NASA  Budget  Estimates,  Fiscal  Year  1991,  Vol.  I. 
112  Id.  at  RD  12-l. 
113  Id.  at  RD  12-5,  12-26. - 36  -
aeronautics  budget  from  1976  to  1990  are  set out  in  Exhibit  3.  According  to 
information  drawn  from  official compilations  of  NASA  R&D  contracts,  Boeing 
r~ceived at  least  $311  million of  NASA  R&D  contracts  between  1979  and  1990 
and  McDonnell  Douglas  received at  least  $1.68  billion of  NASA  R&D  contracts 
in  the  same  period.ll4 
Given  that  one  of  NASA's  primary objectives  is  to assist U.S. 
commercial  aeronautics  and  that,  as  discussed  above,  NASA's  military and 
civilian  R&D  programs  are  closely  interrelated and  almost  all are  highly 
applicable  to  commercial  aeronautics  products,  it can  be  reasonably estimated 
that  90  percent  of  NASA's  aeronautics  R&D  expenditures  constitute  a  benefit 
to  the  U.S.  commercial  aircraft  industry~  Thus,  the  $8.9  billion of  NASA  R&D 
in  the  past  fifteen  years  translates  into a  benefit  to  the  U.S.  commercial 
aircraft  industry of  $8  billion.  Expressed  in  current  dollar  terms  using  an 
opportunity cost/compound  interest  formula,  the  benefit  of  NASA  R&D  is 
$16.96  billion.115 
4.  Dissemination of  NASA  R&D  Results 
An  important  issue  with  respect  to  NASA  R&D  is  that  of  the 
distribution and  availability  to  commercial  manufacturers  of  NASA's  research 
and  development  work.  Some  parties might  argue  that all civilian R&D  results 
are  freely  available  to  the  public  and  therefore  provide  no  special  benefit 
to  U.S.  manufacturers  vis-a-vis  foreign  manufacturers.  Such  a  claim, 
however,  would  not  appear  to  be  true. 
First,  NASA  regulations  specifically provide  that  U.S.  companies  may 
be  given  "early access"  of  two  years  or  more  to  documents  that  "contain  the 
results  of  NASA  research  and  development  which  has  significant  potential  for 
domestic  benefit,  either  for  commercial  or  Government  use."ll6 
One  example  where  research  results  were  withheld  has  been  publicly 
documented.  In  the  late  1960s,  NASA  did  some  fundamental  research  on 
supercritical  wing  technology  which  came  to  have  important,  widespread 
commercial  applications  in  the  1970s  and  1980s.  NASA  did  not  make  the 
results of  its  research  equally available  to all parties. 
114 
"The  results  of  this first  work  on  the  integral 
or  unslotted airfoil  were  given  limited 
This  information  was  obtained  from  the  Federal  Procurement  Data  Center. 
115  This  calculation  is  based  upon  30-year u.s.  Treasury  Bond  interest  rates 
for  each  of  the  years  from  1976  to  1990~  The  calculation assumes  annual 
compounding  up  to  1991.  As  with  the  current dollar  calculations  concerning 
benefits  from  DoD  R&D,  this calculation  should  be  considered  a  rough  estimate 
for  illustrative purposes  only. 
116  NASA  Scientific  and  Technical  Information Handbook:  Documentation, 
Approval,  and  Dissemination,  ~  203.l(c)  (Feb.  6,  1987). - 37  -
distribution  in  1967  in  a  confidential  Langley 
working  paper.  NASA  recognized  the  importance  of 
the  discovery  and  applied  for  patents  on  the 
supercritical  wing  in  Canada,  France,  Great 
Britain,  Australia,  Israel,  Italy,  Sweden, 
Holland,  Germany,  and  Japan.  In order  that 
American-made  aircraft  could  take  advantage  of 
the  discovery,  no  public  announcement  of  the 
supercritical  wing  was  made  until  NASA's  news 
release  on  February  7,  1969."117 
Moreover,  even  if  the  final,  published  results of  particular  research 
are  freely  available,  the  private  company  or  companies  which  participated  in 
the  R&D  project  would  inevitably  have  an  advantage  over  companies  that 
learned  about  the  research  secondhand  and  at  a  later date,  l·~··  when  it  was 
finally  published.  The  R&D  contractors  would  have  personnel  trained  in  the 
areas  relating  to  the  R&D,  as  well  as  a  much  better  and  earlier understanding 
of  its  importance  and  possible  commercial  applications.  The  fact  that  NASA 
R&D  contracts  go  almost  exclusively  to  U.S.  companies  points  to  a  clear 
benefit  for  the  U.S.  industry  relative  to  its foreign  com~titors.ll8 
B.  Major  NASA  Programs 
As  noted  in  the overview  of  NASA's  aeronautics  R&D  activities above, 
NASA  has  carried out  a  number  of  large-scale  R&D  efforts.  Such  efforts are 
multi-year  programs  consisting of  a  series of  research projects  unified  by  a 
central  programmatic objective.  This  section presents  an  overview of  one 
major  program,  the  Aircraft  Energy  Efficient  Program,  in order  to  illuminate 
the  direct  commercial  relevance  of  these  NASA  programs.  In addition,  this 
section briefly describes  three  other  major  NASA  civilian aeronautics  R&D 
programs:  the  noise  reduction  program,  the supercritical  wing  program,  and 
the  high-lift  system  program. 
1.  Aircraft  Energy  Efficient  Program119 
NASA's  Aircraft  Energy  Efficient  (ACEE)  program  was  initiated  in  1976 
with  the  objective of  increasing  the  fuel  efficiency of  large  commercial 
aircraft.  The  ACEE  program consisted of  six  separate  R&D  projects.  These 
projects  and  their  commercial  benefits  are  summarized  below.  To  emphasize 
the  significance of  the  ACEE  program,  it should  be  noted  here  that  according 
117  Midwest  Research  Institute,  Economic  Impact  and  Technological  Progress 
of  NASA  Research  and  Development  Expenditures,  Vol.  III at  III-14  - III-15 
(1988). 
118  British Aerospace,  for  example,  has  received  only  one  R&D  contract  from 
NASA  in  the  past  twenty  years.  This  pattern appears  to  be  similar  for  the 
other  major  European  manufacturers. 
119  Appendix  8  describes  the  ACEE  program  in  more  detail. - 38  -
to  NASA  experts,  "[t]he  ACEE  programme  was  the  genesis  of  the  Boeing  757  and 
767  aeroplanes."l20 
a.  Energy  Efficient  Engine  Project 
The  Energy  Efficient  Engine  (E3)  Project,  which  was  funded  from  1975 
to  1983,  was  an  outgrowth  of  NASA's  work  in  the  early  1970s  on  a 
fuel-efficient  engine.  The  goal  of  the  E3  project  was  to  reduce  fuel  usage 
and  direct  operating costs  while  meeting  future  FAA  regulations  and  EPA 
exhaust  emission  standards  for  turbofan  jet engines  (specifically General 
Electric's CF6-50C  and  Pratt  & Whitney's  JT9D-7A).l2l 
Under  the  E3  project,  contracts  were  awarded  to General  Electric  and 
Pratt  & Whitney.  While  original  component  test  results  focused  on  the  GE 
CF6,  the  E3  program  resulted  in  numerous  design  and  performance  improvements 
on  the  PW2000  for  the  narrow-body  Boeing  757,  and  the  PW4000  series  for 
wide-body  aircraft  such  as  the  DC-10  and  747.  NASA  expended  approximately 
$200  million  on  the  program  over  its nine-year  life.122 
b.  Advanced  Turboprop  Project 
The  objective of  the  Advanced  Turboprop  (ATP)  project  was  to achieve  a 
15  to  20  percent  fuel  saving  over  existing  turbofan aircraft  by  developing 
technology  for  a  fuel  efficient  short-to-medium  range,  100-150  passenger 
advanced  turboprop aircraft  traveling at cruise  speeds  up  to  Mach  .80  and 
altitudes of  up  to  35,000.123  Boeing,  McDonnell  Douglas,  Lockheed,  Pratt  & 
Whitney  and  General  Electric all particiFated  in  ATP.  The  technology  was 
successfully validated  in  three  flight  tests conducted  on  Boeing  and 
McDonnell  Douglas  aircraft.  The  commercial  applications of  this  program, 
however,  never  reached  series production  because  high  noise  levels  and  lower 
oil  prices  decreased  the  economic  value  of  implementing  this  technology. 12 4 
After  1987,  propulsion work  initiated during  the  ATP  project  was 
refocused  on  Ultra High  Bypass  (UHB)  engine  technology  aimed  at  reducing  fuel 
consumption  by  an  additional  25  to  30  percent  beyond  that  of  the  latest 
120  R.  Petersen  & B.  Holmes,  "U.S.  Aeronautical  Research  for  the  1990s," 
World  Aerospace  Technology  91  at  52  (London  1991). 
121  Fuel  Economy,  at  29:  Comptroller  General,  Report  to  Congress,  "A  Look  at 
NASA's  Aircraft  Energy  Efficient  Program,"  at  39  (GAO,  July  28,  1980) 
(hereinafter  "Comptroller's Report"):  see  also Aeronautics  and  Space  Report 
of  the  President,  1981  Activities,  at  26. 
122  Comptroller's  Report  at  42-43. 
123  Fuel  Economy  in Aviation,  NASA,  at  43  (1985)  (hereinafter  "Fuel 
Economy"). 
124  Aeronautics  Research  and  Technology,  NASA  (1988). - 39  -
generation  turbofan-powered  aircraft.125  Although  UHB  programs  were  funded 
at  approximately  $12  million per  fiscal  year  from  1988  through  1991,  UHB  also 
did  not  reach  series production  for  the  same  reasons  described  above.l26 
NASA,  however,  has  continued  its  interest  in  reducing  the  noise  level of  UHB 
engines,  and  plans  to  make  further  requests  for  FY  1993  funding.l27 
Total  costs  of  the  ATP  project  through  1987  -- when  initial objectives 
were  completed  -- totalled  $140  million.128  In addition,  UHB  program  funding 
through  1991  was  $48  million.l29 
c.  Engine  Component  Improvement  Project 
The  Engine  Component  Improvement  (ECI)  project  was  directed  at 
improving  performance  and  reducing  fuel  consumption  of  various  existing 
commercial  aircraft  engines,  in  particular Pratt  & Whitney's  JT8D  and  JT9D 
and  GE's  CF6.l30 
NASA  expended  approximately  $40  million on  the  ECI  program  from  1974 
to  1979.131  Contracts  awarded  to  Pratt  & Whitney  under  the  ECI  project 
resulted  in  several  system  and  design  improvements  to existing  JT8D  and  JT9D 
engines  as  well  as  new  engine  configurations,  such  as  the  PW2037. 132  Among 
the  aircraft  that  have  benefited  from  this  technology  are  the  DC-9,  DC-10  and 
Boeing  727,  737,  and  747.133 
As  a  result  of  the  commercial  success  of  the  JT8D  engine,  Pratt  & 
Whitney  repaid  the  U.S.  government  approximately  $19.2  million of  the  initial 
$26.3  million government  investment  through cost-recovery provisions 
contained  in  the  initial contract. 134  Although  Pratt  & Whitney  is  expected 
to  repay  the  remaining  $7.1  million during  the  early  1990s,  the  company  at  a 
125  Information  from  NASA;  "UHB  Technology Validation  - The  Final  Step," 
AIAA-88-2807  (July  1988). 
126  Information  from  NASA. 
127  Id. 
128  Id. 
129  Id. 
130  Fuel  Economy,  at  9-10. 
131  Comptroller's Report,  at  37;  information  from  NASA. 
132  NASA  ECI  Programs:  Benefits  to  Pratt  & Whitney  Engines  (1982). 
133  Fuel  Economy,  at  15. 
134  Aviation  Dailv,  March  7,  1989. - -iO  -
m1n1mum  received  the  equivalent  of  an  interest  free  loan of  $26.3  million 
over  approximately  15  years.lJS 
d.  Composite  Primary Aircraft  Structures 
P-roject 
The  Composite  Primary Aircraft  Structures  (CPAS}  project  was  an 
outgrowth  of  research  conducted  by  NASA  in  the  early 1970s.  The  goal  of  the 
CPAS  project  was  to facilitate  the  use  of  composite  components  to  reduce  the 
weight  of  aircraft  by  25  percent  and  to  increase  fuel  efficiency  by  10  to 
15  percent.136  To  implement  the  project,  NASA  contracted with  Boeing, 
McDonnell  Douglas  and  Lockheed  to  develop  and  test  components  and  wing 
sections. 137 
Components  developed  during  the  CPAS  program  have  been  used  in  the 
DC-10,  L-1011,  and  B-727,  757,  and  767  airplanes.l38  In addition,  advances 
made  in  composite  research  during  the  CPAS  project are  now  being  used  in 
projects  such  as  the  NASP  and  High  Speed Civil Transport.  The  estimated 
annual  cost  to  the  government  of  R&D  for  the  CPAS  project  has  varied  between 
$110  million  and  $217  million.l39 
e.  Energy Efficient  Transport  Program 
The  Energy  Efficient  Transport  (EET)  project  focused  on  the 
technological  development  of  aerodynamics  and  active controls  and  included 
investigation of airfoils,  winglets,  airframes,  engines,  high-lift  devices 
for  a  supercritical wing,  laminar  flow,  surface  coatings  and  active 
controls.140  Boeing,  McDonnell  Douglas,  Lockheed  and  Pratt  & Whitney all 
participated  in development  and  testing  under  the  EET  project. 
135  .Information  from  NASA. 
136  Fuel  Economy,  at  59-60. 
137  Id.  at  62-71. 
138  Id;  Statement  of  R.  Schauffle,  V.P.  Engineering,  McDonnell  Douglas,  1986 
NASA  Senate  Budget  Authorization Hearings,  at  551.  Other  components  for  some 
or  all of  the  aircraft,  such  as  the  electronic flight  systems,  may  have  been 
developed  under  other  government  programs,  such  as  the  Federal  Aviation 
Administration's Electronic Flight  Instrument  System  program. 
139  Comptroller's  Report,  at  57-58. 
140  Fuel  Economy,  at  77-91. - ~1  -
The  DC-10,  the  B-757  and  767,  and  the  L-1011-500  all incorporated 
technology  from  this  project. 141  The  R&D  cost estimate  for  the  EET  project 
was  $85.7  million.l42 
f.  Laminar  Flow  Control  Project 
The  Laminar  Flow  Control  (LFC)  project  was  intended  to  increase  fuel 
efficiency by  20  to  40  percent  by  developing  a  suction  system  to  reduce 
surface-airstream friction. 143  Under  this  project,  NASA  contracted  with 
Boeing,  McDonnell  Douglas  and  Lockheed  to  enhance  laminar  flow  control.l44 
At  the  conclusion of  this  project,  laminar  flow  research  was  continued  under 
the  Research  and  Technology  Base  Program,  with  an  emphasis  on  applications 
for  fuel  efficient  subsonic  and  high  speed  transport.l45 
The  R&D  cost  estimate  for  the  LFC  project  was  $227  million. 146 
Additional  funding  has  been  requested  for  a  "Wing  Route  Experiment,"  based  on 
the  LFC  program  which  is  aimed  at  increasing  fuel  efficiency  for  600  to  1,000 
passenger  subsonic  transports.  ~his  $300  million  line  item,  however,  has  yet 
to  be  approved. 147 
2.  Aircraft  Noise  Reduction  Program148 
There  were  two  series of  NASA  programs  between  1965  and  1979  that 
examined  the  problem of  aircraft  noise.  A panel  convened  in  1965  to  assess 
the  growing  problem of  noise  around  airports  concluded  that  an  initiative  for 
reducing  aircraft noise  could only  come  from  the  federal  government.  Under 
an  executive office mandate,  NASA  established  a  separate  R&D  project  for 
aircraft  noise.  NASA  was  unable  to  assemble  sufficient  internal  staff  for 
14l  Fuel  Economy,  at  77-91.  Also,  in cooperation  with  NASA,  McDonnell 
Douglas  developed  winglets  for  the  MD-11.  These  winglets,  which  reduce  drag 
and  increase overall  performance,  are  in  use  on  the  MD-11. 
142  Comptroller's  Report,  at  49. 
143  Id. 
144  Fuel  Economy,  at  101. 
145  "Research  in Natural  Laminar  Flow  and  Laminar  Flow Control,"  NASA 
Conference  Publication  2487  Pt.  1,  at  2,  28  (1987);  information  from  NASA. 
146  Comptroller's  Report,  at  53. 
147  Information  from  NASA. 
148  Information  on  NASA's  Aircraft  Noise  Reduction  program  has  been  drawn 
from  J.  Langford,  Federal  Investment  in  Aeronautical  Research  & Development: 
Analyzing  the  NASA  Experience  (MIT  Doctoral  Dissertation,  June  1987). - ~2  -
this  project,  however,  and  turned  to  large-scale contracting  with  industry. 
Three  major  programs  eventually  emerged: 
0 
0 
0 
Acoustic  Nacelle  Program-- headed  by  NASA's  Langley  Research 
Center  and  aimed  at  determining  the  feasibility of  nacelle 
retrofits  for  existing airliners; 
Quiet  Engine  Program -- headed  by  NASA's  Lewis  Research  Center  to 
develop  a  demonstrator  engine  optimized  for  low  noise;  and 
Steep Approach  Program -- conducted  jointly by  NASA's  Langley, 
Dryden  and  Ames  Research  Centers  to develop  techniques  and 
equipment  for  rapid descents  into airports,  with  the  goal  of 
minimizing  noise  exposure  on  the  ground. 
Ensuing  debate  over  noise  reduction  during  the  1970s  led  NASA  to 
initiate  a  new  series  of  programs  which,  like  the  first  wave  of  programs,  was 
intended  both  to  provide  data  and  options  for  regulatory decisions  and  to 
advance  the  technology of  noise  reduction.  These  programs  included: 
0 
0 
0 
REFAN  --NASA's  largest  noise  reduction  program,  undertaken  to 
determine  feasibility of  reducing  noise  levels  by  retrofitting 
existing aircraft with  REFAN  engines  and  new  acoustically treated 
nacelles; 
QCSEE  (Quiet  Clean  STOL  Experimental  Engines)  -- under  which  NASA 
built  and  tested  two  research  engines  designed  for  low-noise 
operation  on  short  takeoff  and  landing aircraft;  and 
QCGAT  (Quiet  Clean  General  Aviation Turbine)  -- undertaken  in  an 
effort  to  extend  noise- and  pollution-reduction  technology  to 
smaller  engines  than  those  engines  used  in  previous efforts. 
Federal  R&D  expenditures  to  remedy  the aircraft noise  problem 
eventually  totaled more  than  $500  million,  with  almost  85  percent  spent 
through  the  aeronautics  programs  of  NASA. 149  Each  of  these  six noise 
reduction  programs  had  an  impact  on  the  commercial  aircraft  industry.  In 
particular,  the  sound-absorbing  material  (SAM)  developed  by  the  Acoustic 
Nacelle  Program was  promptly  incorporated  into  the  B-747,  DC-10,  and  1~1011. 
It  was  fitted  into  new  production  versions  of  the  B-727,  B-737,  and  DC-9 
beginning  in  1972,  and  this alone  allowed  these aircraft  to  meet  certain 
federal  acquisition regulations.  The  private sector  has  continued  to  refine 
149  Federal  Interagency  Aviation  Noise  Panel,  Federal  Research,  Technology, 
and  Demonstration  Programs  in  Aviation  Noise,  Office  of  Noise  Abatement  & 
Control,  U.S.  Environmental  Protection Agency  (EPA  440/9-78-307),  March  1978. - 43  -
the  effectiveness of  SAM.  New  generations  of  material  are  used  extensively 
in  new  Stage  3  aircraft  such  as  the  B-757,  B-767  and  MD-80.150 
3.  Supercritical  Wing  Programl51 
From  1964  through  1975,  NASA  conducted  research,  wind  tunnel  tests, 
and  flight  validation programs  regarding  supercritical  wing  design,  a 
significant  technological  advance  in  wing  design  that  has  permitted 
substantial  increases  in  the  speed  and  efficiency of  large commercial 
aircraft.  From  1964  on,  NASA  and  the  U.S.  industry  worked  closely  together 
to  refine  this  concept  into  an efficient  transportation  technology.  As  noted 
above  in  the  section  on  dissemination of  NASA  research,  NASA  recognized  the 
importance  of  the  supercritical  wing  discovery  and  helped  the  U.S.  industry 
take  advantage  of  it by  delaying  public  announcement  of  it.  In  addition, 
"(t]he extensive  experimental  results obtained after  1967  on  refinements  and 
applications  of  the  NASA  supercritical airfoils  remained classified until 
1983."152 
4.  High-Lift  System  Programl53 
Early  test  flights  of  NASA's  supercritical  wing  for  commercial 
transport  aircraft demonstrated  the  necessity of  developing  high-lift  systems 
for  these  newer  airfoils to  improve  aircraft lift at  low  speed.  In  response, 
in  the  early  1970s  NASA  initiated a  research  program  to explore  high-lift 
devices  and  promote  development  of  superior  multi-element airfoil  systems  for 
transport  aircraft.  This  program  resulted  in significant  improvements  in 
theory,  design  techniques  and  test  methods. 
One  approach  to  high-lift or  multi-element  airfoil analysis  was 
developed  by  Lockheed  under  the  sponsorship of  the  NASA  Langley  Research 
Center.l54  Boeing,  under  NASA  contract,  made  a  substantial  "modification  and 
150  Vaughn  Bloomenthal  of  Boeing  said  in  1973  that,  "much  of  the  original 
acoustic  technology  was  developed  in  the  NASA  •.• program starting  in  1967. 
That  work  has  been  invaluable  in  arriving at  today's  acoustic 
configurations."  House  Hearings,  Aircraft  Noise  Abatement,  December  1973, 
at  142. 
151  See  generally Midwest  Research  Institute,  Economic  Impact  and 
Technological  Progress of  NASA  Research  and  Development  Expenditures  (1988) 
(hereinafter  "Midwest  Research  Institute  Study"). 
152  Id.  at  III-15. 
153  Information  on  NASA's  High-Lift  System  program  has  been  drawn  from  the 
Midwest  Research  Institute Study. 
154  W.A.  Stevens,  S.H.  Goradia,  & J.A.  Braden,  "Mathematical  Model  for 
Two-Dimensional  Multi-Component  Airfoils  in  Viscous  Flows,"  NASA  TM-89125, 
July  1987. - 44  -
clarification of  the  NASA-Lockheed  multielement  airfoil computer  program"  in 
1977  and  1978.  This  program  marked  the  beginning  of  an  eight-year  refinement 
of  high-lift  systems  of  Boeing's  aircraft. 155  Both  Boeing  and  McDonnell 
Douglas  engineers  were  enthusiastic about  the  data  provided  by  Langley's  low 
turbulence  pressure  tunnel:  "a  real  jewel-- a  unique  national  resource."l56 
The  12-foot  tunnel  at  Ames  was  also  relied  on  extensively until  it was 
derated  and  scheduled  for  extended  repairs.  McDonnell  Douglas  engineers  who_ 
worked  most  extensively with  Ames  in  the  mid  and  late  1980s  indicated  that 
lack  of  availability of  the  12-foot  tunnel  significantly  hampered  or  delayed 
the  development  of  the  advanced  high-lift  systems. 157 
Benefits  derived  from  industry  and  NASA  advances  in high-lift  design, 
including  the ability  to  develop  advanced  high-lift  sections  and  proceed  to 
wind-tunnel  testing,  virtually assured  that  the  aerodynamic  characteristics 
will  be  close  to  those  desired.  Thus,  both  the  time  and  cost  to create  and 
certify  new  high-lift  systems  have  been  reduced. 
C.  Analysis  of  Specific Contracts 
In  order  to  analyze  the  commercial  benefits  from  NASA  R&D  at  a  more 
specific  level,  we  examined  a  number  of  NASA  R&D  contracts obtained  through 
earlier  Freedom  of  Information  Act  requests.  Three  such  contracts,  all part 
of  NASA's  JT8D  engine  program,  are  described  below. 
NASA's  JT8D  program,  which  was  carried out  in  the  1970s  as  part of  the 
noise  reduction  program  described  above,  was  a  two-phase  program  aimed  at 
redesigning  the  JTBD  engine  to  make  it quieter.  Phase  I  of  the  program 
involved  defining  and  designing  the  engine  modifications,  initiating  the 
procurement  of  experimental  hardware  and  preparing  for  engine  testing. 
Phase  II  involved  testing  the  modified  engine  (known  as  the  refan  JTBD 
engine)  and  producing  retrofit kits  for  the  engine. 
The  first  of  the  three contracts  under  consideration  here  was  one 
between  NASA  and  the  United  Aircraft Corporation  (Pratt  & Whitney Aircraft 
Division),  dated  June  29,  1973.  The  total  amount  obligated  under  the 
contract  was  $15  million.  Under  the  contract,  Pratt  & Whitney  was 
responsible  for  completing  the  engine  refan modifications  design,  producing 
and  testing  refan engines  and  providing  retrofit  kits  for  refan  engines .. 
This  contract,  and  the  JT8D  program generally,  were  of  great  commercial 
significance  to  Pratt  & Whitney,  since  they  led  to  a  major  improvement  in  the 
JTBD  engine  and  ensured  its continuing  use  in  major  commercial  aircraft. 
The  second  contract  was  between  NASA  and  the  McDonnell  Douglas 
Corporation,  also  dated  June  29,  1973.  The  contract,  for  $7.8  million,  was 
155  Midwest  Research  Institute  Study,  at  III-32. 
156  Id.  at  III-35. 
157  Id. - ~5  -
part  of  Phase  II of  the  JTBD  refan  project.  McDonnell  Douglas  was 
responsible  for  identifying  the  modifications  required  to  install  the 
modified  JTBD  engine  on  the  DC-9;  designing  and  fabricating  flightworthy 
nacelles  and  aircraft modifications;  providing  engineering  support  and 
hardware  for  engine_ground  tests at  Pratt  & Whitney;  and  performing 
demonstration flights  of  the  modified  DC-9  equipped  with  JTBD  refan  engines. 
The  contract  and  the  JTBD  refan  program  generally  had  commercial 
significance  for  McDonnell  Douglas.  The  JTBD  refan  program  permitted 
McDonnell  Douglas  to  keep  its  DC-9  program  alive.  The  DC-9  program  had  been 
suffering  due  to weight  problems  encountered  with  rear-mounted  engines.  The 
only practical  solution  was  to  carry out  a  weight  modification  to  the  JTBD 
engine  to  permit  its use  on  the  DC-9. 
The  third contract  was  between  NASA  and  Boeing,  dated  July  11,  1973. 
The  total obligated  amount  under  the  contract  was  $4.5  million.  The  contract 
was  also part  of  Phase  II  of  the  JTBD  refan  program.  Under  the  contract, 
Boeing  was  to test  the  installation of  JTBD  refan  engines  on  the  727. 
Specifically,  Boeing  was  responsi~le for  th~ following  tasks:  identifying 
the  modifications  to  the  727  necessary  to  install  the  modified  engines; 
designing  the nacelles;  providing  hardware  for  engine  ground  tests; 
performing  demonstration  ground  tests of  the  refanned  727  engine;  and 
developing  retrofit kit costs  for  the  727. 
This  contract  was  commercially  significant  to  Boeing  because  Boeing 
faced  a  choice  between  trying  to  upgrade  the  727  with  the  refan JTBD  engine 
or  re-engining  the  737  with  the  CFM-56  high  bypass  engine.  The  work  under 
this  contract -- testing  the  JTBD  on  the  727  -- underwrote  the  costs  for 
Boeing  of  assessing  the  727  option.  Boeing  ultimately decided  to  concentrate 
on  re-engining  the  737. 
Each  of  these  contracts  represents  an  important  example  of  how  NASA 
R&D  directly and  intentionally benefits  the  U.S.  commercial  aircraft 
industry.  Taken  together,  the  contracts  demonstrate  how  one  major  R&D 
project  can  provide  benefits  to  a  range  of  U.S.  companies  simultaneously, 
even  when  those  companies  may  be  in  competition  with  each  other.  The 
contracts  also demonstrate  the  immediate  competitive  value  of  participating 
directly  in  the  R&D  activities,  rather  than  having  to  await  publication of 
the  results of  the  efforts several  years  later. 
D.  NASA  Recoupment 
l.  NASA  Recoupment  Policy  in Theory 
When  a  project  undertaken  by  a  private  company  for  NASA  involves  the 
development  of  a  product  or  technology  having  an  estimated  development  cost 
of  over  $10  million,  NASA  retains  the  option of  including  a  recoupment - .t6  -
provision  in  the  relevant  contract.158  The  inclusion of  a  recoupment 
provision  is  not  required,  however,  absent  a  specific congressional 
mandate. 159 
NASA  considers  a  variety of  factors  in  determining  whether  recoupment 
is appropriate,  including  the  expected  impact  of  recoupment  on  NASA's 
objective of  preserving  the  role of  the  U.S.  as  the  leader  in aeronautical 
and  space  technology;  the  nature  of  the activity;  whether  there  is  a  viable 
and  effective  mechanism  for  obtaining  recoupment;  and  the  extent  to  which 
NASA,  through  its funding,  has  developed  a  practical application of  the 
specific  technological  capability  involved.l60 
The  relevant  program  office  is  charged with  estimating  the 
Government's  investment  and  recommending  the  recoupment  fee  to  be  charged  in 
the  setting of  individual  contracts.  The  guidelines  provide  that  recoupment 
pricing  shall  be  equitable  and  nondiscriminatory and  suggest  that  where  a 
product  is  sold  or  leased,  consideration should  be  given  to  a  recoupment 
policy  based  on  the  pro  rata  sha~e.of the  Government's  nonrecurring costs.l6l 
The  recoupment  price  is  periodically  reviewed  and  may  be  reduced  or 
eliminated  based on,  inter alia,  existing  market  conditions;  the  negative 
impact  of  recoupment  on  the  availability of  NASA  developed  technological 
capability;  or  the  interests of  the United  States.l62 
2.  NASA  Recoupment  in Practice 
The  NASA  recoupment  provisions  in  the  three  contracts  described  in  the 
preceding section of  this  report  follow  a  standa::d  format.  The  provisions 
mandate  that  if a  contractor sells or  leases  a  product  developed  under  a  NASA 
contract  or  a  product  entirely or  substantially derived  from  technology 
developed  under  a  NASA  contract,  the  Government  is entitled to a  maximum  of  3 
to  4  percent  of  the  receipts  from  that  sale or  lease,  as  reimbursement  for 
the  cost  of  development  paid  by  the Government.  In addition,  the  provisions 
require  the  contractor  to  pay  to  the  Government  a  maximum  of  5  to 10  percent 
of all  sums  received  from  third parties  for  the  right  to sell,  lease,  or 
manufacture  the  complex  and  potentially subjective  task. 
A variety of  factors  are  to  be  considered  in  establishing  the  actual 
recoupment  charge,  including  the  extent  to  which  the  contractor's  own  funds 
158  See  "Recoupment  Policy  for  the  Use  of  NASA  Technology,"  NASA  Management 
Instruction  No.  5109.13A at  7(a)(2)  (June  15,  1978). 
159  Id.  at  7(b)(2). 
160  Id.  at  7(b)(3). 
161  Id.  at  7(c). 
162  Id.  at  8(b). - 47  -
were  utilized  in  the  design of  the  product;  the  extent  to  which  contractor-
developed  technology  was  utilized  in  the  design  of  the  product;  the 
competitive  environment;  and  the ability of  the  con~ractor  to  sell the 
product.  Direct  reimbursement  is  reduced  by  the  amounts  paid  through  third 
party  licenses.  Total  reimbursement  also  is  capped  at  the  level of  funding 
provided  by  the  Government.  Further,  some  of  the  contracts  provide  that  if 
full  reimbursement  is not  made  within  a  certain time  period,  generally  about 
10  years,  the  balance  will  be  waived.  Finally,  reimbursement  can  be  waived 
altogether. 
To  the  best of  our  knowledge,  there  are  no  published data  indicating 
the  aggregate  recoupment  charges  actually  levied  on  private contractors. 
However,  one  of  the  most  pronounced  features  of  the  program  is  the  broad 
discretion  retained  by  NASA  with  regard  to  the entire process,  starting with 
decisions  about  the  inclusion  of  recoupment  provisions  in contracts  in  the 
first  instance,  through  retention of  the  power  to waive  contractually 
required  recoupment  fees. 
Further,  collection of  recoupment  charges  outside  the  context  of 
direct  sales of  the  product  developed  under  the  contract,  even  if called  for 
theoretically,  could  prove  difficult.  Determining  whether  a  product  is 
"entirely or  substantially"  derived  from  a  product  or  technology  developed 
for  NASA  would  necessarily  be  a  complex  and  potentially subjective  task. 
Further,  a  contractor's  commercial  program  could  benefit  substantially 
from  the  contractor's participation  in  a  NASA  project,  regardless  of  whether 
the  project  led  to  any direct  commercial  spin-offs  which  might  be  subject  to 
recoupment.  For  example,  the  commercial  program  could  benefit  from  the 
identification of  technological  dead-ends,  the on-the-job  training  given  to 
the  contractor's  employees,  and  the  testing  and  training  in  the  use of 
certain  tools,  technical  processes  and  facilities.  Moreover,  even  if NASA 
did  receive  full  recoupment  through  levies  on  sales  of  commercial  spin-offs, 
given  the  cap  on  recoupment,  the private  contractors  would still have  enjoyed 
the  equivalent  of  a  multi-year  interest  free  loan  equal  to  the original  NASA 
funding  for  the  period prior  to full  repayment.163 
III.  TAX  PROGRAMS164 
In  addition  to  the  very  significant  benefits  that  the  U.S.  commercial 
aircraft  industry  receives  from  participation  in  government-sponsored  R&D 
projects,  the  industry also  receives  major  benefits  from  the  U.S.  tax  system. 
These  benefits  have  included  the  completed  contract  method  for  long-term 
contracts,  domestic  international sales corporations,  foreign  sales 
corporations  and  investment  tax credits.  Based  on  publicly-available data, 
one  can  estimate  that  since  1976,  the  completed contract  method,  domestic 
163  Of  course,  NASA's  waiver  of  recoupment  of  any  portion of  the  funds  would 
constitute  a  grant  in  the  year  of  the  waiver. 
164  See  Appendix  C  for  a  more  detailed  account  of  this topic. - -l8  -
international  sales  corporations  and  foreign  sales corporations  have  provided 
special  benefits  of  approximately  $1.7  billion to  Boeing  and  $1.4  billion to 
McDonnell  Douglas.  See  Exhibit  4. 
A.  Completed  Contract  Method  for 
Long-Term  Contracts 
From  1976  through  1989,  the  aerospace  industry accounted  for  long-term 
contracts  under  the  completed  contract  method  (CCM)  of  accounting.  Under 
CCM,  the  gross  contract  price  is  included  in  income,  and  costs  associated 
with  the  contract  are deducted,  in  the  year  the  work  required  by  the  contract 
is  completed  and  accepted.  This  provides  a  tax deferral  of  income,  and  the 
associated  income  tax,  until  the  contract  is  fully completed.  The  stated 
rationale  for  CCM  is  that  contracts extending  over  a  long  period  of  time  may 
be  subject  to significant  risks  and  thus  the  amount  of  profit  realized  by  the 
taxpayer,  if  any,  cannot  be  ascertained  with  any  certainty until  the  contract 
is  completed.  Tax  policy  analysts,  however,  have  viewed  the  CCM  rules  as 
little more  than  a  tax  break  tailored  specifically  for  large  contractors  like 
Boeing  and  McDonnell  Douglas.165 
Congress  also  recognized  that  the  CCM  rules  provided  an  unwarranted 
deferral  of  income  for  long-term contracts.l66  The  Joint  Committee  on 
Taxation  (Joint  Committee)  prepared  the  Study of  1983  Effective  Tax  Rates  on 
Selected  Large  U.S.  Corporations  which  showed  that  several  large  corporations 
had  significant  levels  of  deferred  taxes  and  low  effective  tax  rates  as  a 
result  of  the  CCM  rules.l67 
Boeing  has  reported  deferred  taxes  attributable  to  "completed  contract 
method  and  related  inventory costs"  of  $1.645  billion over  the  period  1976 
through  1990.  These  tax  deferrals,  because  of  the  time  value  of  money, 
effectively saved  Boeing  approximately  $619.55  million of  interest  over  the 
same  period.  See  Exhibit  4. 
McDonnell  Douglas'  Annual  Reports  to  shareholders  show  deferred  income 
taxes  from  uncompleted  contracts of  $1.281  billion over  the  period  1976 
through  1990.  These  tax  deferrals,  because  of  the  time  value  of  money, 
effectively saved  McDonnell  Douglas  approximately  $899.26  millfon of  interest 
over  the  same  period.  See  Exhibit  4. 
165  See  Citizens  for  Tax  Justice,  Third  Annual  List  of  America's  Corporate 
Taxpayers  and  Corporate  Freeloaders,  July  1986  (noting  that  "for  one  set  of 
particularly successful  corporate  tax  avoiders,  defense  contractors, 
something  called  the  'completed  contract  method'  is  pivotal"  to  "legal"  tax 
avoidance.) 
166  See  Staff of  Joint  Committee  on  Taxation,  lOOth  Cong.,  1st Sess., 
General  Explanation of  the  Tax  Reform  Act  of  1986  (1987). 
167  Id.  at  527. - ~9  -
Because  the  CCM  rules  were  limited  by  the  Tax  Reform  Act  of  1986  and 
subsequently  eliminated  in  1989,  large  aerospace  contractors  like  Boeing  and 
McDonnell  Douglas  are  now  paying  back  those  deferred  taxes.  Boeing  has  paid 
$316  million  in  1987,  $677  million  in  1988,  $213  million  in  1989,  and 
Slll million  in  1990.  McDonnell  Douglas  paid  $261  million  in  1988,  $268 
million  in  1989,  and  $207  million  in  1990. 
This  so-called  payback,  however,  leaves  these  companies  well  ahead  of 
the  game  for  two  reasons.  First,  the  interest  saved  on  the  deferred  tax 
payments  will  never  be  paid  back  and  thus  is  a  permanent  benefit.  Second, 
corporate  tax  rates  were  reduced  sharply,  from  a  46  percent  maximum  corporate 
rate  to  the  current  rate  of  34  percent,  by  the  1986  Tax  Act.  Thus,  taxes 
were  deferred  under  the  CCM  rules  during  years  in  which  the  statutory rate 
was  46  percent,  but  were  then  paid  back  during  years  in  which  the  statutory 
rate  was  reduced  to  34  percent.  This  benefit  can  be  roughly  estimated  as 
having  been  $429  million  for  Boeing  and  $334  million  for  McDonnell 
Douglas. 168 
B.  Domestic  International Sales Corporations  and 
Foreign  Sales  Corporations 
Congress  provided  significant  tax  incentives  for  exports  when  it 
created  the  domestic  international sales corporation  (DISC).  Under  the 
original  DISC  provisions,  profits of  a  DISC  were  taxed  to  the  shareholders 
only  when  distributed or  deemed  distributed  to  its shareholders.  A DISC  was 
deemed  to  have  distributed  50  percent  of  its export  profits  and  100  percent 
of  its  nonexpert  profits  annually.  Federal  tax  could  be  deferred 
indefinitely  on  the  remaining  50  percent  of  the  DISC's  export  profits.  The 
DISC  provisions also  provid~d special  intercompany  pricing  rules  which 
allowed  a  substantial  portion of  the  U.S.  profit  on  sales  from  the  U.S. 
parent  corporation  to  the  DISC  to  be  attributed to  the  DISC. 
Controversy erupted  between  the  United  States  and  other  signatories of 
the  General  Agreement  on  Tariffs and  Trade  (GATT),  including  members  of  the 
European  Community,  concerning  the  DISC.  The  United  States eventually  agreed 
to  propose  legislation that  would  address  the  GATT  concerns  with  respect  to 
the  indefinite  deferral  of  taxes  on  DISC  income. 
Legislation  was  adopted  by  Congress  as  part  of  the  Deficit  Reduction 
Act  of  1984  (1984  Tax  Act).  All  DISCs  were  deemed  to  have  terminated  on 
December  31,  1984,  and  any  accumulated  tax-deferred  income  at  December  31, 
1984,  was  treated as  previously  taxed  income.  As  a  result,  income  originally 
168  These  estimates are  based  on  the  assumption  that  prior  to  1986,  Boeing 
and  McDonnell  Douglas  were  paying  taxes  (on  income  not  deferred  under  CCM)  at 
the  maximum  statutory  rate  of  46  percent  and  that  since  the  enactment  of  the 
1986  Tax  Act,  they  have  been  paying  at  the  new  lowered  maximum  rate of 
34  percent.  See  Appendix  C,  note  26. - so  -
considered  to  be  tax-deferred  under  the  DISC  provisions  was  permanently 
exempted  from  taxation. 
Congress  created  the  Foreign Sales  Corporation  (FSC}  as  part  of  the 
1984  Tax  Act  in  large  part  to  replace  the  DISC  provisions.  It  was  apparent, 
however,  that  the  new  FSC  provisions  raised  some  of  the  same  tax  subsidy 
concerns  as  the  DISC  provisions.  The  FSC  provisions actually  exempt  a 
portion  of  the  FSC's  export  income  from  tax.  Thus,  the  FSC  differs  from  the 
DISC,  which  only  allowed  the  deferral of  income. 
The  DISC  and  FSC  provisions  have  benefited  those  companies  engaged  in 
significant  exporting,  including  aerospace  companies.  The  amount  of  tax 
liability forgiven  on  accumulated  DISC  income  by  the  1984  Tax  Act  was 
estimated  at  between  $10  billion and  $14  billion for  all  industries,  with 
Boeing  and  McDonnell  Douglas  among  the  principal  beneficiaries  because  of 
their  large  accumulated  deferrals. 
Boeing's  1984  Annual  Report  stated  that  its deferred  tax  liability on 
DISC  income  amounted  to  $397  million.  McDonnell  Douglas'  1983  Annual  Report 
disclosed  that  its accumulated  deferred  DISC  income  was  $323.2  million. 
McDonnell  Douglas'  1984  Annual  Report  does  not  disclose  the  total  DISC 
forgiveness  from  which  the  company  benefited  although  the  total  forgiveness 
can  be  estimated  as  having  been  approximately  $148  million.169 
As  for  the  FSC,  Boeing's  Annual  Reports  and  SEC  filings  disclose  that 
the  company  has  derived  benefits  from  the  FSC  provisions  of  $35  million  in 
1985,  $49  million  in  1986,  $22  million  in  1987,  $35  million  in  1988, 
$44  million  in  1989,  and  $97  million  in  1990,  for  a  total benefit of 
$282  million. 
McDonnell  Douglas  disclosed  in  its  1986  Annual  Report  that  it  had 
"export  tax-exempt  income"  of  $18.9  million  iri  1985  and  $9.3  million  in  1986. 
In  subsequent  years,  its Annual  Reports  showed  "export  tax-exempt  income"  of 
S9  million  for  1987,  $9  million  for  1988,  $26  million  for  1989,  and  SB 
million  for  1990,  for  a  total of  $80.2  million  for  the  period  1985  through 
1990.170 
169  This  estimate  was  arrived at  by  multiplying  the  $323.2  million of 
deferred  DISC  income  by  the  maximum  statutory marginal  tax  rate of 
46  percent. 
170  We  have  assumed  that  "export  tax-exempt  income"  refers  to  the  FSC  tax 
benefit  in  such  years,  since  from  Annual  Reports  for  years  before  1984  it  is 
clear  that  the  term  "export  tax-exempt  income"  referred  to  DISC  tax-exempt 
income.  Compare  1983  McDonnell  Douglas  Annual  Report,  at  24  with  1985 
McDonnell  Douglas  Annual  Report,  at  30. - 51  -
IV.  OTHER  PROGRAMS  AND  ACTIVITIES 
The  three  forms  of  support  analyzed  above  -- DoD  R&D,  NASA  R&D,  and 
tax  programs -- provide  the  bulk  of  readily  identifiable  U.S.  government 
support  for  the  U.S.  commercial  aircraft  industry.  Nonetheless,  a  variety of 
other  programs  and  activities also  provide  benefits  to this  industry.  In 
this section,  we  examine  the  benefits  involved  in  the  use  of  government  test 
facilities  by  U.S.  aeronautics  companies  and  the  1982  U.S.  government 
purchase  of  McDonnell  Douglas  KC-lOs.  We  also note  the  fact  that  financial 
flows  between  the  military and  commercial  sides of  Boeing  and  McDonnell 
Douglas  may  constitute  a  form  of  benefit  to  commercial  activities.  Finally, 
one  area  not  covered  in  this  report  relates  to  the  aeronautics  R&D  projects 
carried out  by  the  U.S.  Federal  Aviation Administration,  which  may  in  some 
cases  be  beneficial  to  the  U.S.  commercial  aircraft  industry. 
A.  Use  of  Government  Facilities 
A further  form  of  governm~nt  support  to  the  commercial  aircraft 
industry  involves  government  test facilities  used  in aeronautics  R&D. 
According  to  the  National Critical Technologies  Panel, 
"Aeronautical  test  facilities,  such  as  wind 
tunnels,  engine  test cells,  and  supercomputers 
are  required  to  conceive  and  validate  aspects  of 
aircraft design,  construction,  and  operation.  A 
state-of-the-art  aeronautical  testing 
infrastructure  is  therefore. required  for  the 
United  States  to  design,  build,  and  operate 
advanced  aircraft."l7l 
The  most  important  government-owned  facilities utilized  by  the 
aircraft  industry  are  operated  by  NASA  and  the  Air  Force.  In  addition,  the 
Navy,  Army,  and  Departments  of  Energy,  Commerce,  and  Transportation,  also 
maintain  federal  facilities.172  As  of  1985,  the  replacement  value  of  NASA 
and  DoD  facilities  alone  was  estimated  to  be  $10  billion.l73 
In  some  circumstances,  U.S.  aircraft manufacturers  are  allowed  to  use 
government  facilities at  low  or  no  cost.  This  section briefly examines 
industry  use  of  NASA  and  Air  Force  facilities.  A more  detailed analysis  is 
presented  in  Appendix  D. 
171  Report  of  the  National Critical Technologies  Panel  at  96  (1991). 
172  U.S.  Department  of  Commerce,  Federal  Laboratory  and  Technology  Resources 
(1990). 
173  The  Competitive  Status of  the  U.S.  Civil  Aviation  Manufacturing 
Industry  117  (1985). - 52  -
1.  NASA  Facilities 
NASA's  aeronautical  research facilities  have  been  described  by  NASA  as 
"unique  national assets."174  Indeed,  the  Chairman  of  the  House  Subcommittee 
on  Transportation,  Aviation  and  Materials  has  credited  those  facilities  with 
"provid[ing]  the  foundation  for  America's  traditionally strongest  industry, 
building airplanes."175  As  of  1982,  NASA  maintained  42  major  aeronautical 
research  facilities  among  its centers,  valued  at  approximately S4  billion. 176 
As  of  1985,  fourteen  of  those  facilities  had  no  equal  worldwide  in  size 
and/or  speed  in  meeting  user  requirements. 177 
NASA's  Aeronautics  Research  and  Testing  (R&T)  programs  are  primarily 
conducted  at  three  research  centers:  Ames  Research  Center  located  in  both 
Moffett  Field  and  Edwards,  California;  the  Lewis  Research Center  in 
Cleveland,  Ohio;  and  the  Langley  Research  Center  in  Hampton,  Virginia.  Each 
center  is  used  in  four  different  ways:  (i)  NASA-only  testing;  (ii)  projects 
conducted  jointly by  NASA  and  industry;  (iii)  projects  conducted  by  NASA  and 
another  government  agency,  usually  DoD;  and  (iv)  industry-only projects. 
Of  these  four  types  of  usage,  the  joint  NASA-industry  projects most 
clearly appear  to  involve  government-sponsored  benefits  to  the  industry.178 
In  such  projects,  NASA  typically pays  both  the  variable  and  fixed  costs 
associated  with  the  project.  As  NASA's  contribution  is  funded  through  its 
budget,  it normally  provides at  its expense  the  testing facilities, 
engineering  capability,  and  power/electricity to  support  the  project.  The 
industry partner  pays  only  for  the  hardware  or  technology model  to  be  tested. 
There  is  no  exchange  of  funds  be~ween NASA  and  the  industry partner  in  these 
cooperative  programs,  regardless of  whether  their objectives  are  commercial 
or  military applications.  The  data  generated  by  these  joint  projects  may  be 
published  by  NASA,  but  NASA  is  sometimes  willing  to  delay data  release  for 
some  period  of  time,  normally  up  to one  year. 
174  NASA  Aeronautics  (1991). 
175  Cong.  Rec.  2194  (May  13,  1982)  (Statement  of  Rep.  Glickman). 
176  J.  Langford,  Federal  Investment  in  Aeronautical  Research  & Development: 
Analyzing  the  NASA  Experience  at  28-29  (M~T Doctoral  Dissertation,  June 
1987). 
177  Aeronautical  Facilities Catalog,  Volume  1,  NASA,  January  1985. 
l7S  According  to  NASA,  in  industry-only projects  the  user  companies  bear  all 
direct  and  indirect  costs  of  the  project.  See  Appendix  D. - 53  -
NASA's  major  aeronautics  R&T  centers  are  described  below. 
a.  Ames  Research Center 
The  Ames  Research  Center  has  facilities  valued at approximately 
$3  billion and  includes  a  facility  in Moffett,  California  (Ames-Moffett)  and 
the  Dryden  Flight  Research  Center  (Ames-Dryden).l79  In  addition  to 
maintaining  the  world's  largest  network  of  wind  tunnels,  valued  at 
$1  billion,  the  Ames  Research Center  has  a  number  of  unique  testing  and 
technology capabilities.  All  of  these  facilities  and  capabilities are 
available  to  and  utilized  by  the aircraft  industry  for  both  military  and 
commercial  applications.  Nearly every  important  aircraft  developed  in  recent 
years  has  been  tested  in  the  wind  tunnels at  Ames. 
As  with  other  NASA  facilities,  private  companies  are  charged  a  fee  for 
tests  the[ conduct  at  the  Ames  facilities  that  are  not  performed  in 
conjunction with  a  government  agency.  Fees  for  standard  tests conducted  by 
private  companies  at  Ames'  facilities are  roughly  between  $3,000  and  $4,000 
per  hour.l80  For  example,  at  the  end  of  1990,  Boeing  tested  its  767-X  model 
in  Ames'  facilities at  a  price  of  $750,000  for  four  weeks  of  testing.  In 
addition,  on  three other  occasions,  Boeing  has  tested  its proposed  new 
aircraft  models  in  Ames'  wind  tunnels.181 
b.  Lewis  Research Center 
The  primary  focus  of  the  Lewis  Research Center's  facilities  and 
capabilities  is  on  aeronautical  and  space  propulsion.  These  facilities are 
particularly relevant  to  the  development  of  U.S.  civil  and  m1litary aircraft. 
Several  collaborative  government  and  industry projects  have  been 
undertaken  which  have  directly benefited  the  commercial  aircraft  sector.  An 
example  of  such  a  project  is  the  1987  joint effort of  Lewis  and  a 
NASA/industry  team  working  on  advanced  turboprop  propulsion as  part  of  the 
fuel  saving  effort  of  the  Aircraft  Energy Efficient  Program  {ACEE). 182 
Flight  tests  and  wind  tunnel  testing of  scale models  helped  Boeing  and 
McDonnell  Douglas  design  the  turboprop  for  future  aircraft  in  the  100-150 
passenger  class. 183 
179  Aviation  Week  and  Space  Technology,  June  24,  1991,  at  45. 
180  Information  from  NASA. 
181  Aviation  Week  & Space  Technology,  October  8,  1990. 
182  Aerospace  America,  October  1988,  at  14-15. 
183  Id. - 54  -
c.  Langley Research Center 
The  Langley  Research Center  specializes primarily  in  aerodynamics, 
fluid  dynamics,  computer  science,  and  structures  and  materials  research.  A 
number  of  Langley  facilities are  used  for  both civil and  military 
applications. 
Langley  has  been  involved  in several  government-industry  projects 
aimed  at developing  commercial  technology  for  the aircraft  industry.  For 
example,  in  1990,  a  joint government-industry  program  which  included  the  Air 
Force's  Wright  Research  and  Development  Center,  NASA-Langley,  and  Boeing's 
Commercial  Airplane  Group,  modified  and  tested  a  wing-suction device  designed 
to  produce  laminar  air  flow  over  a  wing  to  reduce  airplane  drag  by  10  percent 
or  more. 184 
2.  Air  Force  Facilities 
Information  about  u.s.  military aeronautics  facilities,  and  their  use 
by  private  industry,  is difficult  to obtain.  The  U.S.  Air  Force  maintains 
numerous  aeronautics  test  facilities,  including  the  Wright  Research 
Laboratory,  Air  Force  Flight Test  Center,  Design  and  Analysis  Branch,  Flight 
Dynamics  Laboratory,  Propulsion  Wind  Tunnel  Facility,  and  Von  Karman  Gas 
Dynamics  Facility.  These  facilities,  in particular  Wright  Research 
Laboratory  and  the  Air  Force  Flight  Test Center,  conduct  research  and  testing 
in  conjunction  with  industry.l85 
Private  companies  generally  use  these  facilities only  for 
DoD-sponsored  projects.  In  such  situations,  the  facility may  be  provided  to 
the  contractor  at  no  charge,  as  part  of  the  government's  contribution  to  the 
project.  To  the  extent  that  DoD-sponsored  R&D  projects  involve  commercially 
relevant  work  for  private  companies,  these  companies  are  deriving  a  benefit 
from  the  free  use  of  the  military test  facilities. 
B.  Special  Purchase of  KC-lOs 
1.  Description of  Events 
The  KC-10  is  the  military version of  the  DC-10;  in  fact,  the  two 
planes  have  88  percent  of  their  parts  in  common  and  are  manufactured  on  the 
same  production  line.l86  Beginning  in  1981,  McDonnell  Douglas  began  warning 
that  it would  have  to  close  its  KC-10/DC-10  production  line,  absent  an 
184  Aviation  Daily,  August  24,  1~90,  at  360. 
185  Federal  Laboratory  and  Technology Resources,  U.S.  Department  of  Commerce 
(1990). 
186  "Air  Force  Will  Upgrade  Aerial  Refueling Capabilities,"  Aviation  Week 
and  Space  Technology,  August  ll,  1980,  at  56. - 55  -
additional  KC-10  order  by  the  U.S.  government.187  McDonnell  Douglas 
ultimately  succeeded  in  encouraging  the  U.S.  government  to  purchase 
additional  KC-lOs.  An  order  for  44  KC-10s  was  made  at  the  end  of  1982,  with 
deliveries  extending  through  1987,  and  the  DC-10  production  line  thereby 
remained  open.188  . 
The  ability to  keep  the  DC-10  production  line  open  as  a  result  of  the 
1982  KC-10  order  (and  a  follow-up  order  for  KC-lOs  in  1985)  kept  McDonnell 
Douglas  in  the  market  for  large,  commercial  aircraft  long  enough  to develop 
the  MD-11,  a  derivative  of  the  DC-10.189  Indeed,  McDonnell  Douglas  itself 
questioned  whether  it would  have  been  able  to  build  a  derivative of  the  DC-10 
if  it  had  had  to  shut  down  the  DC-10  production  line.190  More  importantly, 
absent  the ability  to  build  the  MD-11  and  to  thereby  answer  the  competition 
provided  by  Boeing  and  Airbus,  McDonnell  Douglas  would  have  had  to  leave  the 
market. 19l 
The  special utility of  keeping  the  DC-10  production line  open  derived 
from  the  high  degree  of  commonality  between  the  DC-10  and  MD-11.  This 
commonality  between  the  two  aircraft  is easily  illustrated:  the  fuselage  for 
the  MD-11  is  simply  a  stretched version  of  the  DC-10,  and  the  MO-ll  uses  a 
DC-10  wing,  albeit  with  a  modified  profile aft  of  the  rear  spar.192 
The  specific benefits  to  McDonnell  Douglas  in  keeping  the  DC-10  line 
open  for  development  and  production of  the  MD-11  included  the  savings  from 
not  having  to  close  and  reopen  the  line  and  the  savings  from  preserving  its 
learning  curve  advantage -- it  was  able  to  use  the  same  production  team  that 
had  worked  on  the  DC-10  to  produce  the MO-ll.  In  terms  of  the  learning 
curve,  McDonnell  Douglas  has  stated  that  when  it produced  the  first  MO-ll  it 
was  as  if  that  first  plane  was  the  447th  plane  to  come  off  the  production 
187  O'Lone,  "New  Order  Dip  Threatens  Airframe  Makers'  Future,"  Aviation  Week 
& Space  Technology,  May  3,  1982,  at  16;  Reuters  Wire  Service,  October  7, 
1981;  Reuters  Wire  Service,  September  13,  1982;  Lindsey,  "Lockheed  to Halt 
Output  of Tristar,"  New  York  Times,  December  8,  1981,  at  1. 
188  "Military  Order  Safeguards  DC-lO's  Future,"  Financial  Times, 
December  24,  1982,  at  22. 
189  Id. 
190  "McDonnell  Must  Decide  Soon  on  Fate  of  DC-10  Production,"  Wall  Street 
Journal,  January  9,  1985,  at  10. 
191 
95. 
192 
"How  Long,  How  Thin,  How  Many?",  Flight  International,  June  13,  1987,  at 
Id. - 56  -
line.l93  According  to McDonnell  Douglas  Vice  President  Worsham, 
McDonnell  Douglas'  development  costs  for  the  MD-11  were  only  $700  million, 
compared  to  $3.5  billion for  the  A330/340,  the airplane  Worsham  has  described 
as  the  "head  to  head  competitor"  of  the  MD-11.194  Worsham  estimates  the 
learning experiences  from  the  DC-10  that  were  applied  to  the  MD-11  resulted 
in  a  75  percent  savings  in  the  development  and  production costs of  the  MD-
11.195 
2.  Calculation of  Benefit 
McDonnell  Douglas'  learning  curve  advantage  would  have  been  reduced 
markedly  and  its development  and  production  costs  for  the  MD-11  would  have 
been  substantially higher  if  it  had  not  received  the  U.S.  government's  KC-10 
order  in  1982  and,  as  a  result,  had  closed  its DC-10/KC-10  production line. 
Airbus  has  calculated  that,  based  on  various  assumptions  -- including  the 
degree  of  commonality  between  the  DC-10  and  MD-11;  McDonnell  Douglas' 
estimate of  the  number  of  MD-lls  that  will  be  sold  over  the  life of  the 
p~ogram;  the  cost  savings  in not  ~aying to close  and  reopen  the  DC-10/KC-10 
production  line;  and  the  production  costs  for  the  MD-11  -- the  1982  KC-10 
order  saved  McDonnell  Douglas  roughly  $800  million  in  connection with  the 
development  and  production of  the  MD-11. 
C.  Military-Civilian Cross-Subsidization 
A possible  form  of  government-sponsored  benefit  to  the  U.S.  commercial 
aircraft  industry  that  lies outside  the  scope of  this  report  is  that  stemming 
from  the military activities of  the  companies  that  manufacture  large 
commercial  aircraft.  The  argument  has  been  made  that  profits  and  revenues 
from  military activities  underwrite  the  commercial  activities of  the  major 
u.s.  aircraft  manufacturers.  For  example,  Nathan  Rosenberg,  a  noted  u.s. 
commentator  on  the  industry  has  said: 
"High  profits and  federal  research  support  in  the 
development  and  sale of military aircraft  have 
comprised  an  important  government  subsidy  to  the 
development  and  manufacture  of  new  commercial 
designs.196 
193  1991  National  Defense  Authorization  Act  Hearings,  March  1,  7,  8,  15  and 
April  4,  1990,  at  346-47. 
194  Hearing  before  the  Subcomm.  on  Commerce,  Consumer  Protection and 
Competitiveness  of  the  House  Comm.  on  Energy  and  Commerce,  lOOth  Cong.,  1st 
Sess.,  June  23,  1987,  at  69-70. 
195  Id.  at  58. 
196  R.  Nelson,  Government  and  Technical  Progress:  A Cross-Industry Analysis 
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Similarly,  the  1982  report  on  aeronautics  research  by  the  U.S.  Office  of 
Science  and  Technology Policy  stated: 
•In  summary,  military  procurement  can  effectively 
subsidize  commercial  ventures,  just as  any  large 
customer  purchase  can  affect  the  viability of  a 
firm.  Such  carry-over  eEfects  can  influence  the 
competition  in  the  commercial  market,  and  can 
have  distributional  consequences  in  the 
commercial  sector  that  are  independent  of  public 
policy.•197 
The  industry  itself openly  acknowledges  the  point.  As  Boeing's  Chairman, 
Frank  Shrontz,  recently stated: 
•[A]  defense-commercial  mix  provides  long-term 
stability and  a  testing  ground  for  new 
technologies  lacking  immediate  commercial 
application.  Financially,  there  have  been  times 
when  the  defense  side carried  the  commercial 
business.198 
In  general,  the  close  relationship  that  major  U.S.  defense 
contractors,  such  as  McDonnell  Douglas  and  Boeing,  have  with  the  U.S. 
government  may  open  the  door  to special  financial  support  from  the 
government.  In  early 1991,  for  example,  McDonnell  Douglas,  faced  with 
serious  cash  flow  problems,  quietly asked  the  Department  of  Defense  for  a  Sl 
billion advance  on  major  defense contracts.l99  Although  it appears  that 
McDonnell  Douglas  ultimately withdrew  its  request,  the  Department  of  Defense 
did  consider  the  request  seriously and  undertook  specific planning  for  a 
financial  assistance effort.20 0  Facts  about  the  incident  are still emerging 
and  whether  or  not  government  assistance  was  actually given,  the  incident 
underlines  the  special  relationship  that exists  between  major  u.s.  defense 
contractors  and  the  U.S.  government  as  well  as  the  possible  financial 
benefits  that  relationship may  bring  to private  companies. 
197  Office of  Science  and  Technology  Policy,  Executive  Office  of  the 
President,  Aeronautical  Research  and  Technology Policy,  Volume  II:  Final 
Report,  Nov.  1982,  at  V-26. 
19B  Wall  Street  Journal,  July  30,  1991,  at  1. 
199  Wall  Street  Journal,  July  24,  1991,  at  4. 
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V.  TRANSPARENCY 
A significant  feature  of  almost  all  the  forms  of  support  given  by  the 
u.s.  government  to  the  u.s.  commercial  aircraft  industry  is  a  very  low  level 
of  transparency.  That  is  to  say,  although  it  is possible  to  identify  the 
major  forms  of  support  and  make  some  estimates  of  their overall  magnitude, 
obtaining  detailed  information  is difficult or  impossible  in  many  cases.  As 
a  result,  precise quantification of  the  benefits  to  the  U.S.  industry  usually 
is  not  possible.  Some  of  the  major  areas  in  which  transparency  is  most 
noticeably  lacking  are  the  following: 
0  DoD  R&D:  Most  information  about  military  R&D  work  in  aeronautics 
is  classified,  greatly limiting  the  available  information  on  that  subject. 
Without  highly  specific  information  about  military  R&D  projects,  it  is 
difficult  to  assess  the  amount  or  degree  of  commercial  utility  in  any 
particular  project.  We  were  able  to obtain basic  information  about  R&D 
contracts  between  DoD  and  Boeing  and  McDonnell  Douglas,  including  such 
information as  the  date,  contract  amount,  contracting  agency,  and  product 
service  code  involved  in each contract.  It  is not  practically possible, 
however,  to get  detailed  information about  the  technical content  of  those 
contracts.  The  Freedom  of  Information Act  (FOIA)  theoretically can  be  used 
to  obtain copies  of certain  DoD  R&D  contracts,  but  it is a  very  limited 
tool  -- past  experience  has  shown  that  many  of  the  requests  for  contracts  are 
denied  and  even  those  contracts  that are  released  may  have  been  redacted  to 
eliminate critical details.  In  addition,  the  government's  response  to  FOIA 
requests  is  very  slow. 
0  IR&D:  IR&D  outlays  are  related  to military  R&D  projects,  and  thus 
information on  IR&D  also  has  proved  to be  difficult  to obtain.  Although  it 
was  possible  to develop  an  estimate of  the  overall  amount  of  IR&D  outlays  for 
aeronautics  R&D  projects,  it was  not  possible  to obtain specific figures  for 
the  aeronautics-related  IR&D  figures  for  IR&D  outlays  to particular  companies 
or  any  listing  of  specific  IR&D  projects. 
0  MANTECH:  It was  not  possible  to obtain figures  for  the  amount  of 
MANTECH  funds  that  have  gone  to specific  companies  or  to obtain descriptions 
of  specific MANTECH  programs. 
0  DoD  Recoupment:  There  is  very  little publicly available 
information  about  DoD  recoupment  practices.  There  are  no  published  figures 
on  the  precise  amount  of  recoupment  that  DoD  receives  from  private  companies. 
We  obtained  estimates of  such  amounts  through  informal  means;  although  we 
believe  the  figures  to  be  accurate,  they  are  not  authoritative,  given  that 
they  are  not  official.  It  is  not  possible  to  find  out  how  much  a  particular 
company  has  paid  in  recoupment  charges  to  DoD  or  to determine  whether  a 
company  paid  recoupment  on  any  particular  R&D  contract. 
0  NASA  R&D:  Information  about  NASA  R&D  is  somewhat  more  available 
than  data  concerning  DoD  R&D,  given  the  civilian nature of  much  of  NASA's 
activities.  Nonetheless,  there  are still areas  of  NASA's  aeronautics  work 
where  it  is  very difficult  to  find  useful  information.  Information  on  NASA - 59  -
recoupment  practices,  for  example,  is  as  scarce  or  even  more  scarce  as 
information  on  DoD  recoupment.  We  were  not  even  able  to  obtain  an  informal 
estimate  of  total  recoupment.paid  to  NASA.  NASA's  practices  concerning  the 
public  dissemination  of  R&D  findings  present  another  difficult  problem.  It 
is  not  possible  to  determine  systematically  in  what  instances  NASA  has 
delayed  dissemination  of  research  findings  for  the  sake  of  U.S.  industry, 
although  it  is  known  that  such  delays  have  occurred. 
0  Government  Facilities:  Our  research  indicates  that  the  use  of 
government  R&D  facilities  by  private  companies  is often  governed  by  informal 
personal  relationships  rather  than  regulatory  procedures,  particularly with 
respect  to  usage  fees.  Such  informal  relationships are  not  subject  to  public 
scrutiny  and  render  substantive  information-gathering on  the  subject 
impossible. 
In  sum,  problems  with  the  transparency  of  U.S.  government  programs  are 
numerous  and  significant.  The  low  level  of  transparency  is  not  a 
coincidental  feature  of  the  programs  under  study.  Rather,  it  is  an 
inevitable  feature of  the  intimate  relationship  between  the  U.S.  government 
and  the  U.S.  commercial  aircraft  industry.  The  government  and  the  industry 
have  been  operating  in  a  close,  cooperative  fashion  for  so  long  that  they 
have  developed  many  kinds  of  ties  that  are  rarely,  if ever,  held  up  to  public 
scrutiny. APPENDIX  A 
SUPERSONIC  AND  HYPERSONIC  TRANSPORTS 
A.  Introduction 
When  President  Reagan  highlighted  the  National  Aerospace  Plane  (NASP) 
in his  1986  State of  the  Union  message  and  made  reference  to  use  of  the 
vehicle  as  the  "Orient  Express,"  u.s.  attention  turned  to  the  opportunities 
and  potential of  this high  speed  form  of  flight.  Since  that  time,  numerous 
u.s.  governmental  agencies  as  well  as  sectors of  U.S.  industry  have  begun  to 
study  the  technology,  economic  considerations  and  applications of  high  speed 
flight,  as  well  as  to develop  the materials,  components,  structures,  fuel, 
etc.,  needed  to  make  high  speed  flight  a  reality. 
While  both  the  NASP  and  the  "Orient  Express,"  or  as  it is  known  more 
generically,  High  Speed Civil Transport  (HSCT),  contemplate  high  speed 
flight,  the  programs  differ  in  the  speed  and  elevation at  which  the  proposed 
vehicles will  travel.  The  NASP  is expected  to  travel out  of  the  atmosphere 
at  approximately  150,000  feet  and  at  speeds  of  Mach  5  to  Mach  15,  while  HSCT 
would  fly within  the  atmosphere  at  60,000  feet  and at  speeds  of  Mach  2  to 
Mach  5. 1 
Because  0f  these  technical differences,  the  pntential  uses  for  the  two 
vehicles  likewise  differ.  The  NASP  is  seen  more  as  a  space  and  military 
aircraft  wnile  HSCT  is  a  long-range,  high-speed  civ1l  aircraft.  Nonetheless, 
because  the  requirements  and  capabilities of  high  speed  flight  are  s1milar, 
the  planned  technology  developed  for  these  two  vehicles  (although different) 
is  parallel  and  complementary.  NASP  areas  under  development  include 
propLlsion  systems  and  fuels;  aerodynamics;  materials  and  structures;  flight 
and  engine  control  systems;  and  displays  and  navigational  systems.  All  of 
these efforts  run  parallel  to  those  of  HSCT,  with  much  of  the  work  performed 
by  the  same  contractors.  For  example,  use  of  a  computational  technique  known 
as  computational  fluid  dynamics  was  developed  for  the  NASP,  but  it also will 
be  applied  to  the  HSCT.2  In addition,  NASA  has  indicated  that  NASP  work  in 
materials  and  computer  analysis  methods  is applicable  to HSCT. 3 
Numerous  reports  and  official statements  demonstrate  the potential 
interrelationship between  the  two  vehicles  and  their  development.  For 
example,  one  report  states, 
l  Jane's  - All  ~he World's  Aircraft,  1989-1990  at  471;  Commercial  High  Speed 
Aircraft Opportunities  and  Issues,  Senate  Committee  on  Commerce,  Science  and 
Transportation  2  (1989). 
2  :ommercial  High  Speed  Aircraft  Opp2ft~ni~ies and  Issues,  a~  23;  T.J. 
Gregory  & H.  Wri3ht,  National  Aerospace  Pla~Status and  Plans,  May  1989, 
at  1~9-56;  jane·s~All the  World's  Aircraft,  1989-1990,  at  471. 
C~mme=c1al HlJh  Speed  Aircraft  Opport~nit1es and  Issues,  at  58. - 2  -
"Although  not  directed  toward  a  supersonic 
civilian aircraft,  the  NASP  program bears  some 
relation to  the  current  interest  in 
HSCT.  .  .  .  While  there  is little 
relationship  between  the  NASP  and  an  HSCT  in 
the Mach  2-4  range,  some  of  the  technologies 
developed  for  the  NASP  may  be  applicable.  The 
potential applicability would  be  significantly 
greater  for  an  HSCT  in  the  Mach  5  range  .  .  . 
particularly with materials  and  engine 
technologies.  In addition,  the .NASP  program 
has  contributed  to  the  renewed  interest  in  an 
HSCT  and  has  helped  maintain active  research 
into high  speed  flight."4 
The  links between  the military and  civilian application of  high  speed 
flight  are  further  demonstrated  by  a  statement  in National  Aeronautical  R&D 
Goals,  a  1985  report  prepared  by  the  Executive Office  of  the President, 
Office of  Science  and  Technology  Policy which  states, 
detail. 
"Gaining  sustained  supersonic cruise 
capability  is  of  very  high  priority for  future 
military aircraft  survivability ••.• 
However,  this military capability  is also 
aligned  with  highly  constructive civil 
opportunities  that  could  benefit  the  U.S.  in 
important  non-military areas  as well." 
The  following  sections describe  the  NASP  and  HSCT  programs  in greater 
B.  National  Aerospace  Plane 
l.  Description of  Program 
NASP's  origins  can  be  traced  to a  1984  Defense  Advanced  Projects 
Research  Agency  (DARPA)  investigation  into  hypersonic air  breathing 
~repulsion.  The  first  manifestation of  a  serious  U.S.  government  interest  in 
designing  a  hypersonic  vehicle  came  in  January  1986,  when  the  government 
initiated a  $700  million  program  to design  the National  Aerospace  Plane.  The 
NASP  was  envisioned  as  a  vehicle  that  could  take off horizontally  from  an 
aircraft  runway,  fly directly  into  low  earth orbit at  25  times  faster  than 
the  speed  of  sound  and  demonstrate  single-stage-to-orbit  (SSTO)  operations. 
This  would  oe  made  possible  by  deve~oping certain key  technologies,  including 
air  breathing  propulsion,  advanced  materfals  and  structures,  actively-cooled 
4  Id.  at  3. - 3  -
structures  and  computational  fluid  dynamics. 5  The  program  was  originally 
undertaken  jointly by  the  DoD  (through  DARPA,  the  Air  Force  and  the  Navy), 
NASA  and  the  Strategic Defense  Initiative Organization.  In  April  1986,  DARPA 
awarded  S7  million  in contracts  to  a  number  of  U.S.  aircraft manufacturers, 
including  Boeing  and  McDonnell  Douglas,  in  a  competition  for  the  conceptual 
design of  the  NASP.  In  1988,  the  management  of  the  NASP  shifted  from  DARPA 
to  the  Air  Force.6 
The  NASP  is  now  in  its  Phase  II  contract  stage,  extended  30  months 
into January  1993,  when  a  decision will  be  made  on  whether  or  not  to  build  a 
pair of  X-30  research vehicles  to validate  the  computational  fluid  dynamics, 
materials,  structures  and  propulsion  development  aspects  of  the  program. 
As  part  of  Phase  II,  on  February  l,  1991,  the  Air  Force-NASA  joint 
program office  awarded  five  u.s.  companies,  joined  in  a  single  team,  a 
5502  million contract  to  continue  airframe  and  propulsion  development  on  the 
NASP  up  to  the  planned  1993  deadline.  The  five  co~panies .are  General 
Dynamics,  McDonnell  Douglas,  Pratt  & Whitney,  and  Rockwell  International's 
Rocketdyne  and  North  American  Ai~craft Divisions.7  Each.of  these  contractors 
has  a  lead  role  in different  technological  aspects of  the  program: 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
McDonnell  Douglas  has  lead  responsibilities  in  the  areas  of 
fuselage  development,  vehicle  thermal  controls  and  aerodynamic 
stability and  control; 
General  Dynamics  is  to  lead  the  integration of  airframe 
subassemblies  and  integration of  the  vehicle's airframe  and 
engines; 
Rockwell  Corp.'s  North  American  Aircraft  is  to  lead efforts  in 
developing  the  X-30's  vehicle  management  system and  vehicle 
subsystems; 
Pratt  & Whitney  has  lead  responsibility  in engine  flow  path 
integration  and  controls;  and 
Rockwell's  Rocketdyne  will  lead  engine  systems  integration  and 
propulsion structures  and  materials eff6rts.8 
5  Statement  by  John  J.  Welsh,  Jr.,  Assistant  Secretary of  the  Air  Force  for 
Acquisition,  Hearings  before  the  Subcomrn.  on  Research  and  Development  of  the 
Comm.  on  Armed  Services  and  the  Subcomm.  on  Technology  and  Competitiveness  of 
the House  Comm.  on  Science,  Space,  and  Technology,  March  12,  1991,  quoted  in 
Defense  News,  March  18,  1991,  at  3. 
6  "Aircraft  Design,"  Aerospace  America,  December  1988,  at  70. 
7  Defense  News,  March  18,  1991,  at  3. 
8  Aviation  Week  & Space  Technology,  October  29,  1990,  at  39. - 4  -
2.  Benefits 
Although  the  primary  function  of  the  NASP  as  now  contemplated  focuses 
on  single-stage-to-orbit operation with  primary  emphasis  on  the  military 
applications of  this capability,  there also  has  been considerable discussion 
of  the  industrial  and  commercial  benefits  of  this  program.  While  the 
benefits  and  applications  of  the  NASP  are still under  study  and  are  not  yet 
fully  understood,  there  is  a  strong belief  that  through  the  NASP  program  a 
competitive  base  for  future  commercial  hypersonic  programs  is  being 
established.9  NASP  could  yield  "technologies  that  would  not  only  add  to  an 
overall  defense  technology  base  but  help  to maintain  U.S.  leadership  in 
technologies  critical  to  the  aerospace  industry,  show  important  benefits  to a 
wide  spectrum of  high  tech  industries  and  provide  revolutionary  methods  of 
transportation:  civilian,  military  and  space-oriented."10 
One  of  the  primary  spinoff  technologies  frequently discussed  in 
reference  to  the  NASP  is  NASP-derived  vehicles,  or  NOV,  whose  function  would 
be  to  launch  payloads  into  space  in  a  cost  effective manner.11  Other  areas 
where  the  technologies  to  be  demonstrated  in  the  NASP  program  could  be 
applied  to  civilian  transports  include  military aircraft;  air,  space,  and 
fleet  defense  interceptors;  space  interdiction;  and  sustained  hypersonic 
flight  within  the  atmosphere.l2 
Work  on  composites  is  one  of  the  primary  areas  of  NASP  development 
that  is  expected  to  have  numerous  commercial  spinoffs.  Early  in  the  NASP 
program,  government  officials  and  industry experts  recognized  the  importance 
of  advanced  materials  to  the  program.13  A consortium  was  therefore 
established  to develop  these materials  cooperatively and  accelerate  their 
development.  The  National  Materials  and  Structures  Augmentation  Program 
{NMASAP)  consortium  involves all five  NASP  contractors  with  the  primary 
objective  of  accelerating  the  development  of  selected materials  for  the  NASP 
research vehicle,  the  X-30,  in  a  much  shorter  time  than  the  typical  15  years 
9  See  Statement  of  J.  Welsh,  supra  note  5. 
10  Id. 
ll  Space  Flight,  April  1991,  at  134. 
12  "NASP  Keeps  Moving,"  Space  Markets,  February  1989,  at  84;  see  also  NASP 
Materials  and  Structures  Augmentation  Program  Overview,  AIAA,  October  1990, 
at  5. 
13  Testimony  by  Robert  H.  Gulcher,  Rockwell  International  and  Ned  D.  Newman, 
McDannel:  Douglas,  on  the  NASP  Materials  and  Augmentation  Program,  Hearing  on 
the  National Critical Materials Council  before  the  Subcomm.  on 
~ransportation, Aviation  and  Materials  of  the  House  Comm.  on  Science,  Space 
and  Technology,  June  26,  1990. - 5  -
generally necessary  to qualify materials  for  use  in manned  aerospace 
vehicles.14 
As  a  participant  in  the  NMASAP,  each  NASP  contractor  has  a  contract 
with  the  government  to  lead  the  development  of  a  particular material. 
General  Dynamics  is  developing  refractory  composites;  McDonnell  Douglas, 
titanium metal  matrix  composites;  Pratt  & Whitney,  high  specific creep 
strength materials;  North  American  Aircraft,  titanium aluminized  materials; 
and  Rocketdyne,  high-conductivity composites. 
The  five  contracts  total  nearly  $150  million  and  involve 
subcontractors  from  across  the  nation.  This  was  a  significant  increase  over 
the  $17  million  level  of  funding  initially established  in  the  NASP  program 
for  material  development. 15  As  stated  in  Congressional  testimony  on  the 
National Critical Materials  Council,  "the  NMASAP  team  has  already  made  the 
program  a  success  by  accomplishing  many  industry firsts  as  well  as  providing 
benefits  and  spin-offs  in other  areas.  The  NMASAP  achievements  have  laid  the 
ground  work  for  material  spin-offs  which  may  be  applicable  to  the  medical, 
automotive,  and  commercial  aircraft  industries."16 
3.  NASP  Funding 
As  shown  on  the  following  table,  although  there  have  been  annual 
fluctuations  in  funding  for  NASP,  total  funding  through  FY  1991  was 
$1.8  billion. 
14  Id. 
15  Id. 
16  Id.  at  66-67. - 6  -
NASP  FUNDING  (millions)17 
DoD  NASA  Total 
1988  $338  $148  $486 
1989  569  237  806 
1990  195  59  254 
1991  163  95  258 
199218  llill  llll  l1Q2l 
Total  1498  611  2109 
The  NASP's  proposed  $305  million budget  for  1992  has  been  divided 
according  to  its different  technologies.  A'total of  Sl05  million  is 
allocated  for  air  breathing engines;  $65  million  for  materials  structures; 
$55  million  for  airframe  research;  $45  million  for  test facilities;  and 
$35  million for  fuel  5ubsystems.19  According  to  John  Welsh,  Assistant 
Secretary of  the  Air  Force  for  Acquisition,  "the  S2  billion  invested  by  the 
U.S.  government  and  u.s.  companies  in  NASP  research  is  four  times  what  the 
rest  of  the  world  has  spent  on  developing  hypersonic  planes."20  S3.3  billion 
is  the  estimated  total  cost  for  the  NASP  technology  development  program. 21 
C.  High  Speed  Civil Transport 
l.  Description of  Program· 
High-Speed  Civil  Transport  (HSCT)  is  a  supersonic  commercial  aircraft 
which  would  fly  at  speeds  two  to  five  times  faster  than  the  speed of  sound, 
over  a  range  of  about  10,000  km  and  carry about  300  passengers. 22  The  HSCT 
17  NASP  Fiscal  Year  1991  Budget  Request,  at  15;  "NASP  Industry Consortium  is 
Hailed  as  Model  for  Future  High-Tech Projects,"  Space  News,  March  18,  1991, 
at  4. 
18  The  1992  figures  are  budget  requests. 
19  Defense  News,  March  18,  1991,  at  ~. 
20  Id.  at  3. 
21  Space  Flight,  April  1991,  at  135. 
22  Commercial  High  Speed  Aircraft  Opportunities  and  Issues,  supra  note  1, 
at  7. - 7  -
would  reduce  the  costs of  air  transportation  services  and  travel  time  for 
both  passengers  and  freight  over  long  routes.23 
The  development  of  HSCT  technology  can  be  traced  back  to u.s.  interest 
in  and  development  of  supersonic  transport  starting shortly after World 
War  II.  Programs  such  as  the  Supersonic Cruise  Transport  (SST),  which 
started  in  the  early  1960s,  and  the  Supersonic Cruise  Research  (SCR)  program, 
which  lasted  from  1973  until  1981,  were  instrumental  in developing  technology 
associated  with  civilian supersonic aircraft. 24  "The  development  of  the  HSCT 
benefited  from  previous  and  ongoing  related  work.  This  includes  the 
supersonic  transport  work  of  the  1960s;  the  advanced  supersonic  work  activity 
of  the  1970s  including  follow-on  research  by  NASA,  the  Concorde,  and  the 
National  Aerospace  Plane."25 
In addition,  various  R&D  programs  initially undertaken  for  military 
purposes  are  now  being  transferred  to  HSCT  applications.  For  example,  test 
programs  on military applications of  vortex  flap  technology  were  expanded  to 
include  vortex  flap  research applicable  to  wing  designs  for  the  HSCT. 26 
In  1986,  motivated  by  former  President  Reagan's  speech  on  the  "Orient 
Express,"  NASA  let  two  3-phase  study  contracts  to  Boeing  Aircraft  and 
McDonnell  Douglas  to  examine  the  state of  readiness  of  HSCT  technology, 
alternative design  concepts,  environmental  issues,  and  economic  and  market 
issues. 27 
In  1989,  at  the  request  of  Congress,  NASA  developed  a  proposed  HSCT 
research  and  technology  (R&T)  program  to validate  the  technology  needed  for 
the aircraft  industry  to  reach  a  decision  on  whether  to proceed  with 
development  and  production of  an  HSCT.  The  program  focuses  on  the  four  areas 
of  technology  for  the  HSCT  -- propulsion,  aerodynamics,  structures  and 
materials,  and  systems  --with the  objective of  increasing operating 
efficiency  for  an  HSCT  well  above  that  which  could  be  achieved  with  current 
technology. 28 
Although  the  R&T  program  is  aimed  at developing  technologies  for  an 
HSCT,  NASA  does  not  intend  to  build  an aircraft  prototype  or  even  prototypes 
of  major  components.  Rather,  NASA  hopes  that  at  the  end  of  the  research  and 
technology  program,  the  technology  will  be  validated  to  the  point  where  the 
23  Id.  at  4. 
24  Id.  at  12. 
Study  of  High  Speed Civil Transport,  NASA- 1989,  at  17. 
26  Aviation  Week  & Space  Technology,  June  18,  1990,  at  84. 
27  Study  of  High  Speed Civil  Transport,  at  7. 
28  Id.  at  57. - 8  -
U.S.  aerospace  industry will  move  forward  and  develop  a  commercial  HSCT. 
According  to  NASA,  its program  should  significantly  lower  the  risks 
associated  with  development  of  an  HSCT  fleet  through  the  research  and 
validation of  the  technologies  needed  to  meet  environmental  and  economic 
requirements  in  the  first  decade  of  the  21st  century. 29  To  help  ensure  its 
success,  the  program  is  to  be  a  joint  industry-government  activity along  the 
lines of  previous efforts under  the  leadership of  NASA  and  its predecessor 
NACA. 30 
2.  HSCT  Funding 
In  1989,  with  the  initiation of  the  HSCT  R&T  program,  estimates of 
combined  NASA  and  industry contributions  amounting  to  $1.5  to $2.0  billion 
over .ten  to  twElve  years.  were  projected  for  this  program.31  NASA's  1990 
budget  included  S25  million  to  initiate  technology efforts  related  to  the 
development  of  an  environmentally  and  economically  sound  high  speed 
commercial  transport.  In  1990,  a  NASA  study contract  was  awarded  to General 
Electric  and  Pratt  & Whitney  to  look  at  the  possibility of  developing  a 
Mach  1.5  to  Mach  3.5  engine.32 
In  1991,  NASA  efforts aimed  at  providing  a  foundation  for  development 
of  a  new  HSCT  were  accelerated.  NASA  earlier  had  planned to  initiate a 
six-year,  $!-billion Phase  2  high-spee·d  program  in  fis'cal  year  1993. 
Progress  was  so  rapid  in  Phase  1,  however,  that at  least  one  Phase  2  element 
involving  propulsion  system materials  is  being  initiated  in  fiscal  year  1992 
with  requested  funding  of  $16.5 million.ll 
Although  government  funding  for  the  research  portion  of  the  HSCT 
program  appears  to  be  forthcoming,  there  is considerable discussion of  how  a 
prototype  and  an  actual  HSCT  fleet  will  be  financed.  Both  government  and 
industry  representatives  appear  to  acknowledge  openly  that  government 
assistance will  be  needed  to produce  a  commercial  HSCT  fleet,  as  development 
costs  are  expected  to exceed  levels  economically  feasible  for 
manufacturers.34  Some  industry analysts  estimate  the  cost  of  a  prototype 
29  Id.  at  7. 
30  Id.  at  57. 
31  Id.  Although  there 
spent  approximately  SlO 
was  no  specific  HSCT  program  prior  to  1989,  NASA 
to  Sl5  million  in  FY  '88  on  related  technologies. 
Id.  at  12. 
32  Aerospace  Daily,  October  10,  1990,  at  43. 
33  Aviation  Week  & Space  Technology,  March  18,  1991,  at  149. 
34  Commercial  High  Speed  Aircraft  Opportunities  and  Issues. - 9  -
HSCT  vehicle  to  be  between  $5  and  $10  billion,  although  the  cost  situation  is 
highly  uncertain.35 
While  there  is consensus  in  the  industry  that  government  assistance  of 
some  kind will  be  needed,  there  is little agreement  about  the  form  that 
assistance  should  take.  Industry  representatives  feel  the  proper  role  for 
NASA  is  to  undertake  the  research  and  validate  the  technology  to  resolve  the 
high  technological  risks.  However,  the  industry  feels  that  it should  take 
the  lead  in  developing  the  program  from  that  point  on,  even  if additional 
federal  support  is  needed.36 
Others  propose  that  the  government  should  also buy  the first  several 
aircraft  to  be  produced.  This  would  provide  a  guaranteed  market  that  could 
give  manufacturers  enough  assurance  of  recovering  their  investment  to  permit 
them  to  proceed  with  commercial  development  after  technology  validation and 
demonstration.  A difficulty with  this  approach,  however,  is  the  uncertainty 
about  how  many  planes  would  have  to  be  bought  in order  to  provide  a 
sufficient  incentive. 
As  an  alternative  approach,  some  analysts  have  suggested  tax credits, 
guaranteed  loans  and  other  financial  assistance  to  help  the  industry  proceed 
with  commercial  development  of  an  HSCT.  The  likelihood  that  development 
costs  will  be  very  high,  however,  means  that  such  incentives  may  not  be 
sufficient  in  and  of  themselves  to  convince  the  industry  to  move  ahead. 
However,  reports  indicate  that  in conjunction  with  guaranteed  purchases  or  an 
international  consortium,  such  financial  incentives  might  be  helpful.37 
35  Id. 
36  Id. 
37  !d.  at  61. AIRCRAFT  ENERGY  EFFICIENT  PROGRAM  (ACEE) 
NASA's  ACEE  program  was  initiated  in  1976  with  the  objective of 
increasing  the  fuel  efficiency of  aircraft  through  research  and  development 
(R&D)  under  six projects:  (i)  Advanced  Turboprop:  (ii)  Energy  Efficient 
Engine;  (iii)  Engine  Component  Improvement:  (iv)  Composite  Primary  Aircraft 
Structures;  (v)  Energy  Efficient Transport:  and  (vi)  Laminar  Flow  Control. 
Management  of  this  program  was  undertaken  by  NASA's  Lewis  Research  Center  in 
Cleveland,  Ohio  and  at  NASA's  Langley Research  Center  in  Hampton,  Virginia. 
As  the  ACEE  program  was  specifically directed at  reducing  commercial  air 
transport  fuel  consumption,  this  program  provided  direct  benefits  to  the 
commercial  aviation  industry.  Indeed,  NASA  estimated  that  the  ACEE  program 
provided  industry  with over  a  five-year  jump  up  its  technology  learning  curve 
concerning  fuel  efficiency. 1 
While  most  of  the  projects associated  with  the original  ACEE  program 
were  concluded  in  the  early  to mid-80s,  the  commercial  applications of  many 
of  these  programs  and  their  successors  can  be  widely  seen  today.  According 
to  NASA  experts,  for  example,  "[t]he ACEE  programme  was  the  genesis  of  the 
Boeing  757  and  767  aeroplanes."2  Outlined  below  is  a  description  of  the 
origtnal  six  ACEE  projects  and  the  status of  these  projects  today,  together 
with  a  brief  listing of  follow-up  NASA  studies  in  this area. 
A.  Energy  Efficient  Engine  (EJ)  Project 
1.  Historical  Background 
The  E3  project  was  an  outgrowth of  NASA's  work  in  the  early  1970s  on  a 
fuel-efficient  engine.  The  goal  of  the  E3  project  was  to  guide  technology 
efforts  for  turbofan  jet engines  (specifically General  Electric's CF6-50C  and 
Pratt  & Whitney's  JT9D-7A)  to:  (i)  reduce  fuel  usage  by  at  least  12  percent 
and  the  performance  deterioration rate  by  at  least  50  percent;  (ii)  reduce 
direct operating costs  by  at  least  five  percent;  and  (iii)  meet  future  FAA 
regu~ations and  EPA  exhaust  emission  standards.3 
Under  the  E3  project,  contracts were  awarded  to General  Electric and 
Pratt  & Whitney  to:  (i)  design a  Flight  Propulsion  System;  (ii)  design, 
build  and  test  components:  and  (iii)  integrate  the  components  into ·engine 
systems  for  experimental  purposes. 
1  Fuel  Economy  in  Aviation,  NASA,  at  30  (1983)  (hereinafter  "Fuel  Economy"). 
2  R.  Petersen  & B.  Holmes,  "U.S.  Aeronautic~l Research  fo~  the  1990s,"  World 
Aerospace  Technology  91,  at  52  (London  1991). 
3  Fu~l Economy  in  Aviation,  at  29:  Comptroller  General,  Report  to Congress, 
"A  Luoi<.  at  NASA's  Aircraft  Energy  Efficient  Program,"  (GAO,  l'lly  28,  1980) 
at  39  (hereinafter  "Comptroller's  Report");  see  also  Aeronautics  and  Space 
Report  of  the  President,  1981  Activities,  at  26. - 2  -
2.  Current  Status 
The  results of  the  E3  program  yielded  a  12  percent  reduction  in 
specific  fuel  consumption,  a  5  percent  reduction  in direct operating  costs, 
and  a  50  percent  reduction  in  the  specific fuel  consumption deterioration 
rate.  While original  component  test  results  focused  on  the  General  Electric 
CF6,  the  E3  program  resulted  in  numerous  design  and  performance  improvements 
for  other  engines  as  well.  These  included  the  PW-2000  for  the  narrow-body 
Boeing  757  and  the  PW-4000  series  for  wide-body aircraft  such  as  the  DC-10 
and  747. 
3.  Costs  and  Funding 
Fiscal  year  1983  was  the  final  year  of  funding  for  the  E3  project. 
Approximately  $200  million  were  expended  on  the  E3  program  over  approximately 
nine  years.4 
B.  Advanced  Turboprop  (ATP)  Project 
1.  Historical  Background 
rhe  objective of  the  ATP  project  was  to  develop  technology  for  the 
efficient,  reliable,  and  acceptable  operation of  a  short-to-medium  range, 
100-~50 passenger  advanced  turboprop aircraft at  cruise  speeds  up  co  Mach  .80 
1nd  altitudes  up  to  35,000.  The  goal  was  to achieve  a  15  to  20  percent  fuel 
savings  over  current  turbofan aircraft  while  maintaining  the  cabin  noise  and 
vibration  levels  of  those aircraft. 5 
Boeing,  McDonnell  Douglas,  Lockheed,  Pratt  & Whitney  and  General 
Electric  (GE)  all participated  in  the  ATP  project.  The  program  reached 
fruition  in  1987  with  successful validation of  technology  readiness  in  three 
series  of  flight  tests:  (i)  GE/Boeing  flight  tests of  the  GE  gearless 
unducted  fan  (UDF)  on  a  Boeing  B-727  aircraft;  (ii)  the  NASA/Lockheed  Propfan 
Test  Assessment  of  a  single rotation advanced  turboprop  on  a  Gulf  Stream  II 
aircraft;  and  (iii)  the  GE/McDonnell  Douglas  flight  tests of  the  UDF  on  an 
MD-80  aircraft.  These  flight  tests verified  the  readiness  of  ATP  technology 
for  commercial  engine  development.  The  commercial  applications  of  this 
program,  however,  never  reached  series  production·because  high  noise  levels 
and  lower  oil prices decreased  the  economic  value  of  implementing  this 
technology.6 
Co~tr0~ler's Report,  at  42-43. 
Fuel  Economy,  at  ~3. 
5  NASA  Aeronautics  Research  and  Technology  1988,  NASA  (1988). - 3  -
2.  Current  Status 
According  to  an  official  involved  in  NASA's  Engine  Propulsion Program, 
propulsion work  undertaken after  1987  as  part  of  the  ATP  project  has  been 
refocused  on  Ultra High  Bypass  (UHB)  engine  technology.7  UHB  technology  aims 
to  reduce  fuel  consumption  by  an additional  25  to  30  percent  beyond  that  of 
the  latest generation  turbofan-powered aircraft,  ~roviding up  to  a  50  percent 
improvement  relative to  the  majority of  aircraft  that  comprise  the  100  to  150 
passenger  fleet. 8 
A UHB  demonstrator  flight  test  program  undertaken  by  McDonnell  Douglas 
in  1987  led  the  company  to  consider  development  of  the  MD-91  and  MD-92,  two 
commercial  aircraft  vehicles derived  from  the  MD-80  series.  However, 
according  to  industry  sources,  the  MD-90  series utilizing  UHB  did  not  reach 
production because  high  noise  levels  and  decreasing  fuel  prices  eliminated 
the  economic  necessity  and  value  of  production.  UHB  programs  were  funded  at 
approximately  $12  million per  fiscal  year  (FY)  from  1988  through  1991.9 
Although  FY  '92  budget  requests  for  this program  were  denied,  NASA  plans  to 
make  requests  for  FY  '93  funding.  NASA's  goal  is  to  reduce  UHB  noise  levels 
so  that  if  fuel  prices  increase,  UHB  engines  will  be  in  a  position  to  enter 
production quickly. 10 
3.  Costs  and  Funding 
Total  costs  of  the  ATP  project  through  1987  -- when  initial objectives 
were  completed  -- totalled  $140  mil1ion.ll  The  UHB  program  funding  through 
1991  was  $48  million.  Given  that  a  large portion of  UHB  research  concerns 
propulsion  technologies  potentially suitable  for  the  High  Speed Civil 
Transport  (HSCT),  future  generations  of  UHB  technology will  be  incorporated 
into  HSCT  research  and  have  been  programmed  into the  FY  '92  NASA  budget  as 
such~ 12 
C.  Engine  Component  Improvement  (ECI)  Project 
1.  Historical  Background 
The  ECI  project  was  directed at  improving  the  performance  of  various 
existing commercial  aircraft eng1nes  and  thereby  reducing  their  fuel 
7  Information  from  NASA. 
8  "UHB  Technology Validation- The  Final  Step,"  AIAA-88-2807  (July  1988). 
9  Information  from  NASA. 
lO  u. 
ll  Id. 
12  Id. - .t  -
consumption.  Contracts  under  the  ECI  project  were  awarded  to  Pratt  & Whitney 
and  GE,  who  in  turn  subcontracted with  McDonnell  Douglas,  Boeing  and  three 
major  airlines.  The  ECI  project  focused  on  three  major  air  transport 
engines  --Pratt & Whitney's  JTBD  and  JT9D,  and  GE's  CF6.13 
The  ECI  prog~~m advanced  the  state-of-the-art of  thermal  barrier 
coatings  and  ceramic  seal  systems:  demonstrated  the  practicality of  an 
advanced  turbine  clearance  control  system  and  an  advanced  fan  design  in  the 
JT9D  engine;  and  demonstrated  the  advantages  of  modern  cooling,  sealing  and 
aerodynamic  designs  in  the  high  pressure  turbine  and  compressor  of  the  JTBD 
engine.14  These  improvements  were  incorporated  into existing  JTBD  and  JT9D 
engines  as  well  as  into  technology  advances  transferred  to  new  engine 
configurations,  including  the  PW2037  and  the  NASA-sponsored  Energy  Efficient 
Engine.15  According  to  W.O.  Gaffin,  the  ECI  Program  Manager  at  Pratt  & 
Whitney,  "[t]he  ECI  program  resulted  in  significant  improvements  in  current 
JTBD  and  JT9D  engine models,  and  has  made  significant contributions  toward 
improvements  in advanced  commercial  engine  models  under  development  at 
PWA." 16  Among  the  aircraft  that  have  benefited  from  this  technology  are  the 
DC-9,  DC-10  and  Boeing  727,  737,  and  747.17 
2.  Current  Status 
Improvements  to  jet aircraft engines  resulting  from  the  ECI  program 
can currently  be  seen  in  savings  of  2  to  4  billion gallons  of  fuel  -- worth 
between  $1.5  billion and  $3  billion -- for  aircraft  entering  service  in  the 
United  States  through  1990.18 
3.  Costs  and  Funding 
Approximately  $40  million were  expended  on  the  ECI  program  from 
1974-1979,  with  45  percent  of  the ·budget  allocated  to  engine  diagnostics  and 
55  percent  to  performance  improvement.l9 
As  a  result  of  the  commercial  success  of  the  JTBD  engine,  Pratt  & 
Whitney  has  repaid  the  government  approximately  $19.2  million of  the  initial 
13  Fuel  Economy,  at  9-10. 
14  NASA  ECI  Programs:  Benefits  to Pratt  & Whitney  Engines  (1982). 
15  Id. 
16  Id.;  see  also Aviation  DaiJ:..y,  March  7,  1989. 
17  Fuel  Economy,  at  15. 
l8  Aviation  Daily,  March  7,  1989. 
19  Comptroller's Report,  at  37;  information  from  NASA. - 5  -
S26.3  million  ECI  program  contract. 20  The  ECI  program  contract  included 
provisions  designed  to  recoup  the  government's  investment  if  Pratt  & Whitney 
made  commercial  sales  as  a  result  of  the  NASA  program. 21  Repayments  are 
based  on  sales  receipts  and  licenses  and  technical  agreements  that  permit 
others  to sell,  lease  or  manufacture  parts  for  the  two  engines.  Pratt  & 
Whi tne~ is  expected- to  repay  the  remaining  S7 .1  million during  the  early 
1990s.  2  In effect,  Pratt  & Whitney  was  provided  an  interest  free  loan  on 
$26.3  million over  approximately  15  years.23 
D.  Composite  Primary Aircraft  Structures 
(CPAS)  Project 
1.  Historical  Background 
The  CPAS  project  was  an  outgrowth of  research  conducted  by  NASA  in  the 
early  1970s.  The  goal  of  the  CPAS  project  was  to facilitate  the  use  of 
composite  components  to  reduce  the  weight  of aircraft  by  25  percent  and  to 
increase  fuel  efficiency  by  10  to  15  percent. 24  The  project  sought  not  only 
to  Jevelo~ composite  components  but  also  to  test  them  on  transport 
aircraft.  5  · 
~o  implement  the  project,  NASA  contracted with  Boeing,  McDonnell 
Douglas  and  tockheed  to  develop  and  test  components  in  three  stages: 
(i)  representative  secondary  structures;  (ii)  medium-sized  primary 
structures;  and  (iii)  wing  sections.26 
According  to  NASA,  the  CPAS  project  pushed  commercial  aircraft 
companies  5-10  years  ahead  in  composite  research  and  utilization. 27  CPAS 
components  have  been  used  in  a  number  of  aircraft  parts  including:  (i)  the 
DC-10  rudder;  (ii)  the  DC-10  and  L-1011  vertical  fin;  (iii)  the  B-727 
elevators;  (iv)  the  B-737  horizontal tail;  and  (v)  the  L-1011  ailerons.28  In 
addition,  as  stated  by  a  Boeing  official  in  a  Senate  Authorization Hearing 
20  Aviation  Daily,  March  7,  1989. 
21  Id. 
22  Id. 
23  Information  from  NASA. 
2-l  Fuel  Economy,  at  59-60. 
25  Id.  at  60. 
;6  -"d.  at  62-71. 
27  :d.  at  52-71 . 
28  :d. - 6  -
for  the  1986  NASA  budget,  this  research was  instrumental  in  the  decision  by 
Boeing  to  expand  the  use  of  composites  in  the  757/767  airplanes.29 
2.  Current  Status 
Although  work  on  the  CPAS  project  was  completed  in  the  mid-'80s, 
advances  made  in  composite  research  during  the  CPAS  project  are  now  being 
used  in  projects  such  as  the  NASP  and  High  Speed  Civil Transport.  These 
efforts  should  benefit  the aircraft  industry  through  reduced  costs  of 
composite  R&D  as  well  as  shorter  lead  times  on  development  efforts  relating 
to composites. 
3.  Costs  and  Funding 
The  estimated  annual  cost  to  the government  of  R&D  for  the  CPAS 
project  has  varied  between  SllO  million  and  $217  million.30 
E.  Energy Efficient Transport  (EET)  Program 
1.  Historical  Background 
Tne  EET  project  focused  on  the  technological  development  of 
'aerodynam~cs and  active controls  to  form  a  data  base  for  manufacturers  that 
would  assist  them  in  building  energy-efficient  aircraft."31  This  focus  on 
aerodynamics  in  the  EET  project  included  investigation of  airfoils,  winglets, 
airframes,  engines,  high-lift devices  for  a  supercritical  wing,  laminar  flow, 
surface  coatings  and  active controls.32  Boeing,  McDonnell  ~ouglas,  Lockheed 
and  Pratt  & Whitney  all participated  in development  and  testing  under  the  EET 
project. 
2.  Current  Status 
Examples  of  aircraft which  have  incorporated  technology  from  this 
project  are  the  DC-10  (winglets);  the  B-757  and  767  (high-lift devices);  and 
the  L-1011-500  (active controls).33 
29  Statement  of  R.  Schauffle,  V.P.  Engineering,  McDonnell  Douglas,  1986  NASA 
Senate  Budget  Authorization Hearings,  at  551. 
30  Comptroller's  Report,  at  57-5~. 
31  Fuel  Economy,  at  77. 
32  id.  at  77-91. 
J3  F~e:  Economy,  at  77-91. - 7  -
3.  Costs  and  Funding 
The  R&D  cost  estimate  for  the  EET  project  was  $85.7  million.34 
F.  Laminar  Flow Control  (LFC)  Project 
1.  Historical  Background 
The  LFC  project  was  intended  to  "develop  and  demonstrate  by  1985  a 
practical,  reliable  and  maintainable  suction  system  for  reducing  surface-
airstream friction,  thereby  increasing  fuel  efficiency  by  20  to 
40  percent."35 
Under  this  project,  NASA  contracted  with  Boeing,  McDonnell  Douglas  and 
Lockheed  to design potential configurations,  structural concepts  and  suction 
systems  to  enhance  laminar  flow  contro1. 36  NASA  believed  that  LFC  technology 
would  be  of  greatest  use  on  long-range  flights  (2,500  to  5,000  nautical 
miles).  Although  Boeing  apparently  suspended  its  LFC  activities  in  1978, 
McDonnell  Douglas  and  Lockheed  continued  their participation  in  the  project 
until  its conclusion  in  the  mid-l980s. 
2.  Current  Status 
A~  the  conclusion of  the  LFC  project,  laminar  flow  control  research 
was  continued  under  NASA's  Research  and  Technology  Base  Program  with  an 
emphasis  ~n applications  for  fuel  efficient  subsonic  and  high  speed 
transport. 37  Examples  of  several  NASA  tests  undertaken  in  the  area  of 
laminar  flow  include  a  test  undertaken  in  1985  at  NASA's  Langley  Research 
Center  on  the  C-140  Jet  Star  to  evaluate  the  laminar  flow  systems  on  typical 
commercial  flight  routes  and  to  study  the  effects  of  weather  on  the  system's 
operation and  condition. 38  NASA  had  also flight  tested  a  "contoured  glove" 
installed on  the  wing  of  a  Boeing  757.39 
34  Comptroller's  Report,  at  49. 
35  Id. 
36  Fuel  Economy,  at  101. 
37  "Research  in  Natural  Laminar  Flow  and  La~iriar  Flow  Control,"  NASA 
Conference  Publication  2487  Pt.  1,  at  2,  28  (1987);  information  from  NASA. 
38  Avia~ion Week  & Space  Technology,  April  15,  1985,  at  58. 
39  NAS.ll.  1986  Annual  Report,  at  24-25. - B  -
3.  Costs  and  Funding 
The  R&D  cost  estimate  for  the  LFC  project,  which  concluded  in  the 
mid-80s,  was  $227  million.40  However,  according  to  the  NASA  Technical 
Project  Manager,  a  recent  proposal  for  a  "Wing  Route  Experiment,"  based  on 
the  laminar  flow  control  program,  and  aimed  at  increasing  fuel  efficiency for 
600  to  1,000  passenger  subsonic  transports,  was  submitted  for  budget 
authorization.  This  $300  million  line  item  has  yet  to  be  approved. 
40  ComptrJller's  Report,  at  53. APPENDIX  C 
TAX  PROGRAMS 
The  U.S.  system of  taxation  has  provided  significant benefits  to  the 
aerospace  industry  through  various  tax deferrals  and  exemptions.  Based  on 
publicly-available data,  one  can  estimate  that  since  1976,  these  benefits 
have  amounted  to approximately  $1.7  billion to Boeing  and  $1.4  billion to 
McDonnell  Douglas.  See  Exhibit  4. 
A.  Completed  Contract  Method  for  Long-Term Contracts 
1.  Description of  the Rules 
The  tax  laws  of  the  United  States  have  permitted  taxpayers  to account 
for  income  received  from  certain  long-term contracts  under  the  completed 
contract  method  ("CCM")  of  accounting  since at  least  1918.1  The  stated 
rationale  for  CCM  is  that  contracts  extending  over  a  long  period  of  time  may 
be  subject  to  significant  risks  and  thus  the  amount  of  p~o~it realized  by  the 
:axpayer,  if any,  cannot  be  ascer~ained with  any  certainty until  the  contract 
1s  completed.  However,  tax  policy analysts  have  viewed  the  CCM  rules  as  a 
tax  subsidy  program  for  large  compan1es  like  Boeing  and  McDonnell  Douglas.2 
CCM  provides  that  the  gross  contract  price  is  included  in  inc0me,  and 
costs  associated with  the  contract  are  deducted,  ;n  the  year  the  contract  is 
completed  and  accepted.  CCM  accounting  differentiates  between 
"contract-related"  costs,  which  are  capitalized  and  deducted  when  the 
contzact  is  co~pleted and  income  is  recognized,  and  "period"  costs,  which  are 
deducted  in  the  tax  year  in  which  they are  paid  or  accrued  and  are  not 
allocable  to  a  long-term contract.  Regulations  adopted  in  1976  provided  very 
detailed  rules  for  the  allocation of  costs  between contract  costs  and  period 
costs. 
Repeal  of  the  CCM  rules  was  proposed  by  the  Reagan  Administration  in 
1982.  The  Tax  Equity  and  Fiscal Responsibility  Act  of  1982  did  not  repeal 
the  CCM  rules,  but  did  modify  the cost allocation rules,  requiring  more 
extensive capitalization of  costs. 
1  Treas.  Reg.  S  33,  art.  121  (Re~enue Act  of  1916,  as  amended  by  Revenue  Act 
of  1917).  A "long-term contract"  is generally defined  as  a  building, 
installation,  construction or  manufacturing  contract  that  is  not  completed  by 
the  end  of  the  taxable  year  in  which  such contract  is  commenced.  Treas.  Reg. 
s 1.451-J(b)(l)(i). 
2  See  Citizens  for  Tax  Justice,  Third  Annual  ~ist of  America's  Corporate 
raxpa~_and Corporate Freeloaders,  July  1986  (noting  that  "for  one  set  of 
part •cu:ariy successful  corporate  tax  avoiders,  defense contractors, 
something  called  the  'completed  contract  methud'  is pivotal"  to  "legal"  tax 
3V01Jance.) - 2  -
The  Tax  Reform  Act  of  1986  ("1986  Tax  Act")  further  reduced  the 
revenue  deferral available  under  the  CCM  rules. 3  Congress  believed  that  the 
CCM  accounting  procedures  permitted an  unwarranted  deferral of  income  for 
long-term contracts.4  Thus,  "Congress  believed  it was  appropriate  to limit 
the  tax  deferral obtainable  through  use  of  the  completed  contract  method  by 
requiring  that  a  portion of  the  income  from  long-term contracts  be  reported 
on  a  percentage  of  completion method."5 
The  Congressional  Joint  Committee  on  Taxation  ("Joint Committee") 
prepared  the  Study  of  1983  Effective  Tax  Rates  on  Selected Large  U.S. 
Corporations,  which  showed  that  several  large corporations  had  significant 
levels of  deferred  taxes  and  low  effective  tax  rates  as  a  result  of  the  CCM 
rules.6  The  Joint  Committee  noted  that  the  annual  reports of  certain  large 
defense  contractors  reflected  negative  tax  rates  resulting  from  net  operating 
loss carryforwards generated  through  the  use  of  the  CCM  rules  in  prior  years. 
The  new  rules  provided  by  the  1986  Tax  Act  required all contractors, 
except  for  certain small  construction contracts that  are  completed  within 
7  years,  to use  a  hybrid  "percent~ge of  completion-capitalized cost  method" 
r"PCM-CCM")  to  account  for  long-term contracts.7  Under  the  PCM-CCM  rules,  a 
certain  percentage  of  the  contract  items  are  accounted  for  under  the 
percentage  of  completion  method  and  the  remaining  costs  are  accounted  for 
under  the  taxpayer's  normal  method  of  accounting,  which  could  include  the 
completed  contract  method.  The  1~86 Tax  Act  provided  that  contractors  were 
required  to account  for  40  percent  of  the  items  with  respect  to  a  long-term 
cuntract  under  the  percentage of  completion  method.8  The  remaining 
60  percent  could  be  account~d for  under  the  CCM  rul~,s.  These  provisions  are 
effective  for  contracts entered  into after  February  28,  1986. 
The  percentage of  completion  method  is determined  by  comparing  total 
contract  costs  incurred  before  the  close of  t~e taxable  year  with  the  total 
estimated contract costs.  Gross  income  is  recognized  by  the  taxpayer 
according  to the  percentage of  the  contract  completed  during  each  taxable 
year,  and  costs  incurred  during  the  year  are currently deductible.  Thus,  the 
taxpayer  must  include  in gross  income  for  the  taxable year  an  amount  equal  to 
the  product  of  (i)  the  gross  contract  price  and  (ii)  the  percentage  of  the 
3  P.L.  99-514,  S  804  (enacting  new  I.R.C.  S 460). 
4  See  Staff of  Joint Committee  on  Taxation,  lOOth  Cong.,  lst Sess.,  General 
Explanation of  the  Tax  Reform  Act  of  1986  (1987). 
5  Id.  at  527. 
6  ld. 
l.R.C.  '460(a)(l). 
8  Id. - 3  -
contract  completed  during  the  year,  less  any  amounts  included  in  gross  income 
for  prior  years. 
The  Joint  Committee  estimated  that  the  changes  brought  about  in  the 
accounting  for  long-term contracts  by  the  1986  Tax  Act  would  raise 
approximately  SlO  billion of  revenue  over  the  five-year  period  from  fiscal 
1987  to  fiscal  1991.9  It was  reported  that  approximately  $1.5  billion of 
this  amount  would  be  raised  from  the  aerospace  industry.lO 
Over  the  following  three  years,  Congress  continued  to  reduce  the  tax 
deferrals available  under  the  CCM  rules.  The  Revenue  Act  of  1987  reduced  the 
revenue  deferral  benefits associated  with  the  CCM  rules  by  requiring 
contractors  to  account  for  70  percent  of  the  items  with  respect  to  a  long-
term  contract  under  the  percentage  of  completion method.11  Thus,  only  30 
percent  of  the  items  with  respect  to  a  long-term contract  could  be  accounted 
for  using  the  CCM  rules.  The  Budget  Committee  of  the House  of 
Representatives  explained  that  the  current  rules  which  allow  a  portion of  a 
long-term contract  to  be  reported  under  the  CCM  rules  permit  "an  unwarranted 
deferral of  income."12 
Congress  provided  further  limitations  on  the  CCM  rules  in  the 
Technical  and  Miscellaneous  Revenue  Act  of  1988  by  requiring contractors  to 
account  for  90  percent  of  the  items with  respect  to  a  long-term contract 
under  the  percentage of  completion  method. 13  Congress  once  again  recognized 
that  the  deferral  provided  by  CCM  does  not  provide  an  accurate  measure  of 
gross  income  over  the  course  of  a  long-term contract. 
9  Id. 
The  committee  believes  that  the  rules of 
present  law  that  permit  a  portion of  a  long-
term  contract  to  be  reported  on  the  completed 
contract  or  accrual  method  of  accounting  do 
not  accurately  measure  the  income  earned  under 
the  contract  for  any  taxable  year  because  a 
portion of  the  income  from  the  contract  may  be 
deferred until the  contract  [is)  completed  or 
the  items  produced  under  the  contract  are 
shipped or delivered.  The  committee  believes 
that  the  percentage  of  completion  method 
10  "Aerospace  Industry Overview,"  Bear,  Stearns,  & Co.  Report,  August  29, 
1986. 
11  P.L.  100-203,  S  10203. 
12  Budget  Committee  Report,  H.R.  Rep.  No.  391  (Parts  1  and  2),  lOOth  Cong., 
1st  Sess.  ( 1987). 
l3  P.L.  100-647,  S  504l(a). - 4  -
provides  a  more  accurate  measure  of  income 
earned  under  a  contract  during  any  year. 14 
The  CCM  rules  were  eliminated  by  the  Revenue  Reconciliation Act  of 
1989  ("1989  Act")  for  all but  a  limited  class of  taxpayers. 15  After  the  1989 
Act,  the  only  taxpayers  excepted  from  the  percentage  of  completion  method  are 
those  taxpayers  whose  average  gross  receipts  for  the  prior  three  taxable 
years  do  not  exceed  SlO  million. 16  As  a  result,  most  long-term contracts 
entered  into  on  or  after July  11,  1989,  must  be  accounted  for  under  the 
percentage  of  completion  method  of  accounting.l7 
2.  Tax  Benefits Realized 
Prior  to  1976,  the  CCM  rules  were  restricted to construction,  building 
and  installation contracts.  In  1976,  the  categories of eligible contracts 
were  broadened  to  include  long-term manufacturing.  This  change  enabled 
aerospace  contractors  to utilize  the  CCM  rules  and,  as  of  1985,  nearly all 
aerospace  companies  reportedly  used  the  CCM  rules  to  account  for  long-term 
contracts.18 
The  aerospace,  shipbuilding  and  construction  industries  vigorously 
opposed  repeal  of  the  CCM  rules  in  1982.  The  aerospace  industry  argued  that 
the  proposals  "could easily raise  the  cost  of  national  defense  more  than  they 
would  produce  in  added  tax  revenues"  (emphasis  in  the original)  essentially 
maintaining  that  the  tax  expenditure  was  a  more  efficient subsidy  than  direct 
payments.19  A similar  argument  was  made  in  a  July  28,  1986  letter  to  the 
Treasury  Department  by  the  CEOs  of  10  major  defense  contractors,  including 
Boeing,  McDonnell  Douglas  and  Hughes.  Treasury,  in  a  letter  from  Assistant 
Secretary  J.  Roger  Mentz  dated  April  2,  1986,  acknowledged  the  importance  of 
the  CCM  rules  to  aerospace  and certain other  industries,  and  expressed  the 
Administrat:on's  position that  the  method  should  be  retained. 
14  Ways  and  Means  Committee  Report,  H.R.  Rep.  No.  795,  lOOth  Cong.,  2d  Sess. 
(1988). 
15  P.L.  101-239,  S  7621. 
16  I.R.C.  S  460(e). 
17  I.R.C.  S  460. 
18  Statement  of  the  Aerospace  Ind~stries Association  before  the  Senate 
~inance Committee  Hearings  on  the  President's Tax  Proposals,  October  4,  1985. 
i 9.  Statement  of  John  S.  Nolan  on  behalf of  the  Aerospace  Industries 
Association  before  the  Senate  Finance  Committee  on  March  19,  1982,  at  3,  and 
before  tne  House  Ways  and  Means  Committee  Jn  April  2,  1982,  at  3  (emphasis  in 
)Cigina1). - 5  -
In  an  informal  survey of  22  aerospace  defense  contractors  conducted  by 
the  Aerospace  Industries Association  in  1982,  half  of  the  companies  reported 
that  the  deferred  tax liability attributable  to  the  CCM  rules  was  equivalent 
to  25  percent  of  the  shareholder  equity of  these  companies.20 
Boeing  has  reported  deferred  taxes attributable  to  "completed  contract 
method  and  related  inventory costs"  of:  5385  million  in  1978;  552  million  in 
1981;  Sl70  million  in  1982;  5138  million  in  1983;  $298  million  in  1984;  5248 
million  in  1985;  and  $354  million  in  1986,  for  a  total of  $1.645  billion.21 
One  can  estimate  that  these  tax deferrals,  because  of  the  time  value  of 
money,  effectively  saved  Boeing  approximately  5619.55  million of  interest 
over  the  period  1976  through  1990.  See  Exhibit  4. 
McDonnell  Douglas  in  1980  reportedly  paid  no  federal  income  tax  and 
reported  tax  deferrals of  $96.4  million  on  "earnings  from uncompleted 
contracts."22  In  subsequent  years,  McDonnell  Douglas'  Annual  Reports  to 
shareholders  show  deferred  income  tax  from  uncompleted  contracts  of 
5363.9  million  in  1978,  5130  million  in  1979,  596.4  million  in  1980; 
$139.1  million  in  1981,  5117  million  in  1982,  5132.2  million  in  1984,  $95.1 
million  in  1985,  571.2  m1llion  in  1986,  and  5136  million  in  1987,  for  a  total 
of  51,280.9  million  for  the  period  from  1978  through  1987. 23  One  can 
estimate  that  these  tax  deferrals,  because  of  the  time  value  of  money, 
effectively  saved  McDonnell  Douglas  approximately  5899.26  million of  interest 
over  the  period  1976  through  1990.  See  Exhibit  4. 
Because  of  changes  brought  about  by  the  1986  Tax  Act  and  subsequent 
limitat1ons  in  the  CCM  rules  which  resulted  in  the  eventual  elimination of 
the  completed  contract  method  for  Boeing,  McDonnell  Douglas  and  other  large 
aerospace  contractors,  these  same  companies  have  largely paid  back  those 
deferred  taxes.  In  1987,  Boeing  paid  $316  million previously  deferred  under 
the  CCM  rules,  as  well  as  5677  million  in  1988,  5213  million  in  1989,  and 
Sill million  in  1990.24  In  1988,  McDonnell  Douglas  paid  5261  million 
20  Statement  by  John  S.  Nolan  on  behalf  of  the  Aerospace  Industries 
Association before  the  Senate  Finance  Committee  on  March  19,  1982,  at  28. 
21  See  1980  Boeing  Annual  Report  at  29;  1983  Boeing  Annual  Report  at  29;  and 
1986  Boeing  Annual  Report  at  35. 
22  Washington  Post,  March  27,  1982,  at; .. A1. 
23  See  1980  McDonnell  Douglas  Annual  Report  at  34;  1983  McDonnell  Douglas 
Annual  Report  at  25;  1986  McDonnell  Douglas  Annual  Report  at  30;  1989 
McDonnell  Douglas  Annual  Report  at  37. 
2-t  1989  Boeing  Annual  Report  at  37;  1990  Boeing  Annual  Report  at  39. - 6  -
previously deferred  under  the  CCM  rules,  as  well  as  S268  million  in  1989,  and 
$207  million  in  1990.25 
This  so-called  payback,  however,  leaves  these  companies  with  a 
significant  net  tax  benefit,  for  two  reasons.  First,  the  interest  saved  on 
the  deferred  tax  payments  will  never  be  paid  back  and  thus  is  a  permanent 
financial  benefit.  The  second  benefit  results  from  the  reduction  in 
corporate  tax  rates  brought  about  by  the  1986  Tax  Act,  which  reduced  the 
. maximum  corporate  rate  from  46  percent  to  the  current  rate of  34  percent. 
That  is,  taxes  under  the  CCM  rules  were  deferred during  years  in  which  the 
statutory  rate  was  46  percent,  but  were  then  paid  back  during  years  in  which 
the  statutory rate  was  reduced  to  34  percent.  This  benefit  can  be  roughly 
estimated  as  having  been  $429  million  for  Boeing  and  S334  million  for 
McDonnell  Douglas.26 
B.  Domestic  International Sales Corporations 
and  Foreign  Sales Corporations 
1.  Domestic  International  Sales 
Corporations 
Congress  provided  significant  tax  incentives  for  exports  when  it 
created  the  domestic  international  sales corporation  ("DISC")  in  the  Revenue 
Act  of  1971.27  There  is little doubt  that  the  tax  deferral  provided  by  the 
DISC  provisions  made  export  transactions  more  profitable  than  comparable 
sales  made  within  the  u.s.28 
25  1989  McDonnell  Douglas  Annual  Report  at  37;  1990  McDonnell  Douglas  Annual 
Report  at  41. 
26  This  estimate  was  arrived at  using  the  following  method  and  assumptions: 
If  Boeing  were  paying  taxes at  the  maximum  statutory  rate  of  46  percent 
during  the  years  it  was  deferring  tax  liability under  CCM,  the  Sl.645  billion 
of  deferred  taxes  represent  $3.576  billion of  income  upon  which  tax  liability 
Nas  deferred.  If  we  assume  that  after  CCM  was  abolished  Boeing  paid  taxes  on 
this  income  at  the  new  lower  maximum  rate of  34  percent,  Boeing  saved 
12  percent  (the difference  between  the  46  percent  and  34  percent  rates)  of 
this  $3.576  billion,  or  $429  million.  The  equivalent  figures  for  McDonnell 
Douglas  are  $2.784  billion of  income  upon  which  tax  liability was  deferred 
and  a  $334  million benefit  (12  percent  o_f  $2.784  billion). 
27  See  P.L.  92-178  (adding  new  sections  991  to  997  to  the  Internal  Revenue 
:Qde  ("I.R.C.")). 
28  See  Rothkopf,  "DISC:  Qualifying  under  the  New  Export  Income  Laws: 
Advantages  and  Hazards,"  36  J.  Tax'n  130  (March  1972). - 7  -
The  DISC,  which  must  be  incorporated  under  the  laws  of  a  state or  the 
District of  Columbia,  is  exempt  from  federal  tax.29  Under  the  original  DISC 
pr6visions,  profits  of  a  DISC  were  taxed  to  the  shareholders  only  when 
distributed or  deemed  distributed  to  its shareholders.  A DISC  was  deemed  to 
have  distributed  50  percent  of  its export  profits and  100  percent  of  its 
nonexpert  profits  annually.  Federal  tax  could  be  deferred  indefinitely on 
the  remaining  50  percent  of  the  DISC's  export  profits. 
One  of  the  significant  benefits  provided  by  the  DISC  was  achieved 
through  special  intercompany  pricing  rules  which  allowed  a  substantial 
portion of  the  u.s.  profit  on  sales  from  the  U.S.  parent  corporation  to  the 
DISC  to  be  attributed  to  the  DISC.30 
a.  Tax  Reform  Act  of  1976 
The  Tax  Reform  Act  of  1976  retained  the  basic structure of  the 
original  DISC  legislation.  The  DISC  remained  a  non-taxpaying  entity and  the 
very  favorable  intercompany  pricing  rules  remained  in  place.  However,  there 
was  one  important  change  in  the  deferral provisions  which  required  the 
deferral  to  be  computed  on  an  incremental  basis.  For  taxable  years  beginning 
after  1975,  the  50  percent  deferral of  prior  law  was  available only  for 
"incremental  export  income,"  i.e.,  income  attributable  to  export  gross 
receipts  in  excess  of  67  percent  of  average  gross  receipts over  a  four-year 
moving  base  period.3l 
The  DISC  provisions  were  a  source of  controversy  between  the  United 
States  and  other  signatories  of  the  General  Agreement  on  Tariffs  and  Trade 
("GATT"),  including  members  of  the  European  Communities.  The  European 
Communities  argued  that  the  DISC  was  an  illegal export  subsidy  because  it 
essentially allowed  an  indefinite deferral  of  taxes  on  income  earned  in  the 
United  States.32 
In  1976,  a  GATT  Panel  Report  concluded  that  the  DISC  provisions  had 
some  characteristics of  an  export  subsidy,  primarily  focusing  on  the  fact 
that  the  u.s.  taxpayers  were  not  charged  interest on  the  DISC  tax 
deferrals.33  The  United  States defended  the  DISC  provisions  and  maintained 
that  the  DISC  acted  as  an  export  incentive  similar  to  provisions  adopted  by 
some  of  its  European  trading  partners. 
29  I.R.C.  S  991;  Treas.  Reg.  S 1.991-l(a). 
30  I.R.C.  S  994(a);  Treas.  Reg.  S 1.994-l(a}. 
31  P.L.  94-455,  94th  Cong.,  2d  Sess.,  90  Stat.  1520  (1976}. 
32  See  Deficit  Reduction  Act  of  1984,  Explanation  of  Provisions  Approved  by 
the  Committee  on  March  21,  1984,  98th  Ccng.,  2d  Sess.,  Vol.  I,  at  634  (Comm. 
Print  1984). 
33  Id. - 8  -
Even  though  not  conceding  that  the  DISC  provisions violated  GATT,  the 
United  States  agreed  to  the  adoption  of  the  GATT  Panel  Reports  on  the  DISC 
and  the  related  tax  practices of  some  of  its European  trading  partners, 
including  Belgium,  France  and  the  Netherlands.  The  Panel  Reports  were 
accepted,  subject  to  a  1981  GATT  Council  decision  which qualified  the 
findings  in  the  Panel  Reports.34  The  1981  GATT  Council  decision  provided 
·that,  among  other  things,  GATT  signatories are  not  required  to  tax  export 
income  attributable  to  domestic  economic  processes;  arm's-length pricing 
principles  should  be  observed  between  exporting enterprises  and  commonly 
controlled  foreign  buyers;  and  the  GATT  does  not  prohibit  measures  intended 
to  avoid  the  double  taxation of  foreign  source  income. 35 
Ensuing  debate  over  the  tax  deferral benefits  provided  by  the  DISC 
provisions  raised  the  possibility of  a  breakdown  in  the  GATT  dispute 
settlement  process,  resulting  in  the  isolation of  the  United  States over  the 
DISC  issue.  The  EC  requested  authorization  from  the  GATT  Council  to  take 
retaliatory action against  the  United  States.  To  resolve  these  problems,  the 
United  States agreed  to  propose  legislation that  would  address  the  concerns 
of  other  GATT  members  with  respect  to  the  DISC. 
b.  The  Deficit  Reduction  Act  of  1984 
Legislation was  adopted  by  Congress  as  part  of  the  Deficit Reduction 
Act  of  1984  ("1984  Tax  Act").  All  DISCs  were  deemed  to  have  terminated  on 
December  31,  1984.  Any  accumulated  tax-deferred  income  of  the  DISC  at 
December  31,  1984  was  treated as  previously  taxed  income  and  thus  exempted 
from  taxation.  As  a  result,  income  that  was  considered  to  be  tax-deferred 
income  under  the  DISC  provisions  was  permanently  exempted  from  taxation. 
Congress  created  the  Foreign  Sales  Corporation  ("FSC")  to  replace  the 
DISC  provisions.  Congress  knew,  however,  that  the  new  FSC  provisions  might 
give  rise  to  further  EC  protests: 
3 4 
35 
Id. 
Id. 
Although  it was  aware  that  the  EC  had  again 
raised  questions  about  the  GATT  compatibility 
of  certain aspects  of  [the  FSC]  proposal, 
Congress  enacted  this  legislation based  on  its 
own  assessment,  and  that  of  the 
Administration,  that  the  legislation satisfies 
GATT  rules.  In  light  of  the  considerable 
effort  required  to  replace  the  DISC  and  the 
new  burdens  placed  on  u.s.  exporters,  Congress 
expected  the Administration  to  defend 
vigorously  the  legislation against  any  GATT 
challenge  and  to  inform Congress  immediately - 9  -
of all GATT  developments  relating  to  the 
legislation.36 
The  DISC  was  not  eliminated  completely  by  the  1984  Tax  Act.  Instead, 
Congress  created  the  "interest charge  DISC,"  which  continued  the  tax  deferral 
to  U.S.  export  companies  on  limited  amounts  of export  income.37  Like  its 
predecessor,  an  interest  charge  DISC  is  a  tax-exempt  domestic  corporation, 
with operational  provisions  similar  to  those  provided  under  the  original  DISC 
provisions.  However,  the  shareholders  of  an  interest  charge  DISC  are  charged 
interest  on  the  deferred  income,  with  interest  rates  tied  to Treasury bill 
rates. 38  Interest  is  calculated  on  the  tax  that  would  otherwise  be  due  on 
the  deferred  income,  as  if  such  income  actually was  distributed  to  the  DISC 
shareholders.  In  addition,  the  tax  deferral  is only available  for  taxable 
income  not  exceeding  $10  million  of  qualified export  receipts.39  Taxable 
income  attributable  to qualified export  receipts  in excess  of  $10  million  is 
deemed  to  be  distributed  and  thus  currently taxable  to  the  shareholders.40 
2.  Foreign  Sales  Corporations 
_Congress  created  the  Foreign Sales  Corporation  ("FSC»)  as  part  of  the 
1984  Tax  Act  in  large  part  to  replace  the  DISC.  These  provisions  exempt  a 
portion of  the  FSC's  export  income  from  tax  by  treating certain  "exempt 
foreign  trade  income"  as  "foreign source  income  which  is  not  effectively 
connected  with  the  conduct  of  a  trade or  business  within  the  United 
States."41  Thus,  the  FSC  differs  from  the  DISC,  which  only  allowed  the 
deferral  of  income.  The  FSC  exempts  income  from  taxation  rather  than 
deferring  payment. 
A U.S.  corporation  is entitled to  a  100  percent  dividends-received 
deduction  for  distributions  of  earnings  and  profits attributable  to  foreign 
trade  income,  including  both  (i)  exempt  foreign  trade  income,  and 
(ii)  nonexempt  foreign  trade  income  which  is determined  under  the 
administrative pricing  rules. 42  Distributions  from  a  FSC  are  deemed  to  be 
made  first  out  of  the  FSC's  foreign  trade  income.  The  result  is  that  no 
corporate-level  tax  is  imposed  on  exempt  foreign  trade  income,  and  only  a 
36  General  Explanation  of  the  Revenue  Provisions  of  the  Deficit  Reduction 
Act  of  1984,  H.R.  4170,  98th Cong.,  2d  Sess.  at  1042  (1984). 
37  1984  Tax  Act,  S  802. 
38  I.R.C.  S  995(f). 
39  I.R.C.  S 995(b)(l). 
40  Id. 
I.R.C.  S 92l(a). 
I.R.C.  S  245(c). - 10  -
single-level  corporate  tax  (at  the  FSC  level)  is  imposed  on  nonexempt  foreign 
trade  income.  This  contrasts with  the  DISC  provisions  which  provided  for  no 
tax  to  be  levied  at  the  corporate  level. 
Only  the  "foreign trade  income"  of  a  FSC  qualifies  for  the  exemption 
from  federal  tax.~ 3  Foreign  trade  income  is defined  as  the  gross  income  of  a 
FSC  attributable  to  "foreign  trading  gross  receipts."44  Foreign  trading 
gross  receipts are  defined  as  the  gross  receipts of  a  FSC  from:  (1)  the 
sale,  exchange,  or  other  disposition of  export  property;45  (2)  the  lease  or 
rental  of  export  property  for  use  by  the  lessee  outside  the  United  States; 
(3)  services  which  are  related  and  subsidiary  to  those  transactions  described 
in  (l)  and  (2);  (4)  engineering  or  architectural services  for  construction 
projects  located  (or  proposed  for  location)  outside  the  United  States;  and 
(5)  certain managerial  services  performed  for  an  unrelated  FSC  or  DISc. 46 
Certain  income  is  specifically excluded  from  the  definition of  foreign 
trading  gross  receipts  if:  (1)  the  export  property or  services are  for 
ultimate  use  in  the  U.S.  or  for  use  by  the u.s.  government  if such  use  is 
required  by  law  or  regulation;  (2)  such  transaction  is accomplished  by  a 
subsidy;  or  (3)  such  receipts  are  from  another  FSC  which  is  a  member  of  the 
same  group of  controlled corporations. 47  Investment  income  and  carrying 
charges  are also excluded  from  the definition of  foreign  trading  gross 
receipts.-!8 
A FSC  will  be  treated  as  having  foreign  trading gross  receipts  only  if 
two  requirements  are  satisfied:  (1)  the  management  of  the  FSC  is  performed 
outside  the  United  States;  and  (2)  the  "economic  process"  with  respect  to  the 
43  I.R.C.  S  92l(a). 
44  I.R.C.  S  923(b). 
45  "Export  property,"  the  sale of  which  gives  rise  to  foreign  trading  gross 
receipts,  is  property manufactured,  produced,  grown,  or  extracted  in  the  U.S. 
other  than  by  a  FSC,  which  is  held  primarily  for  sale,  lease  or  rental  by  or 
to  a.FSC  for  direct  use,  consumption or disposition outside  the u.s.,  and  not 
more  than  50  percent  of  the  fair  market  value  of  which  is attributable  to 
imported  articles.  I.R.C.  927(a)(l).  Export  property specifically does  not 
include:  (1)  Property  leased  or  rented  by  a  FSC  for  use  by  another  member  of 
the  controlled group  of  corporations  to  which  the  FSC  belongs;  (2)  Intangible 
property;  (3)  Oil  or  gas  or  any  primary  products  thereof;  (4)  Products  whose 
export  is  restricted to  protect  the  economy;  and  (5)  Products  determined  by 
the  U.S.  President  to  be  in  short  supply.  I.R.C.  S  927(a)(2),(3). 
46  I.R.C.  S  924(a). 
47  I.R.C.  S  924(f)(l). 
4B  i.R.C.  S  924(f)(2). - 11  -
FSC  transactions  takes  place outside  the  United  States.49  The  foreign 
management  requirement  is satisfied if:  (l)  all meetings  of  the  board  of 
directors  and  of  the  shareholders  take  place outside  the  United  States; 
(2)  the  FSC's  principal  bank  account  is maintained  outside  the  United States; 
and  (3)  all dividends,  legal  and  accounting  fees,  and  the  salaries of 
officers  and  members  of  the  board  of  directors  are  disbursed  from  bank 
accounts  outside  the  United  States.so 
The  foreign  economic  process  requirement  has  two  parts,  the  first 
relating  to  the  sales portion of  the  transaction,  and  the  second  relating .to 
the  direct costs  incurred  in  connection with  the  transaction.  With  respect 
to  the  sales  portion,  an  FSC  will  not  be  considered  to earn  foreign  trading 
gross  receipts  from  a  transaction .unless  the  FSC,  or  a  person  under  contract 
with  the  FSC,  participates outside  the  United  States  in either  the 
solicitation  (other  than  advertising),  negotiation,  or  making  of  the  contract 
relating  to  the  transaction.Sl  With  respect  to direct costs,  an  FSC  will  not 
earn  foreign  trading  gross  receipts  from  a  transaction unless  the  foreign 
direct  costs  incurred  by  the  FSC  attributable  to  the  transaction  equal  or 
exceed  50  percent  of  the  total direct  costs  incurred  by  the  FSC  with  respect 
to  the  transaction. 52  There  is  also  an  alte~native test,  under  which  foreign 
direct  costs  incurred  by  the  FSC  attributable  to  any  two  of  five  enumerated 
activities  relating  to disposition of  export  property  equal  or  exceed  85 
percent  of  the  total direct  costs of  at  least  two  of  those  five  activities. 53 
The  amount  of  foreign  trading  income  which will  be  eligible  for 
exemption  from  tax  depends  on  which  pricing  rules  are  used  to determine  the 
amount  of  a  FSC's  foreign  trade  income.  If arm's-length  pricing  is  used, 
then  the  amount  of  exempt  foreign  tr~de  income  is generally  30  percent  of 
foreign  trade  income  if  the  FSC  has  a  corporate  shareholder. 54  If  the  income 
earned  by  the  FSC  is  determined  under  the  administrative pricing  rules,  then 
the  amount  of  exempt  foreign  trade  income  is generally  15/23  of  the  foreign 
trade  income  if  the  FSC  has  a  corporate  shareholder,  subject  to  certain 
limitations  and  qualifications.ss 
Some  have  questioned  whether  the  tax  savings  are  worth  the 
administrative  burdens  of  qualifying  a  corporation as  a  FSC,  especially 
49  I.R.C.  s  924(b) ( l). 
so  I.R.C.  s  924(c). 
51  I.R.C.  §  924(d)(l)(A). 
52  I.R.C.  §  924(d)(l)(B). 
53  I .R.C.  §  924(d)(2). 
54  I .R. C.  ss  923(a)(2)  and  29l(a)(4). 
55  I.R.C.  §§  923(a)(3)  and  29l(a)(4). - 12  -
considering  that  the  1986  Tax  Act  reduced  the  highest  marginal  tax  rates  from 
46  percent  to  34  percent.56  In  particular,  companies  with  "excess  foreign 
tax  credits"  may  no  longer  receive  benefit  from  use  of  an  FSC. 
3.  Benefits  Derived  from  Use  of  DISCs 
and  FSCs 
The  DISC  and  FSC  provisions  have  benefited  those  companies  engaged  in 
significant exporting,  including  aerospace  companies.  The  Aerospace 
Industries  Association  of  America  wrote  a  letter on  January  30,  1984  to 
Senator  Robert  Dole,  then  chairman  of  the  Senate  Finance  Committee,  which 
st~ted that  the  industry's  total  exports  reached  Sl7.3 billion  in  1983.  The 
letter  further  observed  that  "the  continuing ability of  the  U.S.  aerospace 
industry  to contribute  a  large  trade  surplus  to  the  total  U.S.  balance  of 
trade will  depend  on  the  industry's ability  to effectively counter  the 
growing  competitive  strength of  foreign  aerospace  producers." 
The  amount  of  tax  liability forgiven  on  accumulated  DISC  income  by  the 
1984  Tax  Act  was  estimated at  between  $10  and  $14  billion for  all  industries. 
A  report  prepared  by  the staff  of  Senator  Howard  Metzenbaum  estimated  the 
U.S.  tax  deferral  on  DISC  income  at  S13.6  billion.  The  report  attributed 
more  than  $3  billion of  this  amount  to  ten corporations,  including  Boeing  and 
McDonnell  Douglas.  A contemporaneous  press  report  quoted  a  Senate aide as 
stating  that  "in absolute  terms,  Boeing  and  McDonnell  Douglas  would  be  among 
the  principal  beneficiaries of  the  forgiveness  because  of  their  large 
accumulated  deferrals."57 
On  July  14,  1984  an  editorial  in  the  New  York  Times  criticized  the 
1984  Tax  Act  for  failing  to  reduce  the  federal  deficit.  Referring  to  the  tax 
forgiveness  of  accumulated  DISC  income,  the editorial stated  that  the "bill's 
greatest generosity  is  to  companies  with  large export  sales,"  naming  Boeing 
and  McDonnell  Douglas,  among  others. 
In  its  1984  Annual  Report  to  Shareholders,  Boeing  stated  the  extent  of 
its deferred  tax  liability on  DISC  income  as  $397  million.  1984  Boeing 
Annual  Report  at  26.  McDonnell  Douglas'  Annual  Report  disclosed  that  its 
accumulated  deferred  DISC  income  was  $323.2  million.  1983  McDonnell  Douglas 
Annuar Report  at  24.  McDonnell  Douglas'  1984  Annual  Report  does  not  disclose 
the  total  DISC  forgiveness  from  which  the  company  benefited,  although  the 
total  forgiveness  can  be  estimated  as  having  been  approximately 
Sl48  million.sa 
56  P.L.  99-514,  S  60l(a). 
57  Aviation  Week  & Space  Technology,  July  2,  1984,  at  25. 
58  This  estimate  was  arrived at  by  multiplying  the  SJ23.2  million of 
deferred  DISC  income  by  the  maximum  statutory marginal  tax  rate  of  46%. - 13  -
As  for  the  FSC,  in  Boeing's  Annual  Reports  and  SEC  filings,  Boeing 
disclosed  that  it has  derived  benefits  from  the  FSC  provisions  0f  $35  million 
in  1985,  S49  million  in  1986,  $22  million  in  1987,  $35  million  in  1988,  $44 
million  in  1989,  and  $97  million  in  1990  for  a  total of  $282  million.59 
McDonnell  Douglas  disclosed  in  its 1986  Annual  Report  that  it  had 
"export  tax-exempt  income"  of  $18.9  million  in  1985  and  $9.3  million  in  1986. 
1986  McDonnell  Douglas  Annual  Report  at  30.  In  subsequent  years,  the  Annual 
Reports  showed  export  tax-exempt  income  of  $9  million  for  1987,  $9  million 
for  1988,  $26  million for  1989,  and  sa  million  for  1990,  for  a  total of  $80.2 
mill.ion  for  the  period  1985  through  1990.6° 
59  1986  Boeing  Annual  Report  at  35;  1989  Boeing  Annual  Report  at  39;  1990 
Boeing  Annual  Report  at  39. 
60  We  have  assumed  that  export  tax-exempt  income  refers  to  the  FSC  tax 
benefit  in  such  years,  since  from  earlier  Annual  Reports  it  is clear  that  the 
term  export  tax-exempt  income  for  years  before  1984  referred  to  DISC  tax-
exempt  income.  Compare  1983  McDonnell  Douglas  Annual  Report  at  24  with  1985 
McDonnell  Douglas  Annual  Report  at  30. APPENDIX  0 
USE  OF  GOVERNMENT  FACILITIES 
A.  Historical  Background 
The  impetus  for  the  establishment  of u.s.  government  aeronautic 
testing,  research  and  development  facilities occurred at  the  beginning of 
World  War  II when  it became  evident  that  a  rapid  expansion of  the  aircraft 
industry  was  required.  Initially,  the  u.s.  government  offered special 
incentives and  a  variety of  economic  concessions  to the  industry,  such as 
rapid depreciation  schemes  allowing  companies  to  amortize  newly  constructed 
plants  over  the  space  of  five  years,  as  compared  to  the  normal  20- or  30-year 
period.  However,  incentives  and  concessions  did  not  sufficiently encourage 
the  construction of much-needed  large aircraft factories.  These  were 
eventually built at public expense  and  leased  to  the  companies.  After  the 
war,  the aircraft  business  decreased  and  the  U.S.  government  was  unable  to 
convince  companies  to purchase  these  factories.  As  a  result,  companies  such 
as  General  Dynamics  and  Lockheed still continue  to  lease factories  from  the 
government,  thereby  avoiding  the  fixed  cost  of  owning  a  large  facility,  as 
Nell  as  certain state property  taxes. 
Today,  the  most  important  government-owned  facilities  utilized  by  the 
aircraft  industry  are  operated  by  NASA  and  the Air  Force  and  these  facilities 
are  examined  below. 1  These  facilities -- which  include  wind  tunne:s, 
propuls1on  laboratories  and  supercomputers -- provide  a  broad  range  of 
testing  and  research  and  development  capabilities.  As  of  1985,  the 
replacement  value  of  NASA  and  Department  of  Defense  facilities alone  was 
estimated  to  be  SlO  billion.2 
B.  NASA  Facilities 
NASA's  aeronautical  research facilities-- including  wind  tunnels, 
simulators  and  advanced  computing  facilities -- have  been described  by  NASA 
as  "unique  national assets."]  Indeed,  the  Chairman  of  the  House  Subcommittee 
on  Transportation,  Aviation  and  Materials  has  credited  those  facilities with 
"prov1d[ing]  the  foundation  for  America's  traditionally  strongest  industry, 
building airplanes."4 
1  In  addition,  the  Navy,  Army,  and  Departments  of  Energy,  Commerce, 
and  Transportation,  also maintain  federal  aeronautics facilities. 
Federal  Laboratory  and  Technology  Resources,  U.S.  Department  of 
Commerce  (1990). 
2  The  Competitive  Status of  the  U.S.  Civil  Aviation  Manufacturing 
Industry  117  (1985). 
3  NASA  Aeronautics,  1991. 
Cong.  Rec.  2194  (May  i3,  1982)  (Stateme~t of  Rep.  Glickman). - 2  -
As  of  1982,  NASA  maintained  42  major  aeronautical  research facilities 
among  its centers,  valued  at  approximately  S4  billion.5  As  of  1985,  fourteen 
of  those  facilities  had  no  equal  worldwide  in  size and/or  speed  in meeting 
user  requirements.6  Indeed,  the  AIAA  has  said  that  "NASA's  19  wind  tunnels 
underpin U.S.  competitiveness  in civil aeronautics."? 
NASA's  wind  tunnels  alone  are  valued  at  several billion dollars.  NASA 
Aeronautics,  1991.  The  value of  these  wind  tunnels  is  further  evidenced  by 
the  1989  NASA  Major  Wind  Tunnel  Revitalization Program,  to  be  completed  in 
1993  for  approximately  $300  million.  The  wind  tunnel  program  will  replace 
the  structural shell  and  refurbish  the  test  section and  equipment  of  the  Ames 
pressure  wind  tunnel;  rehabilitate motors  and critical equipment  for  the 
Lewis  supersonic  tunnel;  and  modernize  nozzles,  heaters,  and  controls  for  the 
hypersonic  facilities  complex at  Langley. 8 
In addition  to  supporting  the  work  of  NASA,  these  facilities  support 
research  and  development  being  undertaken  by  the  aerospace  industry and  other 
Government  agencies,  including  the  Federal  Aviation Administration  (FAA},  the 
Departmen~ of  Defense  (DoD),  and  the  Department  of  Energy  (DoE). 9 
NASA's  aeronautics  research  and  testing  (R&T)  programs  are  primarily 
conducted at  three  research  centers:  the  Ames  Research  Center  located  in 
Moffett  F;eld  and  Edwards,  California;  the  Lewis  Research Center  in 
Cleveland,  Ohio;  and  the  Langley  Research  Center  in Hampton,  Virginia.  Each 
center  conducts  research  in close coordination with  other  government  research 
organizations,  universities  and  industry.  In  practice,  the  centers  conduct 
four  ge~eral  t;pes  of  testing:lO 
NASA  Jnly  -- NASA  sponsored  projects. 
NASA-industry  -- Projects  conducted  jointly by 
NASA  and  industry.  Although  each_project  is negotiated  on  a  case-by-
case  basis,  several  generalizations  can  be  made: 
5  J.  Langford£  Federal  Investment  in  Aeronautical  Research  & 
Development:  Analyzing  the  NASA  Experience,  at  28-29  (MIT  Doctoral 
Dissertation,  June  1987). 
6  Aeronautical  Facilities Catalogue,  Volume  1,  NASA,  January  1985. 
7  Aerospace  America,  February  1988. 
8  1991  NASA  Authorization Hearings,  March  20,  1990  at  27;  Aviation 
~e~~ ~~Qace Technology,  October  8,  1990;  NASA  Aeronautics,  1991. 
9  ~ASA Aeronautics,  1991. 
1 _,  :nformation  from  NASA. 0 
0 
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NASA  typically  pays  both  variable  and  fixed  costs  associated 
with  the  project.  NASA's  contribution  is  funded  through  its 
budget.  NASA  normally  provides  at  its expense  the  testing 
facilities,  engineering capability,  and  power/electricity  to 
support  the  project;  the  industry partner  pays  only  for  the 
hardware  or  model  to  be  tested. 
There  is  no  exchange  of  funds  between  NASA  and  the  industry 
partner  in  these  cooperative  programs,  regardless  of  whether 
their  objectives  are  commercial  or  military applications. 
NASA-government  -- Projects  conducted  by  NASA  and 
DoD,  including  testing  by  commercial  entities  under  DoD-sponsored 
projects. 
Industry only -- Projects  that  involve  the  use  of 
a  NASA  facility  by  a  private  company  for  research  or  testing,  where 
the  data  generated  by  the  projects are  held  as  proprietary  information 
by  the  user  company.  NASA  officials stated  that all direct  and 
indirect  costs associated  with  the  project  are  borne  by  ~he user 
~ampany.  NASA  officials also  say  that  NASA  facilities  are  used 
:~frequently for  this  purpose,  because  a  heavy  fee  is charged  to  the 
user  company. 
Of  these  four  types  of  users  of  NASA  test facilities,  it  is  the 
second  -- joint  NASA-industry  projects -- that  readily  appears  to  involve 
benefits  to  private  industry.  In  such  projects,  private compan1es  a~e 
essentially  being  allowed  to  use  extremely  valuable  test  facilities  tor  free. 
The  projects  are  ones  which  necessarily concern  issues  of  interest  to  NASA, 
but  given  NASA's  broad  involvement  in civil aviation,  the  project  may  still 
be  of  direct  commercial  significance  to  the  companies. 
The  results  of  such  joint projects  may  be  published  by  NASA,  but  it  is 
not  known  what  percentage  of  commercially significant  results are  in  fact 
published.  In addition,  NASA  may  sometimes  agree  not  to  release  data  for 
some  period,  usually  not  more  than  12  months,  after  the  testing  has  been 
completed. 
Three  of  NASA's  major  aeronautics  R&T  facilities  are  described  below. 
1.  Ames  Research Center 
a.  Description of  Facility 
The  Ames  Research  Center  has  facilities  valued  at  approximately 
$3  billion  and  includes  a  facility  in  Moffett,  California  (Ames-Moffett)  as 
well as  ~he Dryden  Flight  Research Center  (Ames-Dryden). 11  :n additicn  to 
maintaining  the  world's  largest  network  of  wind  tunnels,  ~alued at 
ll  Aviation  Week  & Space  Technology,  June  24,  1991,  at  45. - 4  -
Sl  billion,  the  Ames  Research  Center  has  a  number  of  unique  capabilities 
ranging  from  aerodynamic  testing  and  flight  simulation,  to  human  factor 
research,  to  computer  and  supercomputer  technology  available  through 
numerical  aerodynamic  simulation.12  Ames-Dryden's  extensive  flight  test 
research  capability complements  the  Ames-Moffett  ground  test  capability.  Key 
systems  technology  areas  at  the  two  centers  include:  propulsion/airframe 
integration,  powered  lift technology,  and  rotorcraft  aeromechanics. 
All  of  these  facilities  and  capabilities are available  to  and  utilized 
by  the  aircraft  industry  for  both military  and  commercial  applications. 13 
Nearly  every  important  aircraft  developed  in  recent  years  has  been  tested  in 
the  wind  tunnels  at  Ames.  The  results  of  future  research  on  High  Speed Civil 
Transport  (HSCT),  the  National  Aerospace  Plane  (NASP),  and  other  new 
commercial  aircraft will  be  tested  at  Ames. 14 
Projects  conducted  at  Ames-Dryden  have  led  to  major  advances  in  many 
military  and  civil aircraft.  For  example,  during  the  1970s,  an  F-8  aircraft 
was  modified  at  Ames-Dryden  with  an  all-electric flight  control  system  from 
which  developed  the digital  fly-by-wire  concept  now  used  on  both  military and 
commercial  aircraft.l5  In  addition,  an  F-B  was  also  used  in  the  1970s  to 
12  Aerospace  America,  October  1990;  Aviation  Week  & Space 
Technology,  June  24,  1991,  at  45. 
13  According  to  the Office of  Science  and  Technology,  the 
utilization percentage  of  A~es Research Center  facilities  by  civil, 
military,  and  NASA  entities  is  as  follows: 
14 
15 
Percentage  of  Use  for: 
Civil  Military  NASA 
Facility  Purposes  Purposes  Purposes 
12'  Pressure  Tunnel  lB\  32\  50\ 
Flight  Simulator  for 
Advanced  Aircraft  10  55  35 
Vertical  Motion  Simulator  25  15  60 
J.  Langford,  Federal  Investment  in  Aeronautical  Research 
and  Development:  Analyzing  the  NASA  Experience,  at  29. 
It is  not  clear  from  this publicationwhether  "NASA 
purposes"  includes  joint  NASA-civil  use  of  the 
facilities. 
Aviation  Week  & Space  Technology,  October  8,  1990,  at  71. 
NASA  Facts,  NASA,  January  1991,  at  2. - 5  -
test  a  new  airfoil called  a  supercritical  wing,  which  is  now  widely  used  on 
both  military  and  commercial  aircraft.l6 
Ames'  state-of-the-art  supercomputer  complex -- known  as  the  Numerical 
Aerodynamic  Simulation  System  (NAS)  -- is  used  in  computational  fluid 
dynami~s and  is  considered  a  "national asset."17  The  NAS  has  been  and 
continues  to  be  used  to  pioneer  new  developments  over  a  broad  range  of 
aerospace  applications  including  structural  mechanics,  aeroelasticity, 
turbo-machinery,  rotorcraft  and  powered  lift modeling,  as  well  as  for 
development  of  the  NASP.  The  NAS  is  used  by  the  aerospace  industry, 
universities  and  federal  agencies.  The  selection criteria for  use  of  the 
computer  complex  include  national  need,  how  timely  the  proposed  project  is, 
and  the  technical  quality of  the  project.l8 
b ..  Description  of  Benefit 
As  with  other  NASA  facilities,  private  companies  are  charged  a  fee  for 
tests  they  conduct  at  the  Ames  facilities  that  are  not  performed  in 
conjunction with  a  government  agency.  Fees  ~or  standard  tests  conducted  by 
private  companies  at  Ames'  facilities are  roughly  between  53,000  and  $4,000 
per  hour. 19  For  example,  at  the  end  of  1990,  Boeing  tested  its  767-X  model 
in  Ames'  facilities at  a  price  of  $750,000  for  four  weeks  of  testing. 
2.  Lewis  Research  Center 
a.  Description of Facility 
The  primary  focus  of  the  Lewis  Research  Center's  facilities  and 
capabilities  is  propulsion,  including  aeropropulsion,  jet  propulsion,  space 
propulsion,  space  power,  and  space  science/applications.  Lewis' 
aeropropulsion  facilities  are  particularly  relevant  to  the  development  of 
U.S.  civil  and  military aircraft.20 
16  Id. 
17  Aerospace  America,  October  1990. 
18  Id. 
19  Information  from  NASA. 
20  NASA  Aeronautics,  1991.  According  to  the  Office  of  Science  and 
Technology,  the  utilization of  Lewis  facilities  by  civil,  military 
and  NASA  entities  is  as  follows: 
Percentage  of  Use  for: 
Civil  Military  NASA 
Purposes  Purposes  Purposes 
(Footnote  continued  on  next  page] - 6  -
Several  collaborative  government  and  industry  projects  have  been 
undertaken  which  have  directly benefited  the  commercial  aircraft  sector.  An 
example  of  such  a  project  is  the  1987  joint effort  of  NASA-Lewis  and  a  NASA/ 
industry  team  working  on  advanced  turbopro~ propulsion as  part  of  the 
Aircraft  Energy  Efficient  (ACEE)  Program. 2  Flight  tests  and  wind  tunnel 
testing of  scale  models  helped  Boeing  and  McDonnell  Douglas  design  the 
turboprop  for  future  aircraft  in  the  100-150  passenger  class.22 
b.  Description of  Benefit 
As  noted  above,  private  industry  does  not  pay  NASA  for  the  use  of  its 
facilities  where,  as  with  the  ACEE  program,  the  tests are  performed  as  part 
of  a  joint  NASA-industry  project.  The  ability to  use  NASA  facilities  without 
charge  on  joint projects with  the  U.S.  government  clearly confers  a  benefit 
on  the  U.S.  industry.  When  private  companies  use  the  facilities  on  their 
own,  they  pay  a  fee.  Although  there  is not  a  set  fee  schedule  for  the  use  of 
Lewis'  major  facilities  by  private  industry,  NASA  provides  the  following 
rough  order  of  magnitude  for  test costs,  which  do  not  include  the  cost  of 
test-specific  equipment: 23 
[Footnote  continued  from  previous  page] 
21 
22 
23 
High  Pressure/Temp 
Facility  0%  0%  100% 
8  x  6  Trans/Supersonic 
Tunnel  55  0  45 
Icing  Research  Tunnel  28  30  42 
. 
J.  Langford,  Federal  Investment  in  Aeronautical  Research 
and  Development:  Analyzing  the  NASA  Experience,  at  29. 
It  is  not  clear  from  this publication whether  "NASA 
purposes"  includes  joint  NASA-civil  use  of  the 
facil1ties. 
Aerospace  America,  October  1988,  at  14-15. 
~d. 
Aerapropulsion  Facilities and  Experiments  Division,_NASA  Lewis 
Research  ~enter  (undated). - 7  -
Facility  Cost  (per  week) 
10'  x  10'  Wind  Tunnel  s  160,000 
8'  x  6'  Wind  Tunnel  80,000 
9'  x  15'  Wind  Tunnel  55,000 
Propulsion  Systems  Lab  (PSL)  200,000 
Icing  Research  Tunnel  40,000 
3.  Langley  Research  Center 
a.  Description of  Facility 
The  Langley  Research  Center  specializes  in  fundamental  aerodynamics 
and  fluid  dynamics,  computer  science,  unsteady  aerodynamics,  and 
aeroelasticity.  Aerodynamic  testing  to  support  the  research  in  each  of  these 
areas  ~s  a  major  focus  of  the  Center.  In  addition,  the  Center  is  a  leader  in 
structures  and  materials  research  with  a  primary  focus  on  the  development  and 
validation of  structural analysis  methods  and  research  in  airframe  metallic 
and  composite materials.  The  Center  also  conducts  fundamental  research  on 
fault  tolerant  electronic  systems  and  flight  control.24  A number  of  Langley 
facilities are  used  for  both civil and  military applications.25 
24  NASA  Aeronautics,  1991. 
25  According  to  the Office  of  Science  and  Technology,  the 
utilization of  Langley  facilities  by  civil,  military and  NASA 
entities  is  as  follows: 
Percentage  of  Use  for: 
Civfl 
Facility  Purposes 
.3M  Cryogenic  Transonic 
Tunnel  40% 
National  Transonic 
Facility  40 
Transonic  Dynamic  Tunnel  7 
Spin  Tunnel  30 
B'  Hlgh  Temp  Structure 
Military  NASA 
Purposes  Purposes 
0%  60% 
40  20 
45  48 
13  57 
[Footnote  continued  on  next  page] - 8  -
Langley  has  been  involved  in  several government/industry  projects 
aimed  at  developing  commercial  applications  for  the  aircraft  industry.  For 
example,  in  1990,  a  joint  government-industry  program,  which  included  the  Air 
Force's  Wright  Research  and  Development  Center,  NASA-Langley,  and  Boeing's 
Commercial  Airplane  Group,  modified  and  tested  a  wing-suction device  designed 
to  produce  laminar  air  flow  over  a  wing  to  reduce  airplane  drag  by  10  percent 
or  more.  This  program  modified  22  feet  of  the  left  wing  of  a  Boeing  757 
jetliner with  a  titanium  leading  edge  skin  penetrated  by  roughly  19  million 
tiny  holes  drilled with  a  laser.26  As  a  result  of  this  program,  Boeing 
proved  that  it could  manufacture  a  sufficiently  smooth,  permeable  wing 
structure at  a  reasonable  cost.  Each  percentage  point  of  drag  eliminated  by 
the  U.S.  transport  fleet  represents  an  estimated  savings  in  fuel  costs  to  the 
U.S.  airline  industry of  SlOO  million  annually. 27  Such  fuel  savings  benefit 
Boeing  by  making  its aircraft  more  competitive  in  the  marketplace.  Moreover, 
because  this  was  a  joint  industry-government  project,  Boeing  presumably  did 
not  pay  for  the  use  of  Langley's  facilities. 
b.  Description of  Benefits 
Listed  below are  the  charges  to  private  companies  for  the  use  of 
several  of  Langley's  facilities: 2B 
[Footnote  continued  from  previous  page] 
26 
27 
28 
8'  High  Temp  Structure 
Tunnel  0  10  90 
Impact  Dynamic  Facility  10  20  70 
Landing  Loads  & Traction 
Facility  10  45  45 
Aircraft  Noise  Reduction 
Lab  30  0  70 
J.  Langford,  Federal  Investment  in Aeronautical  Research 
& Development:  Analvzing  the  NASA  Experience,  at  29. 
It  is  not  clear  from  this publication whether  "NASA 
purposes"  includes  joint  NASA-civil  use  of  the 
facilities. 
Aviation  Daily,  August  24,  1990,  at  360. 
:j, 
Intarmation  from  NASA. - 9  -
Facility  Cost  (per  week) 
14'  x  22'  Subsonic  Windtunnel  S  56,788 
16'  Transonic  Windtunnel  66,240 
Unitary  Plan  Windtunnel  53,827 
C.  Air  Force  Facilities 
The  U.S.  Air  Force  maintains  numerous  aeronautic  test  facilities 
including  the  Wright  Research  Laboratory,  Air  Force  Flight Test  Center, 
Design  and  Analysis  Branch,  Flight  Dynamics  Laboratory,  Propulsion  Wind 
Tunnel  Facility,  and  Von  Karman  Gas  Dynamics  Facility.  These  facilities,  and 
in  particular,  Wiight  Research  Laboratory  and  the  Air  Force  Flight  Test 
Center,  conduct  research  and  testing  in conjunction  with  private  industry.29 
Private  companies  use  these  facilities normally  only  as  part  of  a 
DoD-spon~ored project.  In  such  situations·the facility may  be  prcvided  to 
the  contractor  at  no  charge,  as  part  of  the  government's  contribution  to  the 
project.  To  the  extent  that  DoD-sponsored  R&D  projects  involve  commercially 
relevant  work  for  private  companies,  those  companies  are  deriv;ng  a  benefit 
from  the  free  use  of  the  military  test  facilities. 
Two  of  the  u.s.  Air  Force's  test  facilities are  described  below: 
1.  Wright  Research  Laboratory 
a.  Description of  Facility 
Wright  Research  Laboratory  is  made  up  of  the  Aerospace  Structures 
Information  and  Analysis  Center  (ASIAC)  and  the  Flight  Dynamics  Laboratory. 
Its functional  areas  include all  facets  of  aerospace structural  design  and 
analysis,  and  structures and  dynamics.30  Wright  Research Laboratory  recently 
worked  in  conjunction with  Boeing  and  NASA  on  the  Boeing  757  to  produce 
laminar  air  flow  over  the wings. 
b.  Description of  Benefits 
The  Wright  Research  Laboratory  can  only  be  used  by  the  U.S.  aircraft 
industry  in conjunction with  a  federal  partner.  In  these projects  -- which 
are called cooperative  research  and  development  agreements  (CRDAsJ  -- the 
federal  partner  provides  personnel,  services,  facilities  and  equipment  while 
29  Fede~al Laboratory  and  Technology  Resources,  u.s.  Departme~t of 
Comme:ce,  :990. 
30  Federal  Laboratory  and  Technology  Resources,  J.S.  Department  ~f 
Commerce,  1990. - 10  -
the  industry partner  contributes  its  resources  as  well  as  funding.  Wright 
apparently  does  not  provide  funding  for  CRDAs. 31 
2.  Air  Force  Test  Flight  Center 
a.  Description of  Facility 
The  Air  Force  Test  Flight Center  at  Edwards  Air  Force  Base  conducts 
and  supports  tests of  manned  and  unmanned  aerospace  vehicles  and  conducts 
flight  evaluations  and  recovery  of  research.  The  center  is  known  worldwide 
for  its  unique  ability  to  conduct  aerodynamic  tests  on  current  and  future 
aircraft  that  will  serve  the  United  States.  Since  the  early  1980s,  the  Air 
Force  Flight  Test  Center  has  experienced  a  steady  increase  in  test  and 
support  activity.  Federal  funds  were  recently allocated  to correct  severe 
problems  with  the Center's  infrastructure.32 
The  Air  Force  Flight Test  Center  is utilized  by  the  aircraft  industry 
for  civil and  military projects.  For  example,  the  U.S.  Air  Force/McDonnell 
Douglas  C-17  transport  is  scheduled  to  begin  flight  testing  sometime  during 
1991  or  1992.  Indeed,  a  new  facility was  built  at  Edwards  fer  aerial 
delivery  evaluations.  The  C-17  Combined  Test  Force  tCTF)  expects  to  have 
five  atrcraft  at  Edwards  by  February  1992  and  to  have  between  900  and  1000 
people  housed  in  upgraded  facilities  by  June  1992.  The  CTF  will  be 
conducting  a  multiservice  test  program  because  the  U.S.  Army  will  be  the 
C-17's  biggest  customer. 33  At  this  time,  it is  unclear  whether  the  C-17  will 
have  future  comme~cial applications. 
b.  Description of  Benefits 
In  order  for  the  aircraft  industry  to utilize the  Air  Force  Flight 
Test  Center,  a  company  must  have  a·  DoD  sponsor.  Depending  on  the  particular 
project,  the  Air  Force  Flight Test  Center's contribution  to  the  project 
includes  labor,  facilities,  expertise,  and  fue1. 34 
D.  Changing  Role  of  Government-Owned  Facilities 
Although  many  government-owned  facilities  were  originally built  at 
public  expense  and  leased to aircraft  companies,  the  role of  these  facilities 
with  regard  to  industry  has  evolved  into a  more  collaborative  relationship. 
Through  programs  such  as  NASP,  a  process  called  "mainlining"  has  developed  in 
which  government  laboratories  and  research centers  accept  responsibility  for 
pieces  of  work  related  to  the  main  development  path of  the  program. 
31  Information  from  DoD. 
32  Avia~~~~~ek & Space  Technology,  February  4,  1991. 
33  Id. 
34  Information  from  DoD. - ll -
Mainlining  brings  the  government-run  facilities  into  positions  often  played 
by  contract  research  laboratories or  subcontractors.  This  allows  the  program 
officials  to consolidate  the  skills  needed  in  the  program.  In  addition,  it 
permits  a  clear  line of  res~onsibility and  accountability  for  every  item 
developed  under  the  effort.  5 
This  new  role  for  researchers  and  technicians  at  government  facilities 
will  further  integrate  the  capabilities and  resources  of  government-funded 
efforts  with  industry  initiatives,  thereby  increasing  the  benefits  to 
industry  from  these centers. 
35  Aviaticn  Week  &  Space  Techno~:~· October  29,  1990. DEPARTMENT  OF  DEFENSE 
AERONAUTICS  RESEARCH  AND  DEVELOPMENT 
Fiscal  Years  1976-1989 
Year 
BUDGET  AUTHORITY 
1976 
Tr.  Qtr. 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
TOTAL  1976-1989 
OUTLAYS* 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
TOTAL  1982-1989 
$  (millions) 
i 
1,941 
480 
2,256 
2,807 
2,240 
2,336 
2,653 
2,984 
3,221 
3,224 
3,422 
4,927 
4,179 
5,223 
5.063 
4619:!§ 
2,657 
2,920 
2,995 
3,101 
4,373 
4,182 
4,656 
4.896 
$  29,780 
EXHIB:'!'  1 
SOURCE:  Aerospace  Facts  and  Figures  90-91  110  (1990) 
*  Fiqures  for outlays are  not  available for years prior 
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t-> 1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
Total 
NASA  AERONAUTICS  BUDGET  1976- 1990 
(in millions) 
Total  NASA  Aeronautics  % 
Budget  Budget 
$  3,550.3  $  324.9 
3,817.8  377.6 
4,060.1  437. 2 
4,595. 5  565.1 
5,240.2  559.8 
5,518.4  526.0 
6,043.9  516.3 
6,875.3  547.4 
7,248.0  599.7 
7,572.6  647.7 
7,766.0  601.0 
10,507.0  698.0 
9,025.8  723. 4 
10,969.0  871.5 
l3. 073.4  931.8 
105,863.3  8,927.4 
EXHIBIT  3 
of  To~al 
Budge~ 
\  9.2 
9.9 
10.8 
12.3 
10. 7 
9.5 
8.5 
8.0 
8 . 3 
8.6 
7.7 
6.6 
8.0 
7.9 
_L_l 
8.4 
Source :  The  Aeronautic• and  Space Report  of the 
Preaident,  1976-1990,  Appendices  El  (Space 
Activiti ea ot the U.S.  Gove rnment)  and  E3 
(Aeronautic•  Budget  for  NASA) . Boeing 
FSC 
permanent 
tax 
deferral 
1990  $97.00 
1989  44.00 
1988  35.00 
1987  22.00 
1986  49.00 
1985  35.00 
1984 
1983 
1982 
1981 
1980 
1979 
1978 
1977 
1976 
Totals:  $282.00 
MeDonnell  Pouglat 
FSC 
permanent 
tax 
deferral 
1990  $8.00 
1989  26.00 
1988  9.00 
1987  9.00 
1986  9.30 
1985  18.90 
1984 
1983 
1982 
1981 
1980 . 
1979 
1978 
1977 
1976 
Totalt  $80.20 
EXHIBIT  4-
Summary  of  Eltimattd Tax  Btntfitt 
{All  figurtt  are  in milliont) 
CCM 
DISC  CCM  lowered 
tax  interest on  rate on  Total 
liability  deferred  deferred  Benefits 
forgiven  paymentl1  payments  By  Year 
$97.00 
44.00 
35.00 
.  $429 .oo  451.00 
$119.45  168.45 
113.91  148.91 
$397.00  89.11  486.11 
94.90  94.90 
91.02  91.02 
34.21  34.21 
27.97  27.97 
22.02  22.02 
26.96  26.96  - o.oo  o.oo 
o.oo  o.oo 
$397.00  $619.55  $429.00  $1727.55 
CCM 
DISC  CCM  lowered 
tax  interett on  rate on  Total 
liability  deferred  deferred  Btntfitl 
forc;iven2  paymentl1  payment•  By  Year 
$8.00 
26.00 
9.00 
$99.67  $334.00  442.67 
88.79  98.09 
103.87  122.77 
$148.67  94.36  243.03 
129.82  129.82 
169.28  169.28 
87.53  87.53 
70.84  70.84 
29.63  29.63 
25.4~  25.47 
0.00  o.oo 
o.c,  0.00 
SHB.67  $899.:6  SJH.OO  $1462.13 - 2  -
1  calculated ae  intereet earned  on  a  one-year  ~•terral at  the  following  ra~es: 
1987  8\ 
1986  8\ 
1985  10\ 
1984  10\ 
1983  16\ 
1982  20\ 
1981  12\ 
1980  12\ 
1979  6\ 
1978  7\ 
2  Thie  tiqure ie  an  eetimate  ~•rived by  multiplying McDonnell  Douglas'  5323.2 
million of  accumulated  deferred  DISC  income  by  the maximum  sta~utory eorpora:E 
tax  rate  for  1984  of  46\. 